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Putting the People Back into 
the Fourth Amendment 
Ronald J. Bacigal* 
An Unresolved Fabl,e of Heroes and Villains 
Once upon a time, a democratic people actively participated in a 
communal process for resolving conflicts between individual liberty 
and collective security. Over the course of several centuries, a coun-
cil of regents seized power from the people and assumed final con-
trol over society's regulation of liberty and security. Some of the 
people viewed the regents as usurpers of their right to self-determi-
nation-evil tyrants who imposed their arbitrary will without tether-
ing it to the popular will. Others welcomed the regents as wise and 
benevolent sentinels against a hastily formed popular consensus, 
which might threaten the autonomy of unpopular minorities or in-
dividuals. Because they were a law-abiding people, both factions 
shunned armed conflict and enlisted scholars to carry their ban-
ners. The end of the fable is being written, not on the ramparts, but 
in the law journals. 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. The author expresses his appreciation 
to Professor Paul Zwier who commented on an earlier draft of this Article. As this Article 
was in galleys, Professor Akhil Amar published Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. 
L. REv. 757 (1994). The article proposes replacing the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule with damages awarded by civil juries. He refers to my previous "intriguing efforts to 
integrate juries into an exclusionary rule scheme," id. at 818 n.229, but rejects such tinker-
ing with the existing system and insists that his "package of criticisms and alternatives is 
offered as a whole," id. at 761 n.5. He is particularly scornful of "liberals" who "might be 
tempted to beef up both civil remedies and exclusion." Id. With all respect to Professor 
Amar, I decline his invitation to accept his "package as a whole." I fear that his proposal 
would gut the Fourth Amendment as we know it. See Carol Steiker, Second Thoughts About 
First Principles, 107 HARv. L REv. 820 (1994). 
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Introduction 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated. "1 The task of safeguarding this right 
has been entrusted to the judiciary and much of the amendment's 
jurisprudence centers on the courts' efforts to regulate law enforce-
ment activity that intrudes upon protected rights of privacy and lib-
erty. Although " [ w] e the people"2 are the third-party beneficiaries of 
this clash between the judicial and Executive branches,3 individual cit-
izens do not play an operative role in delineating reasonable searches 
and seizures. 4 This was not always the case. As represented by juries, 
colonial Americans were active participants in the tribunals that ad-
dressed early search and seizure law. 
The Supreme Court recently reminded us that "long before the 
adoption of the Constitution the common law courts in the colonies" 
"regularly exercised jurisdiction to enforce English statutes authoriz-
ing the seizure of ships used in violation of customs and revenue 
laws."5 Forfeiture suits against offending vessels "closely followed the 
procedure in Exchequer" and were tried by jury. 6 Pre-revolutionary 
juries thus served an important democratic function by measuring the 
search-and-seizure practices of the government against the commu-
nity's political and moral directives. In contemporary America, we 
continue to honor our founders' regard for the "exalted character of 
jury service" and trial judges commonly discharge jurors with the re-
minder that trial by jury "stands as the keystone to our system of jus-
tice-the connecting link between the courts and the people."7 If 
such rhetoric were taken seriously, we might regain our faith in the 
I. The textual quotation is referred to as the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment. In what is known as the Warrant Clause, the Amendment continues as fol-
lows: "and no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized." U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. 
2. U.S. CoNST. pmbl. 
3. The principal method of enforcing the Fourth Amendment is the exclusionary 
rule, which is not constitutionally mandated, but is a judicially created and judicially ad-
ministered means of protecting Fourth Amendment rights. See infra text accompanying 
notes 235-37. 
4. Under current doctrine, society has no direct say in how to define Fourth Amend-
ment rights or remedy Fourth Amendment violations. Since the inception of the suppres-
sion remedy, judges have decided whether the Amendment was violated and whether 
suppression is appropriate. "To some extent at least, having judges decide what police 
conduct violates the Fourth Amendment reflects a distrust of society's ability or willingness 
to apply the Fourth Amendment properly." George C. Thomas ill & Barry S. Pollack, 
Saving Rights.from a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REv. 147, 149 
(1993). 
5. United States v. 92 Buena V1Sta Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1131 & n.9 (1993). 
6. CJ. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 140 (1943). English precedent, which 
gave rise to the Fourth Amendment, also respected the jury's role in passing upon the 
search-and-seizure practices of the government. See Leach v. Three of the King's Messen-
gers, 19 Howell's State Trials 1001, 1026 (1765) ("'Whether there was a probable cause or 
ground of suspicion,' was a matter for the jury to determine: that is not now before the 
Court."). 
7. WEST'S FEDERAL FoRMs § 7497 (1971) (Some Remarks Upon Discharging Jury). 
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jury's ability to enlighten an isolated and potentially insensitive judici-
ary as to the community's view of government search-and-seizure 
practices. 
The jury's vital role in regulating the exercise of government power 
was a central theme of a provocative article, The Bill of Rights as a Con-
stitution, 8 in which Professor Akhil Amar asked us to suspend conven-
tional wisdom, which views the Bill of Rights as a collection of 
unrelated, substantive rights of individual citizens that are to be pro-
tected by a vigilant judiciary. Examining history with fresh eyes, Pro-
fessor Amar sought a unifying theme for the Bill of Rights and found 
it in the drafters' concept of a structure of government: 
Like the original Constitution, the original Bill of Rights was 
webbed with structural ideas. Federalism, separation of powers, bi-
cameralism, representation, amendment-these issues were under-
stood as central to the preservation of liberty. My point is not that 
substantive "rights" are unimportant, but that these rights were inti-
mately intertwined with structural considerations.9 
Although much of individual rights theory centers on what is consti-
tutional, this question is uniquely related to questions of who should 
decide what is constitutional, and who should decide who decides. 
There is no escape from giving the Bill of Rights some reading, and 
one unavoidable task for constitutional framers is to allocate decision-
making power. For example, in the Fourth Amendment context, 
someone must be charged with responsibility to determine which 
searches and seizures are reasonable. By adopting a constitution and 
a bill of rights, a political community defines its boundaries and estab-
lishes the system from which legitimate outcomes derive. It is not sur-
prising then that the debate over ratification of the Bill of Rights 
focused on "what kind of government Americans wanted, not what 
rights this government should protect. "10 The prime purpose of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights was to put. in place a system 
8. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131 (1991). 
9. Id. at 1205; see also Donald S. Lutz, Political Participation in Eighteenth-Century 
America, 53 ALB. L. REv. 327, 332 (1989) (arguing that concepts of federalism and separa-
tion of powers erect a structure that encourages citizens to participate in a deliberative 
process leading to the decisions that affect their lives and shape their values}; Maeva Mar-
cus, The Adoption of the Bill of Rights, Address in a Plenary Session at the Conference for 
the Federal Judiciary in Honor of the Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights (Oct. 21, 1991), in 
1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.j. 115 (1992). Marcus states that 
Id. 
the Revolutionary generation, in wrestling with the problem of rights, did not 
concern itself primarily with stating, with absolute textual precision, the rights 
that Americans believed would best protect their liberty. Rather, the found-
ing generation struggled with the larger question of what kind of government 
would facilitate the enjoyment of the rights the American people knew they 
possessed. 
10. Marcus, supra note 9, at 117. 
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whereby their meaning would be embodied in the outcome of the 
continuing struggle between various decisionmakers. · 
The internal checks and balances on the decisionmaking power of 
the Judicial, Legislative, and Executive branches are the familiar stuff 
of high school civics. Less attention has been focused on our Bill of 
Rights' presupposition that government in toto is prone to abridge 
citizens' freedom; that the counter to that tendency is to place the 
people between citizen and government; and that the essential feature 
of a jury is its "interposition" between the state and the accused.11 
The paradigmatic image of jurors as populist protectors of the people 
lies at the heart of our Bill of Rights, 12 and the Supreme Court has 
erred in viewing "jury trial as an issue of individual right rather than 
(also, and, more fundamentally) a question of government struc-
ture."13 When the Bill of Rights is seen as a structural limitation on 
the exercise of government power, it is apparent that "the dominant 
strategy to keep agents of the central government under control was 
to use the populist and local institution of the jury. "14 
In the area of search-and-seizure, the government's relationship 
with its citizens achieves its most stark and physical form. Perhaps 
more so than any other provision of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth 
Amendment is profoundly antigovernment, 15 and the need to protect 
the people from a potentially oppressive Executive Branch has domi-
nated the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment corpus.16 The Court, 
11. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (obseIVing that "[p]roviding an 
accused with the right to be tried by ajury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard 
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccen-
tric judge"). 
12. Amar, supra note 8, at 1183. 
13. Id. at 1196. Professor Amar queried: 
For whose benefit did the right to jury trial exist? For Tocqueville, the answer 
was easy-the core interest was that of the Citizens, rather than the parties: "I 
do not know whether the jury is useful to those who have lawsuits, but I am 
certain it is highly beneficial to those who judge them .... " Similarly, Justice 
Blackmun has written that the public has interests, independent of a criminal 
defendant, in monitoringjudges, police, and prosecutors-and in being "edu-
cat[ ed about] the manner in which criminal justice is administered." 
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 1 Au:xls DE TocQUEVIU.E, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA. 296 
(Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1954) (1945), and Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 
U.S. 368, 428-29 (1979) (Blackmun,J., dissenting in part)). 
14. Id. at 1183. 
15. JAMES B. WHITE,JUsnCE AS TRANSLATION 177 (1990). White contends that 
more than any other single constitutional provision [the Fourth Amendment] 
stands between us and a police state, for its central premise is that police (or 
other governmental) conduct that interferes with a ,person's liberty, bodily 
integrity, or right to exclude others from what is hers shall be subject to judi-
cial control. 
Id. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L 
REv. 349, 353 (1974) (arguing that "the Bill of Rights in general and the fourth amend-
ment in particular ... deny to government-worse yet, to democratic government--de-
sired means, efficient means, and means that must inevitably appear . . . to be the 
absolutely necessary means, for government to obtain legitimate and laudable objectives"). 
16. "Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own 
cannot be trusted." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). "[T]heFourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement establishes an institutional structure to compensate for 
the expected excessive zeal of governmental criminal investigators." Frederick Schauer, 
The Occasions of Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REv. 729, 735 (1992). 
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however, has been less astute in recognizing the need to protect the 
people from potentially oppressive judicial power. 
[A]ll permanent government officials-even Article III judges-may 
at times pursue self-interested policies that fail to reflect the views 
and protect the liberties of ordinary Americans. As the Fourth 
Amendment warrant clause and the Eighth Amendment make 
clear, professional judges acting without Citizen juries can some-
times be part of the problem, rather than the solution.1'7 
Professor Amar contends that juries once played the primary role in 
protecting Fourth Amendment freedoms and that judges are "the 
heavies, not the heroes, of the [Fourth Amendment's] story. "18 If this 
reading of history is correct, and I believe it is, the question arises as to 
how and why the jury's foremost role in adjudicating the lawfulness of 
searches and seizures has been eliminat~d by a judiciary jealous of its 
power to interpret the law. This question also has been raised by Jus-
tice Scalia, who acknowledges that when a judge resolves the reasona-
bleness of a search or seizure by invoking "nothing better than a 
totality of the circumstances test to explain his decision, he is not so 
much pronouncing the law in the normal sense as engaging in the less 
exalted function of fact-finding."19 Justice Scalia expressed puzzle-
ment as to "[w]hy ... the question whether a person exercised reason-
able care [should] be a question of fact [for the jury], but the question 
whether a search or seizure was reasonable be a question of law [for 
17. Amar, supra note 8, at 1206; see Essays by a Farmer (IV), in 5 THE CoMPLETE ANn-
FEDERALIST 5, 39 (Herbert]. Storing ed., 1981) (reasoning that "whenever therefore the 
trial by juries has been abolished, •.• [t]he judiciary power is immediately absorbed, or 
placed under the direction of the executive"). 
18. Amar, supra note 8, at 1179. When creating a "good faith" exception to the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court discounted any need to invoke the ex-
clusionary rule as a means of deterring judicial misconduct: 
First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than 
to punish the errors of judges and magistrates. Second, there exists no evi-
dence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert 
the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires appli-
cation of the extreme sanction of exclusion. 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984). In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that 
the Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, restrains the 
power of the government as a whole; it does not specify only a particular 
agency and exempt all others. The judiciary is responsible, no less than the 
executive, for ensuring that constitutional rights are respected. 
Id. at 932. 
19. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L REv. 1175, 1180-81 
(1989). Professor Weinreb characterized the totality-of-the-circumstances test as an "I 
know it when I see it" school of jurisprudence because the Court merely catalogues the 
facts of the case followed by an unconnected conclusion regarding the reasonableness of 
the search. Lloyd L Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 57 
(1974). 
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the judge]?"20 Professor Amar echoes that query by noting that 
"[r] easonableness vel non was a classic question of fact for the jury."21 
This Article attempts to answer such questions by examining the 
evolution of search-and-seizure law in America. Although the struc-
tural nature of decisionmaking embodied in the Bill of Rights has far-
ranging implications for that entire document, I limit my considera-
tion to the unique aspects of the Fourth Amendment. In doing so I 
have followed the suggestion that constitutional interpretation consid-
ers a threefold question: "Does the Constitution mean what it was 
meant to mean, or what it has come to mean, or what it ought to 
mean?"22 Part I examines the historical involvement of juries in 
search-and-seizure cases; Part II considers the current state of the judi-
ciaxy' s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; and Part III concludes with 
a proposed structure for Fourth Amendment decisionmaking that re-
turns the jury to its former prominence. 
I. Pre-Revolutionary Search-and-Seizure Law 
Were I called upon to decide, whether the people had best be omit-
ted in the legislative or judiciary department, I would say it is better 
to leave them out of the legislative. The execution of the laws is 
more important than the making them.23 
The major historical studies of the Fourth Amendment24 begin 
their analyses of colonial searches and seizures with James Otis's re-
nowned challenge of writs of assistance in Paxton's case. 25 Those who 
seek interpretive aid by identifying the evils which the amendment was 
designed to eradicate have recognized that "the Fourth Amendment's 
commands grew in large measure out of the colonists' experience 
with the writs of assistance and their memories of general warrants 
formerly in use in England."26 Between 1761 and 1776 the increas-
ingly volatile Writs of Assistance controversy27 drew the attention of 
colonial courts, legislatures, and patriots like James Otis and John Ad-
ams. American juries, however, had been removed from participation 
20. Scalia, supra note 19, at 1181. 
21. Amar, supra note 8, at 1179. 
22. TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CoNsrITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5 (1969). 
23. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to L'Abbe' Arnold (July 19, 1789), in 3 THE WRIT. 
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 82 (H.A. Washington ed., 1853). 
24. See, e.g., JACOB w. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A 
STUDY IN CoNSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Historical 
and Political Science Series No. 84, 1966); NELSON B. LAssoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE FoURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (The Johns Hop-
kins Univ. Studies in Historical and Political Science Series No. 55, 1937); TAYLOR, supra 
note 22. 
25. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 24, at 32-37; LAssoN, supra note 24, at 51-59. John Adams 
would later state that "Mr. Otis's oration against the Writs of Assistance breathed into this 
nation the breath oflife .... Then and there the child Independence was born." Id. at 59. 
26. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977). 
27. "American histories without exception list Writs of Assistance as one of the active 
causes of the American Revolution." O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the 
Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REvoLUTION 40, 40 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939). 
The writs of assistance controversy "was perhaps the most prominent event which inaugu-
rated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country." Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). 
364 [VOL. 62:359 
Fourth Amendment 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON U..W REVIEW 
in the controversy by England's creation of jury-less vice-admiralty 
courts in the colonies. The jury's role in determining search-and-
seizure law had developed during the preceding century when cus-
toms officials first searched and seized pursuant to the Navigation 
Acts. It is this neglected period leading to the Writs of Assistance con-
troversy that saw American juries defy and defeat British overlordship 
years before a single soldier took to the field.2s 
A. The Navigation Acts 
In the mid-seventeenth century, Holland, not England, was the 
commercial, industrial, and financial center ofEurope.29 Under a sys-
tem of free trade, American commerce would have gravitated to the 
Netherlands; thus the Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1663 were 
designed to bind American trade to the mother country and keep the 
colonies "in a firmer dependence" upon England.30 The first of the 
Navigation Acts, the Enumeration Act of 1660,31 mandated that all 
American imports or exports be shipped in English or American ves-
sels. 32 The Act also specified that certain colonial products-most im-
portant, sugar and tobacco-could be shipped only to England or 
another colony.33 The second Navigation Act, the Staples Act of 
1663,34 further limited the colonists' access to free markets by requir-
ing that all goods imported by the American colonies be loaded in 
England.35 
The initial Navigation Acts were part of a sweeping effort to reestab-
lish the English Crown's control over all colonial activity and govem-
ment.36 During Oliver Cromwell's reign, the American colonies 
avoided close supervision and regulation by the mother country, but 
with the restoration of the English monarchy the Crown turned its 
28. The Fourth Amendment speaks of the right of "the people," not the right of the 
framers of the Bill of Rights. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. Although much attention has been 
directed toward discerning the original framers' intent, it makes sense to focus on the 
perspective of "the people" who fought against oppressive searches and seizures. 
29. SHEPARD B. CLOUGH & CHARLES W. CoLE, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 345 (3d 
ed. 1952) (arguing that the first Navigation Act was aimed at the Dutch carrying trade and 
"consolidated the foundations of England's colonial and maritime system"). 
30. 12 Car. 2, ch. 18 (1660) (Eng.). "The requirement that goods pass through Eng-
land imposed many obligations upon colonial trade in the guise of taxes, fees, cooperage, 
porterage, brokerage, warehouse rent, commissions, extra merchants' profits, and the like, 
which would never have been incurred in a direct trade with the ultimate markets." Law-
rence A. Harper, The Effect of the Navigation Aru on the Thirteen Colonies, in THE ERA OF THE 
AMERICAN REvoLUTION, supra note 27, at 32, 32. 
31. 12 Car. 2, ch. 18 (1660) (Eng.). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. 15 Car. 2, ch. 7 (1663) (Eng.). 
35. Id. 
36. DAVID w. ROBERTSON, ADMIRAL'IY AND FEDERALISM 71 (1970) ("Toward the end of 
the seventeenth centuiy there was an upsurge of English concern with the administration 
of the American colonies."). 
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attention to America.37 The Puritans of the Massachusetts Bay Colony 
objected to increased regulation because they were subjects of the 
English King only to the extent that they voluntarily subjugated them-
selves by the terms of the colony's charter.38 In an effort to resolve 
this "home rule" controversy, Charles II sent a commission to induce 
the colonies to accept the same political compromises that had been 
reached in England upon the restoration of the monarchy.39 The 
commission failed to negotiate an acceptable compromise and the 
Navigation Acts largely were ignored or were evaded by the 
colonists.40 
The third Navigation Act, the Plantation Duty Act of 1672,41 did not 
impose any significant new duties or restrictions upon trade but was 
singularly designed to enforce the provisions of the first two Naviga-
tion Acts.42 Edward Randolph, whose biography is a microcosm of 
search-and-seizure during this period,43 was appointed Collector of 
Plantation Duty and was charged with vigorous enforcement of the 
dormant Navigation Acts.44 Randolph arrived in the colonies in 1679, 
and within three years seized thirty-six ships and prosecuted their 
owners for alleged violations of the Navigation Acts.45 All but two of 
the shipowners, however, were acquitted and Randolph's two success-
ful prosecutions were obtained in trials without ajury.46 
The colonial juries' unwavering refusal to convict for alleged viola-
tions of the Navigation Acts should not be dismissed as merely an ex-
ample of the juries' nullification of the unpopular Acts. We must 
distinguish our concept of a contemporary jury's extra-legal nullifica-
tion of a law from the colonial jury's prerogative to determine law.47 
37. Id. 
38. See generally THOMAS fIUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE CoLONY AND PROVINCE OF 
MAssAcHUSE'ITS BAY (1936). Although the home-rule controversy was most prominent in 
Massachusetts, it was also present in other colonies. For example, in 1701 William Penn 
wrote the following: "Are we comme 3000 miles into a desert ... to have only the same 
privileges we had at home?'' MICHAEL G. HALL, EDWARD RANDOLPH AND THE AMERICAN 
CoLONIES 1676-1703, at 223 (1960) (quoting William Penn). 
39. HALL, supra note 38, at 13-14. 
40. Id. 
41. 25 Car. 2, ch. 7 (1672) (Eng.). 
42. Id. 
43. "In England the customs establishment was elaborate. In New England it was one 
man, Edward Randolph .... " HALL, supra note 38, at 56. 
44. Id. at 55-56. 
45. Id. at 57. The owner of the seized vessel could not remove either his ship or its 
cargo until the case was tried. A conviction resulted in total forfeiture of the ship and 
cargo. Id. at 55. 
46. Id. at 57. 
47. Jury nullification focuses on the jury's raw power to ignore a law they think is 
wrong or unjust, and not to be subject to sanctions for ignoring the law by rendering an 
unreviewable general verdict. Jury prerogative to determine law, however, is not an exer-
cise of raw power, but rather the fulfillment of a duty to interpret and follow the law. On a 
theoretical level, the power and prerogative to address law is inextricably bound up with 
the use of general verdicts. See infra note 158. As a practical matter, the distinction be-
tween jury nullification and jury determination of law often boils down to whether the trial 
attorneys are permitted to argue the law to the jury. See generally Annotation, Counsel's right 
in criminal prosecution to a?g1U1 law or to read lawbooks to the jury, 67 A.L.R2D 245 (1959). 
In United States v. The William, 28 F. Gas. 614 (D. Mass. 1808), cited in Sparfv. United 
States, 156 U.S. 51, 163 (1895) (Gray & Shiras, .IJ., dissenting), a United States District 
Court permitted defense counsel to argue to the jury the unconstitutionality of an Act of 
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In a modem-day criminal case the option to return a general verdict 
of acquittal invests the jury with the raw power to nullify many legal 
determinations, including the trial judge's ruling that a search is con-
stitutional. Suppose, for example, that a police officer observes illegal 
sexual activity as it occurs in the defendant's bedroom. Suppose fur-
ther that at trial, defense counsel's inquiry into the specific compe-
tency of the observer reveals the circumstances of the observation: 
The police officer used binoculars to peer through a crack in the win-
dow curtains. If it is sufficiently offended by the police conduct, the 
jury may acquit the defendant and effectively nullify the trial judge's 
ruling that the police observation was lawful.48 The linkage between 
juries and Fourth Amendment interests was articulated vividly by an 
Anti-Federalist essayist: 
[If a federal constable searching] for stolen goods, pulled down the 
clothes of a bed in which there. was a woman and searched under 
her shift ... a trial by jury would be our safest resource, heavy dam-
age would at once punish the offender and deter others from com-
mitting the same; but what satisfaction can we expect from a lordly 
(judge], always ready to protect the officers of government against 
the weak and helpless citizens .... 49 
In the hypothetical where the officer peers into the citizen's bed-
room, the jury learns of the officer's actions somewhat fortuitously 
because, with a slight change of facts, the very same police activity 
would never come to light at the trial. Suppose, for example, that 
after peering into the bedroom, the police obtain a search warrant, 
enter the dwelling, and apprehend the defendant while engaged in 
the criminal act. If, at the pretrial suppression hearing, "a lordly 
judge" upholds the warrant, the jury will learn only that the police 
entered the dwelling pursuant to a valid warrant. 50 Because contem-
porary juries are not authorized to consider the legality of the search 
warrant, the jury will never discover that the police initially used bin-
oculars to look into the defendant's bedroom. Even when the jury is 
fully aware of the facts surrounding a search, the judge instructs it to 
accept his legal determinations.51 Thus, many law enforcement pro-
cedures of questionable legality do not shock the jury to the point that 
Congress. ButJustice Chase's refusal to allow counsel to argue the law to the jury was cited 
in his articles of impeachment. See REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HoN. SAMUEL CHASE app. 
at 4 (Charles Evans ed., 1805). 
48. At this point, it is immaterial whether the trial judge ruled that the initial police 
observation was a reasonable search or was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. See infra text accompanying note 220. 
49. PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION 1787-1788, at 154 (John B. McMas-
ter & Frederick B. Stone eds., 1970) (1888). 
50. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505 (1925) (stating thatjudge, notjury, deter-
mines the legality of a search). 
51. See infra text accompanying notes 116-18. 
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they defy the judge's instructions.52 Under our present legal system, 
therefore, jury nullification of searches deemed lawful by the judiciary 
is exceptional and extra-legal. 
Under the colonial system of justice, however, juries not only re-
solved factual disputes, they also determined questions of law.53 Most 
of the colonial era's judges and advocates were without formal legal 
training, and the colonists believed that any man of ordinary intelli-
gence was able to plead his own case and to judge law and justice, not 
an unreasonable assumption in a day when educated men generally 
were familiar with the law and its administration.54 In practice, a colo-
nial judge's primary function was "to preserve order, and see that the 
parties had a fair chance with the jury. "55 
52. "It is unlikely that the jury would let any manner of criminal run loose just for the 
thrill of defying the judge." Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right To Say No, 45 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 168, 211 (1972). 
53. See Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794) (stating that questions of law 
and fact are within the jury's power of decision). The dissent in spaefcharacterized Brail-
sford as "a case in which there was no controversy about the facts." Sparfv. United States, 
156 U.S. 51, 156 (1895) (Gray & Shiras,.IJ., dissenting). Nonetheless the trial court, 
while stating to the jury its unanimous opinion upon the law of the case, and 
reminding them of "the good old rule, that on questions of fact it is the prov-
ince of the jury, on questions of law it is the province of the court to decide," 
expressly informed them that "by the same law, which recognizes this reason-
able distribution of jurisdiction," the jury "have nevertheless a right to take 
upon themselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact 
in controversy." 
Id. (quoting Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 4). See generally Mark D. Howe, Juries as Judges of 
Criminal Law, 52 HAR.v. L. REv. 582 (1939) (tracing the development of juries as law judges 
in America). 
54. See generally F'RANcrs R. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL S'YSTEM: SOME 
SELECTED PHASES (1940) (discussing this and other aspects of colonial judges' and juries' 
role in the legal system). The colonies were also "small agricultural communities [where] a 
highly democratic tribunal [could] adequately cope with matters that, in other circum-
stances, [could] more effectively be dealt with through a discreet separation of judicial 
powers." Howe, supra note 53, at 591. The colonists' faith in the common man's ability to 
judge law lived on in the American Revolutionary period. In 1790 James Wilson told his 
students at the University of Pennsylvania that 
the science of law . • . "should in some measure be the study of every free 
citizen, and of every free man. Every free citizen ... has duties to perform 
and rights to claim. . . . On the public mind one great truth can never be too 
deeply impressed, that the weight of the government of the United States, and 
of each state composing the union, rests on the shoulders of the people. 
HUGH H. BRACKENRIDGE, LAw MrsCELU.NIES 33 (Philadelphia, Byrne 1814). 
55. Howe, supra note 53, at 591; see also Amasa M. Eaton, The Deuelopment of the Judicial 
System in Rhode Island, 14 YALE LJ. 148 (1905). In 1792,Justice Hugh Henry Brackenridge 
published a satirical view of politics in the post-revolutionary period. Justice Brackenridge 
was a novelist, poet, justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, a Princeton classmate 
and friend of James Madison, and the organizer of the Jeffersonian Republican Party of 
western Pennsylvania. See CLAUDE M. NEWLIN, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF HUGH HENRY 
BRACKENRIDGE (1932). Professor Paul Carrington paraphrasedJustice Brackenridge's view 
of the judiciary: 
368 
Any animal of the human species, with a mediocrity of talents, may come to be 
a judge, and may appear pretty well in a book of reports, provided he or she 
cites precedents. The knowledge of all law goes but a little way to discerning 
the justice of the cause. Because the application of the rule to the case is the 
province of judgment. Hence it is that if my cause is good and I am to have 
my choice of two judges, the one of great legal science, but deficient in natu-
ral judgment; the other of good natural judgment but of no legal knowledge, 
I would take the one that had what we call common sense. 
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Although colonial practice is clear regarding the jury's determina-
tion of law, colonial legal theory is clouded by the perplexing link 
between the jury's nullification power and the jury's right to interpret 
law. The legal distinction between jury prerogative and jury nullifica-
tion power first came into issue when attaint, the punishment of the 
jury for reaching an incorrect verdict, was abolished in England by the 
decision in Bushell's case in 1670.56 When the trial court lost this 
means to coerce a verdict from the jury, it became apparent that the 
jury possessed the raw power to determine law by rendering an unre-
viewable general verdict of acquittal. , 
In England, the question of whether the jury had not just the 
power, but a prerogative to determine law, was presented by the con-
troversy conc~rning seditious libel.57 The issue was not resolved defin-
itively until 1792 when Fox's Libel Act58 authorized English juries to 
decide both the "fact" of publication and the issue of whether the 
publication was seditious, which is a mixed question of law and fact 59 
In colonial America, the jury's prerogative to determine the issue of 
seditious publication was recognized as early as 1692 in Penn-
sylvania.60 Perhaps the most celebrated case of an American jury de-
termining law arose at the trial of John Peter Zenger in 1735 when 
Alexander Hamilton successfully asserted that jurors "have the right 
beyond all dispute to determine both the law and the fact. "61 
Paul D. Carrington, Law and Chivalry: An Exhortation from the spirit of the Hon. Hugh Henry 
Brackenridge of Pittsburgh (1748-1816), 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 705 (1992). 
56. 6 Cobbett's State Trials 999 (1810). The case arose in 1670 when Quakers William 
Penn and William Mead were tried for unlawful assembly for religious worship. Id. at 1002. 
When the jurors acquitted them against the court's instructions, Bushell and the other 
jurors were fined. Id. at 1005. Bushell refused to pay the fine, was imprisoned, and 
brought a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 1003. The writ was granted and Bushell was re-
lieved from all punishment for having returned a verdict against the trial judge's 
instructions. 
57. See generally John Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free speech, 6 KAN. L. REv. 295 (1957) 
(discussing the history of criminal libel in England and the United States). 
Id. 
58 .. 53 Geo. 3, ch. 60 (1792) (Eng.). 
59. The Act provided 
that, on every such trial the jury sworn to try the issue may give a general 
verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue upon such 
indictment or information; and shall not be required or directed, by the court 
or judge before whom such indictment or information shall be tried, to find 
the defendant or defendants guilty, merely on the proof of the publication by 
such defendant or defendants of the paper charged to be a libel, and of the 
sense ascribed to the same in such indictment or information. 
According to the Sparf dissent, the Act authorized the trial judge to give "'his opinion 
and directions to the jury,'" which "clearly means by way of advice and instruction only, 
and not by way of order or command." Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 135 (1895) 
(Gray & Shiras,.IJ., dissenting). 
60. Howe, supra note 53, at 594-95. 
61. JAMES .Al.ExANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CAsE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER 
ZENGER 99 (2d ed. 1972). Hamilton subsequently acknowledged that in civil cases" 'the 
cognizance of law belongs to the court, of fact to the jury,' " but" 'in criminal cases, the law 
1994] 369 
Zenger's celebrated trial placed the issue of the jury's role at the 
center stage in libel cases; it remained center stage even after the 
Revolution and the adoption of the Constitution. 52 
In other legal areas, American legal theory and practice generally 
deferred to the jury's prerogative to determine law. The historical 
records are spotty, but at least one scholar maintains that the jury's 
determination of law was accepted theory and practice from 1660 un-
til the early 1800s. 63 Although we cannot discount the possibility that 
colonial juries resorted to extra-legal nullification of the unpopular 
Navigation Acts, 64 there is an equally plausible explication of this his-
torical period, which suggests that colonial juries lawfully and respon-
sibly discharged their duty to determine search-and-seizure law. The 
validity of this view becomes apparent when one conside:i;s the jury's 
role in passing upon two formalistic legal objections raised against 
Randolph's seizures of vessels transgressing the Navigation Acts. 
The first of these objections evoked overtones of nullification the-
ory by fusing positive law and "higher law" concepts. 65 The exponents 
of home rule for Massachusetts argued that the Navigation Acts were 
law in the colonies only to the extent that they were accepted by the 
colonists. 66 Determination of positive law in America thus necessi-
tated an examination of the circumstances under which a new and 
separate society is formed and is no longer bound by the positive law 
of the old society. 67 Ultimately, the home rule controversy was re-
solved against the colonies and its influence upon colonial juries is 
and fact being always blended, the jury, for reasons of a political and peculiar nature, for 
the security of life and liberty, is entrusted with the power of deciding both law and fact.' " 
sparf, 156 U.S. at 147 (quoting 7 HAMILTON'S WoRKS 335-36 (1886)). 
62. "[I]fl use my pen with the boldness ofa freeman, itis because I know that the liberty 
of the press yet remains unviolated, and juries yet are judges." Letters of Centinel (I), in 2 THE 
CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 17, at 136, 136. 
63. See JosIAH QUINCY, REPORTS oN CAsES ARGUED AND ADJUDICATED IN THE SUPERIOR 
CoURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MAssACHUSETrS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772 
app. at 541-72 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1865). See generally Howe, supra note 53, at582 
(tracing the decline of jury prerogative to determine law). 
64. Colonial juries "were alleged to consist of merchants or masters of ships." JosEPH 
H. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY CoUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 60 n.390 (Octa-
gon Books, Inc. 1965) (1950). The possibility of nullification, however, should not be 
overemphasized, as this was not yet the age of tea parties, physical recapture of seized 
vessels, and mob violence. See infra text at note 114. Not all forms of resistance to the 
unpopular Navigation Acts were condoned by colonial juries. In the case of the Two Sisters, 
a colonial merchant vessel fired upon the customs inspectors. The merchant was acquitted 
of a violation of the Navigation Acts but was convicted and fined for obstructing the cus-
toms officials in the course of their duties. HALL, supra note 38, at 62. 
The case of the Two Sisters weakens any claim that colonial juries anticipated the modern 
exclusionary rule. In acquitting defendants of alleged violations of the Navigation Acts, 
colonial juries did not face the issue of freeing a "violent" criminal because the constable 
blundered. See infra text at note 372. 
65. In its most elementary form, jury nullification power rests on the maxim that posi-
tive law must yield to "higher" laws such as natural law, God's law, an unwritten constitu-
tion, the social compact, current mores, and the like. See generally John H. Ely, The Supreme 
Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On DisCUtJering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L REv. 5 (1978). 
66. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
67. In theory the colonies were to follow English common law. In practice, they devel-
oped their own common law, and "the English common law remained largely an alien 
system until the middle of the eighteenth century." AUMANN, supra note 54, at 7. The 
Zenger case, see supra text at note 61, followed this tradition when the jury determined "the 
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uncertain.68 The colonists finally prevailed, however,· on a second 
legal objection to Randolph's seizures, an objection that must be char-
acterized as a question of interpreting positive law without resort to 
nullification power. 
This latter objection conceded that the Navigation Acts lawfully ap-
plied to the colonies but asserted that Parliament, owing to legislative 
oversight, had empowered Randolph to enforce only the Plantation 
Duty Act of 1673. Therefore, it was not English customs officials like 
Randolph but colonial governors who held exclusive power to enforce 
the Enumeration Act and the Staples Act. 69 These acts were the real 
backbone of British control and the basis of all of Randolph's 
seizures.70 When this purely positive-law objection finally was submit-
ted to the Customs Commission in England, the commission con-
fessed its error and informed Randolph that he "'had noe more 
power to seize and prosecute . . . than any other person.' "71 Ran-
dolph sought to remedy the legal deficiency in his seizure powers by 
obtaining letters of patent, which explicitly authorized him to enforce 
all of the Navigation Acts.72 The King issued the letters of patent but 
the legal controversy simply was recast in terms of whether the Crown, 
acting without Parliament, could lawfully authorize such seizures. 
Moderate cplonial judges tended to recognize Randolph's commis-
sion as sufficient warrant to seize but colonial juries continued to 
render acquittals.73 
On what basis, then, did colonial juries of the late seventeenth cen-
tury return acquittals? Ideally, de facto nullification of law should be 
separated from jury determination of law, but absent special find-
ings, 74 a general verdict of acquittal cloaks the jury's resolution of spe-
cific issues. What is unequivocal, however, is that colonial juries, in 
rendering those general verdicts of acquittal, were not limited to an 
law as it ought to be, under the conditions of colonial America, rather than the law as it 
was, in England." Paul Finkelman, The Zenger Case: Prototype of a Political Tria~ in AMERICAN 
POLITICAL TRIALS 32, 36 (Michal R Belknap ed., 1981). 
68. If the colonial juries of this period considered whether the Navigation Acts or 
Randolph's seizures violated a "higher" law, such consideration failed to reach the level of 
sophistication to which James Otis would bring the theory some eighty years later in Pax-
ton's case. See LAssoN, supra note 24, at 21 (presenting the constitutional history of the 
Fourth Amendment and James Otis's role in Paxton's case). 
69. HALL, supra note 38, at 65; see also ROBERTSON, supra note 36, at 700 ("In a very real 
sense, whatever admiralty authority there was in the plantations belonged to the 
governors."). 
70. HALL, supra note 38, at 65. 
71. Id. at 66 (quotation omitted). 
72. Id. at 67-68. 
73. In one illustrative case, Governor Bradstreet, presiding as judge, sent out the jury 
three times with orders to reverse its findings. Id. at 61 n.400. The jury refused to alter its 
verdict and cast out the case because Randolph had no warrant to seize the ship. Id. 
74. In civil cases, there was confusion as to whether courts could compel juries to 
render a special verdict and leave legal interpretation for the judge. SMITH, supra note 64, 
at 359-60. In criminal cases, it was assumed that the jury had the right to render a general 
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extra-legal nullification power. Under the common law, warrantless 
searches and seizures, in most circumstances, could be resisted law-
fully, 75 and law enforcement officials were subject to harsh civil penal-
ties if they exceeded their limited power to search or seize without a 
warrant. 76 The warrant process thus conferred an authority on law 
enforcement officers that they would not otherwise possess. After be-
ing alerted to Randolph's disputed credentials, and after being in-
structed that they were the judges of fact and of law, the colonial 
juries were invited to ascertain the lawfulness of Randolph's seizures 
by examining whether he exceeded his specific authority to enforce 
some or all of the Navigation Acts. 77 
The inherent ambiguity of general verdicts precludes a completely 
compelling case for distinguishing the colonial jury's rightful detennina-
tion from the extra-legal nullification of search-and-seizure law, 78 but this 
much is clear: (1) the American colonies faced significant search-and-
seizure questions some eighty years before the Writs of Assistance con-
troversy would bring nullification theory to its zenith; (2) there were 
contested positive-law flaws in the authority of customs officials to 
search and seize; (3) colonial juries were duly informed of the alleged 
legal deficiencies;79 and (4) colonialjuries decided disputed questions 
of law. It is a respectable supposition that the acquittals rendered by 
colonial juries were based, at least in part, upon their conclusion of 
law that the seizures were illegal. A political people sensitive to the 
increasingly intrusive endeavors of British customs officials could be 
expected to avail themselves of the opportunity to exercise their pre-
rogative, as jurors, to determine the lawfulness vel non of those of-
ficers' seizures.so In eliminating the jury's prerogative to determine 
law in the latter half of the nineteenth century, American courts 
looked to English practice rather than to the American colonial 
period.81 
The point here is not how English judges, or for that matter nine-
teenth- or twentieth-century American judges, ultimately resolved the 
verdict. In practice, both civil and criminaljuries insisted upon general verdicts and non-
interference with jury prerogative. Id. 
75. See Paul F. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrt:5t, 78 YALE LJ. 1128, 1129-
32 (1969) (proposing a common law right to resist any unlawful official action, including 
arrest). 
76. See Edwin M. Borchad, Guvemment Liability in Tort, 34 YALE LJ. 1, 7 (1924) (com-
menting that at common law, "damages for torts were recoverable against the wrongdoing 
officer"). 
77. "[A] power of search was not something a customs officer's commission could 
snatch out of the air; there had to be statutory foundation for it." M. HENRY SMITH, THE 
WRITS OF Ass1srANCE CAsE 117 (1978). 
78. Legal materials from this period are so scanty that cautious historians ignore the 
period, and the less cautious draw inferences with limited support. Although I wish to 
avoid imagining the past, I confess to falling into the less cautious category. 
79. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
80. Perhaps what motivated these juries "was not spearhead radicalism, but a genuine 
belief that [the searches and seizures] did not accord with true legal principle." SMITH, 
supra note 77, at 5. Smith offered this observation about colonial judges who opposed the 
writs of assistance, but the observation may apply equally to colonial juries. 
81. See generally Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE LJ. 
170 (1964) (describing the gradual decline of the jury's right to decide questions oflaw). 
372 [VOL. 62:359 
Fourth Amendment 
THE GEORGE WASHINGI'ON !AW REVIEW 
issue of the jury's right or power to interpret law. The relevant consid-
eration is how colonial Americans regarded the jury's function, and 
whether that regard is reflected in the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights. "[l]ssues relative to the structure of the new government, 
rather than the task of defining and enumerating individual rights, 
were foremost in the minds of Americans after the Revolution."82 Co-
lonial Americans valued the jury's ability to determine search-and-
seizure law even if colonial legal theory lacked a thorough apprecia-
tion of the enigmatic distinction between jury power and preroga-
tive. 83 Because trial by jury dramatizes the relationship of law and 
democracy, we must not disserve history by imposing legalistic symme-
try on what was perceived by the colonists and the British as a political 
issue: a frontier concept of popular justice and free trade, opposed to 
an old world fact of King's Law and mercantile subjugation.84 When 
colonial juries persisted in determining search-and-seizure law ad-
versely to the Crown, the conflict over jury prerogative and power 
emerged as part of the larger political struggle to win control over the 
colonies. Numerous acquittals in seizure cases led to repeated British 
efforts to negate the jury's role and led to stubborn efforts by the colo-
nists to preserve the jury's role in the search-and-seizure controversy. 
The late seventeenth-century difficulties with enforcement of the 
Navigation Acts were overshadowed temporarily by the broader strug-
gle regarding home rule for Massachusetts. The struggle climaxed in 
1686 when England vacated the colony's charter and dissolved the 
Massachusetts government.85 A Temporary Council was appointed to 
rule Massachusetts and the erstwhile Edward Randolph continued to 
82. Marcus, supra note 9, at 115. 
83. The colonists' regard for trial by jury was expressed in a charge to the first grand 
jury convened by the newly independent Colony of South Carolina: 
Gentlemen of the Grand Jury: When, by evil machinations tending to nothing 
less than absolute tyranny, trials by jury have been discontinued, and juries, in 
discharge of their duty, have assembled, and, as soon as met, as silently and 
arbitrarily dismissed without being empannelled, whereby, in contempt of 
Magna Charla, justice has been delayed and denied; it cannot but afford to 
every good citizen the most sincere satisfaction once more to see juries, as 
they now are, legally empannelled, to the end that the laws may be duly ad-
ministered. I do most heartily congratulate you upon so important an event. 
Judge Drayton's Charge to the GrandJury of Charlestown, South Carolina (Apr. 23, 1776), 
in 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: A DocuMENrARY H1sroRY OF THE ENGLISH CoLoNIES IN NORTH 
AMERICA 1025 (Peter Force ed., 4th s. 1844). 
84. The jury's determination of law 
is one of those great exceptional rules intended for the security of the citizen 
against any impracticable refinements in the law, or any supposable or possi-
ble tyranny or oppression of the courts . • • • It has indeed been claimed, as 
one of those great landmarks, ... which ..• will always be likely to be charac-
teriz~d as an absurdity by the mere advocates of logical symmetry in the law 
State v. McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491, 531-32 (1860), overruled by State v. Tsurpee, 25 A. 964, 974 
(Vt. 1892). 
85. See generally HUTCHINSON, supra note 38, at 339-49. 
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sexve the Council as Collector, Suxveyor, and Searcher of Customs.86 
Historical records are meager but it appears that under the Tempo-
rary Council Randolph experienced greater success than he had with 
seizures under the old charter government. 87 Whatever brief success 
Randolph enjoyed, however, ended when James II was displaced by 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Massachusetts revolted against the 
ruling council previously sent by James II, which caused Randolph to 
flee to England where he was reduced to working the London docks 
as a "free-lance informer" receiving a percentage of seized goods. 88 
By the early 1690s William and Mary were secure on the English 
throne, Randolph reemerged in the good graces of the Crown, and 
the Massachusetts charter was restored.89 When the now-stabilized 
British Empire focused its attention on colonial trade and enforce-
ment of the Navigation Acts, Randolph returned to America in 1692 
as Suxveyor General of America. 90 He redirected his energies toward 
the southern colonies where he could count on the cooperation of 
more friendly governors, but Randolph had no more success with 
southernjuries than he had had with New Englandjuries.91 He an-
grily reported to his superiors: "I find that by the partiality of juries 
and others, that I can obtain no cause for his Majesty upon the most 
apparent evidences."92 
Randolph's vitriolic reports on the widespread evasion of the Navi-
gation Acts led Parliament in 1696 to enact the fourth Navigation Act: 
An Act for Preventing Frauds and Regulating Abuses in the Plantation 
Trade.93 This act was modelled on the English Statute of Frauds 
(1662) with one major difference that would prove to be a corner-
stone of the American Revolution: The Navigation Act of 1696 au-
thorized the establishment of vice-admiralty courts in America and 
provided that suits for forfeiture of vessels offending the Navigation 
Acts could be brought in "any of His Majesty's Courts," a phrase in-
tended to include the existing colonial common law courts and the 
newly created vice-admiralty courts.94 In England, however, such suits 
could be brought only in the Courts of Exchequer,95 which, unlike the 
vice-admiralty courts, employed ajury.96 The basis thus was laid for 
86. HALL, supra note 38, at 96. 
87. Id. at 101-02. 
88. Id. at 134. 
89. HUTCHINSON, supra note 38, at ch. III. 
90. HALL, supra note 38, at 135. 
91. One ship, The Providence, was prosecuted three times in Maryland and Virginia 
without a conviction. Id. at 140. 
92. Id. at 153. 
93. CARL UBBELOHDE, THE V1CE-AnMIRAL'IY CouRTS AND THE AMERICAN REvoLUTION 15 
(1960). 
94. The phrase ultimately was construed to invest the colonial common law courts and 
the vice-admiralty courts with concurrent jurisdiction over violations of the Navigation 
Acts. See UBBELOHDE, supra note 93, at 15-16. 
95. "The 1662 act expressly laid down that the writ of assistance should be from the 
Court of Exchequer .... " SMITH, supra note 64, at 121; see UBBELOHDE, supra note 93, at 
19. When the seizur!'! issue was submitted to a common law court, the court "closely fol-
lowed the procedure in Exchequer" and the issue was tried by jury. CJ. Hendry Co. v. 
Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 140 (1943). 
96. ROBERTSON, supra note 36, at 33. 
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what would become a major grievance of the colonists: Americans 
were denied their traditional right to a jury trial, a right still eajoyed 
by their fellow subjects in England.9'7 
Although there were incidental benefits to establishing the vice-ad-
miralty courts in America,98 Parliament's primary goal was to negate 
the American jury's role in the enforcement of the Navigation Acts.99 
The ever resourceful colonists, however, countered Parliament with 
their own legal stratagem. In Pennsylvania, the legislature enacted a 
statute mandating that any case involving a violation of the Navigation 
Acts must be tried according to the rules of common law before a 
jury.100 In other colonies, sympathetic judges issued writs of prohibi-
tion against proceedings in the vice-admiralty courts, 101 while colonial 
97. In 1701, William Penn wrote that to try Americans "'without a jury, gives our peo-
ple the greatest discontent, looking upon themselves as less free here than at home, in-
stead of greater privileges, which were promised.'" David S. Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: 
The Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 1764-1766, 16 WM. & MARY Q. 459, 462 
(1959) (quoting William Penn to Robert Harley [c. 1701), 4 THE MANusCRIPTS OF His 
GRACE THE DUKE OF PoRTLJ.ND app., pt. lV, at 31 (London, Historical Manuscripts 
Comm'n, Fifteenth Report 1897) ). The Declaration of Independence and the Declaration and 
Resolves of the Fmt Continental Congress, 1774 both include the grievance that the establish-
ment of the vice-admiralty courts in colonial America deprived the colonists of the right to 
trial by jury. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 
THE BILL OF RicHTS: A DocuMENTARY HisroRY 218 (1971). 
98. In addition to proceeding in rem and by written deposition, the vice-admiralty 
courts functioned throughout the year, as opposed to the limited terms of common law 
courts. See UBBELOHDE, supra note 93, at 20-21. The constant availability of the vice-admi-
ralty courts was important in maritime cases where the parties were often transient, and 
delays in judgment caused unusual hardships. See id. 
99. The Tory position on the Fraud Act of 1696 was that American juries could not be 
trusted to interpret the Acts of Trade impartially; thus "Parliament was justified in violating 
the rights of its subjects so that the Navigation Acts might be enforced." Lovejoy, supra 
note 97, at 468-69. 
100. HALL, supra note 38, at 184. The statute was disallowed by the English government 
"because of its contradiction of the apparent intent of the [Navigation] Act of 1696." Id. at 
185. 
101. The writ of prohibition was an order from a common law court to an inferior court 
to cease the adjudication of a matter on grounds that the inferior court lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the matter. ROBERTSON, supra note 36, at 93 ("The admiralty judges obeyed writs of 
prohibition ... because they were orders ofa more powerful court."). The common law 
courts in America were as jealous of their power as the English common law courts had 
been during their historic struggle with the admiralty courts. The common law courts 
prevailed in England by narrowly defining the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts and by 
issuing writs of prohibition whenever they exceeded their proper jurisdiction. GRANT Gn,. 
MORE & CHARLES BLACK, THE !Aw OF AnMIRAL"IY ch. 1 (2d ed. 1975). American common 
law courts attempted to follow this precedent by issuing writs of prohibition on the ques-
tionable grounds that by authorizing suits for forfeitures "'in any of His Majesty's courts,'" 
the Act of 1696 had conferred jurisdiction only upon "courts of record, which admiralty 
courts were not." See SMITH, supra note 64, at 515-16. England conceded that the Ameri-
can common law courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the vice-admiralty courts but 
maintained that the choice of forum belonged to the prosecutor; thus, writs of prohibition 
did not properly lie. ROBERTSON, supra note 36, at 81. In 1742, Parliament rejected pro-
posed legislation to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the vice-admiralty courts. SMITH, supra 
note 64, at 189. The writs of prohibition were prohibited in the Sugar Act of 1764. See 
infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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juries continued to address the seizure controversy as best they could 
in the common law courts. Although the jury could no longer deal 
directly with the forfeiture trial in a vice-admiralty court, the jury 
could circuitously address the seizure controversy when a civil suit was 
filed against a customs official for false arrest and trespass in seizing a 
vessel.102 In a Massachusetts case that must have been particularly 
galling to the British, a colonial shipowner agreed to settle for 500 
pounds rather than risk total forfeiture in the vice-admiralty court.103 
The shipowner subsequently sued in a common law court for damages 
against the customs official who had seized the vesse1.104 When the 
jury awarded damages of nearly 600 pounds against the customs of-
ficer, the seizure effectively was negated.105 The power of a civil jury 
to reach the seizure issue, however obliquely, was not eliminated until 
the adoption of the Sugar Act in 1764.106 
The period from the Fraud Act of 1696 to the Sugar Act of 1764 
reflected the ongoing conflict between legal theory and actual prac-
tice. Throughout the period England continued to expand the juris-
diction of the vice-admiralty courts, 107 and the colonies continued to 
elude the power of those courts to enforce the Navigation Acts.108 By 
1760, evasion of the Navigation Acts was an accepted practice which 
102. Modem juries can address similar issues in the context of federal officials' con-
ducting searches or seizures in Bivens-type suits, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that iajuries caused by a 
federal official conducting an unreasonable search are redressable through a civil suit in 
federal court for money damages), or in suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see 
Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992) (involving a civil suit brought under§ 1983 
seeking redress for an unreasonable seizure of property). 
103. UBBELOHDE, supra note 93, at 34-35. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. On appeal to the Superior Court by the customs official, the judges upheld the 
validity of judgments issued from the vice-admiralty courts, yet still awarded 500 pounds in 
damages to the shipowner. 
106. 4Geo.3,ch.15 (1764) (Eng.). TheFederalistPapmmakepassingreferencetothis 
power of a civil jury to control the conduct of revenue collectors. THE FEDERAUST No. 83, 
at 615 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 
1866). 
107. In 1721, the American vice-admiralty courts were given exclusive jurisdiction over 
trespasses against the forest preserves of the Royal Navy. This exposed western farmers, far 
removed from ports and sea trade, to trial without a jury. See generally ROBERT G. ALBION, 
FORESTS AND SEA PmVER: THE TIMBER PROBLEM OF THE ROYAL NAVY 1652-1862, at 231-74 
(1926). Until the very eve of the American Revolution, Parliament continued to expand 
the jurisdiction of the vice-admiralty courts. For example, the Molasses Act of 1733, the 
Stamp Act of 1765, and the Townshend Revenue Act of 1768 all extended the vice-admi-
ralty courts' authority to interpret and enforce commercial regulations. See UBBELOHDE, 
supra note 93, at 15-16, 76, 208. 
108. In addition to widespread bribery and intimidation of customs inspectors, the col-
onists found other ways to negate the power of vice-admiralty courts. For example, power-
ful leaders such as William Penn used their influence to have convictions reversed upon 
appeal to England. See SMITH, supra note 64, at 178. The colonists could make life quite 
difficult, socially and financially, for vice-admiralty judges who strictly enforced the Naviga-
tion Acts. See, e.g., Lovejoy, supra note 97, at 462-63. Most important, the colonists suc-
ceeded in having native-born colonists appointed as judges of the vice-admiralty courts. 
SMITH, supra note 64, at 60 n.390. These local men, if not actually in league with the 
merchants, certainly understood and were sympathetic to the difficulties of commercial 
ventures in America. "The vice-admiralty courts had originally been granted jurisdiction in 
determining violations of the acts of trade in an effort to evade colonial juries. But this 
advantage was of little consequence if the judges were as partial to the local merchants as 
the juries had been." UBBELOHDE, supra note 93, at 37. 
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"had come to be considered as almost legal trade. "I09 Matters 
changed greatly in the 1760s; the history of that period as well as the 
history of the writs of assistance controversy have been reported else-
where in great detail. no 
This brief historical survey has focused on the colonial jury's role in 
the search-and-seizure controversy, a role that ended with the adop-
tion of the Sugar Act of 1764. The Sugar Act removed the last vestige 
of the jury's role in seizure cases by precluding suits for false arrest 
against customs inspectors whenever the vice-admiralty court certified 
that there had been probable cause for the seizure.111 Henceforth, 
there would be few opportunities for juries la'wfully to address the 
search-and-seizure controversy, although militant juries continued to 
exercise raw nullification power when given any opportunity to ex-
press themselves on the issue of seizures. Denied direct access to ju-
ries of their peers, the colonists beheld themselves as without 
significant legal recourse against what they perceived to be arbitrary 
and unlawful searches by customs officials. The legal battle against 
such searches was left to those colonial judges who refused to issue 
writs of assistance, 112 while the extra-legal battle was carried on by the 
109. LAssoN, supra note 24, at 51-52. 
110. See SMITH, supra note 64; see also L\NDYNSKI, supra note 24; TAYLOR, supra note 22. 
111. 4 Geo. 3, chs. 15, 51 (1764) (Eng.). "A lawful warrant, in effect, would compel a 
sort of directed verdict for the defendant government official in any subsequent lawsuit for 
damages." Amar, supra note 8, at 1178-79. Professor Amar continued: 
But note what has happened. A warrant issued by a judge or magistrate-a 
permanent government official, on the government payroll-has had the ef-
fect of taking a later trespass action away from a jury of ordinary Citizens. 
Because juries could be trusted far more than judges to protect against gov-
ernment overreaching . • ., warrants were generally disfavored. Judges and 
warrants are the heavies, not the heroes, of our story. 
Id. at 1178-79. 
The Act further discouraged civil suits by placing the burden of proof on the shipowner 
and by directing that treble costs could be awarded against the shipowner. By explicitly 
stating that prosecution could be brought in common law courts or vice-admiralty courts at 
the election of the prosecutor, the Act also precluded issuance of writs of prohibition 
against vice-admiralty proceedings. See Lovejoy, supra note 97, at 465. 
112. The colonialjudiciary's reluctance to issue writs of assistance often is regarded as 
another form of nullification of valid positive law. The assumption is that judges refused to 
issue the writs on the basis of Otis's argument that the writs were contrary to natural law or 
to the British constitution. UBBELOHDE, supra note 93, at 95. No doubt some colonial 
judges were sympathetic to the cause of independence and used their power to nullify even 
legitimate efforts of the Crown. But in addition to Otis's more famous arguments on natu-
ral and constitutional law, there were many purely positive-law objections to the writs. 
"Tory judges were just as determined opponents of general writs as were their Whig associ-
ates." Dickerson, supra note 27, at 75. 
Although I have emphasized the need to curb a potentially arrogant and insensitive 
judiciary, we must not lose sight of the occasions when the judiciary has performed 
admirably. 
1994] 
It took courage for judges to refuse writs of assistance when demanded by the 
customs officers, since they held their commissions at the will of the Crown 
and were dependent for their salaries upon the revenues collected by the Cus-
toms Commissioners. . . . In the face of such formidable pressure from official 
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people through such measures as tarring and feathering customs of-
ficers, physical recapture of seized vessels, 113 and ultimately by 
revolution. 
If the foregoing picture of the jury conflicts with our conventional 
view of juries, perhaps the reason is that the present-day jury is only a 
shadow of its former self. "[T] he judge-created and judge-enforced 
exclusionary rule has displaced the jury trial for damages as the cen-
tral enforcement mechanism of the Fourth Amendment-in part be-
cause of judge-created doctrines of government officials' immunity 
from damages."114 As we shall see, a judiciary jealous of its power un-
dermined the political role115 of the jury in our government. 
B. The Jury in Post-Revolutionary America 
After the American Revolution, the question of the jury's preroga-
tive to determine law and the specific development of search-and-
seizure law were never again joined as they had been in colonial 
America. Jury determination of substantive law continued through 
the middle of the nineteenth century but, by the end of that century, 
virtually was eliminated.116 In some states, the legislature abolished 
the jury's license to determine law but in most jurisdictions, the judici-
ary was responsible for significantly curbing the jury's prerogatives.117 
sources it is surprising that the judiciary from Connecticut to Florida, with 
one exception, stood firm in opposing the legality of the particular form of 
writ demanded of them and continued in their judicial obstinacy through six 
years of nearly constant efforts to force them to yield. 
Id. at 74. 
113. Rescue of seized vessels previously had been " 'an accidental or occasional affair,' " 
but soon became " 'the natural and certain consequence of a seizure.' " UBBELOHDE, supra 
note 93, at 93 (quoting Governor Bernard of Massachusetts, Report to the British Board of 
Trade (Aug. 18, 1766)). 
114. Amar, supra note 8, at 1190-91. In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), 
the Court ruled that police officers who unreasonably and unsuccessfully search without a 
warrant enjoy a good faith defense in civil suits brought against them under the Fourth 
Amendment. Yet, this is precisely the result that strict common law liability for warrantless 
searches did not permit. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
115. "The jury is, above all, a political [and not a mere judicial] institution .•.. " 1 
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 13, at 293. According to Alexander Hamilton, the jury is given its 
power "'for reasons of a political and peculiar nature, for the security of life and liberty.'" 
Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 175 (1895) (Gray & Shiras,.IJ., dissenting) (quoting 7 
HAMILTON'S WORKS, supra note 61, at 335). 
116. See Howe, supra note 53, at 582; Note, supra note 81, at 170. 
117. Only in Maryland has the jury retained significant prerogatives to determine law. 
Maryland currently is the only jurisdiction to consider the jury's role in search and seizure 
cases. In Hubbard v. State, 72 A.2d 733, 735 (Md. 1950), the Maryland Court of Appeals 
held that the question of lawful consent to a search was initially a question for the judge, 
but if the judge found the consent lawful, the issue was to be submitted to the jury for their 
ultimate determination. Fifteen years later, in Wilson v. State, 210 A.2d 824, 828 (Md. 
1965), the court extended the jury's role to encompass consideration of whether there was 
probable cause for an arrest. The Maryland Court of Appeals has not addressed the issue 
since Wilson, but in recent years the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has taken a strong 
stand against the jury's determination of the legality of a search. 
In Price v. State, 254 A.2d 219 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969), the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals suggested that the past practice of submitting the question of probable cause to 
the jury may have accorded the defendant "more than that to which he was entitled." Id. at 
226 (citing Mullaney v. State, 246 A.2d 291 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968) ). That suggestion 
became the holding in Cleveland v. State, 259 A.2d 73 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969), which 
upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that "'if the arrest of the defendant was 
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In the federal system, the practice of permitting the jury to determine 
law ended with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sparfv. 
United States.118 
Ironically, the end of the jury's prerogative to determine law coin-
cided with the early development of Fourth Amendment law. Sparf 
was decided nine years after Boyd v. United States,119 the Supreme 
Court's first important Fourth Amendment decision. By the time the 
Court considered a sizeable body of Fourth Amendment cases in the 
1920s, Sparfwas settled precedent. When confronted with the asser-
tion that the jury should determine the legality of a search, 120 the 
Court eschewed examination of the unique history of search-and-
seizure in America and merely cited a civil case for the general propo-
sition that the judge, not the jury, determines the admissibility of 
evidence.121 
The Sparjdecision, however, did not deny history:122 judges, includ-
ing Supreme Court Justices sitting on circuit courts, frequently had 
instructed juries that they were "the judges both of the law and fact in 
illegal the articles seized as incident thereto were improperly admitted into evidence and 
cannot be considered by you.'" Id. at 75. Cleveland rested on Maryland Rule 729, which 
vested the trial judge with exclusive power to determine the admissibility of evidence. Id. 
at 76; Mn. R. 729. Johnson v. State, 352 A.2d 349, 357 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976), held that 
all forms of searches are governed by Rule 729 and that the judge's ruling on the lawful-
ness of the search is final. 
Cleveland and Johnson are disappointing because 'they place great reliance on Maryland 
Rule 729 and do not examine history or the general benefits and drawbacks of allowing the 
jury to play a role in search and seizure law. A jutjsprudential justification for the Mary-
land rule finally was offered in Ehrlich v. State, 403 A.2d 371, 377 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1979). See infra text accompanying note 137. 
118. 156 U.S. at 51. 
119. 116 U.S. 616 (1885). 
120. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505, 511 (1925) (holding that "the question of the 
competency of the evidence ... by reason of the legality or otherwise of its seizure was a 
question of fact and law for the court and not for the jury"). 
121. Id. at 511 (citing Gila Valley, Globe & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 103 (1914)). 
The exclusionary rule was adopted in the federal system in Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 (1914). The suppression of evidence on constitutional grounds must be distin-
guished from the general admissibility of relevant evidence. Chief Justice Marshall ex-
plained this distinction: 
"No person will contend that, in a civil or criminal case, either party is at 
liberty to introduce what testimony he pleases, legal or illegal, and to con-
sume the whole term in details of facts unconnected with the particular case. 
Some tribunal, then, must decide on the admissibility of testimony. The par-
ties cannot constitute this tribunal; for they do not agree. The jury cannot 
constitute it; for the question is whether they shall hear the testimony or not. 
Who, then, but the court can constitute it? It is of necessity the peculiar prov-
ince of the court to judge of the admissibility of testimony." 
spaif, 156 U.S. at 165 (Gray 8c Shiras,.IJ., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. 
Cas. 55, 179 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693)). 
122. The collection and analysis of this history is the focus of most of the dissenting 
opinion in spaif. See spaif, 156 U.S. at 110 (Gray 8c Shiras,.IJ., dissenting). The spaifmajor-
ity relied "more on principle than on precedent." Howe, supra note 53, at 589. 
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a criminal case, and are not bound by the opinion of the court."123 
Spaif dismissed much of this history as based on state constitutional 
provisions, the uniqueness of seditious libel laws, 124 or the trial judge's 
failure to distinguish between the jury's power or prerogative to deter-
mine law.125 Squarely facing the issue of jury prerogative, Spaif fol-
lowed the scripture of Marbury v. Madison126 and placed the 
determination of law within the exclusive dominion of the judiciary. 
It is instructive to examine Spaif's holding and the role the judiciary 
envisioned for itself. 
The Spaifmajority partially relied upon a distinction between ques-
tions of law and fact, a distinction of limited utility.127 Law/fact de-
nominations are generally no more than convenient labels for 
characterizing which questions are for the jury and which are for the 
court, and as such the denominations are answers, not analyses.128 
The utility of the law/fact distinction is especially doubtful in the 
Fourth Amendment context where the reasonableness of a search is 
often referred to as a factual question.129 Justice Scalia has confessed 
his 
inclination-once we have taken the law as far as it can go, once 
there is no general principle that will make this particular search 
valid or invalid, once there is nothing left to be done but determine 
from the totality of the circumstances whether this search-and-
seizure was "reasonable" -to leave that essentially factual detennina-
tion to the lower courts.130 
123. Spaif, 156 U.S. at 165 (Gray & Shiras, .IJ., dissenting) (quoting United States v. 
Wilson, 28 F. Cas. 699, 708 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830) (No. 16,730)). "'But if you are prepared to 
say that the law is different from what you have heard from [the judges], you are in the 
exercise of a constitutional right to do so.' " Id. (quoting Wilson, 28 F. Cas. at 708). 
124. "[T] he jury who shall try the cause shall have a right to determine the law and the 
fact, under the direction of the court, as in other cases." Sedition Law of 1798, ch. 74, § 3, 
1 Stat. 596, 596-97 (expired by own terms on Mar. 3, 1801). 
125. Justice Chase stated, "'I have uniformly delivered the opinion 'that the petitjury 
have a right to decide the law as well as the fact in criminal cases;' but it never entered into 
my mind that they, therefore, had a right to determine the constitutionality of any statute 
of the United States.'" Spaif, 156 U.S. at 71 (quoting United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 
239, 258 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709) (Chase,]., for the Court)). 
126. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
127. Spaif, 156 U.S. at 101-03. 
128. The "fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter 
of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another 
to decide the issue in question." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985). In discussing 
the judicial ability to "make law," Justice Scalia noted that 
when ... legal rules have been exhausted and have yielded no answer, we call 
what remains to be decided a question of fact-which means not only that it is 
meant for the jury rather than the judge, but also that there is no single 
"right" answer. It could go either way. 
Scalia, supra note 19, at 1181. See generally Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HAR.v. L. REv. 
1303 (1942) (distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law). 
129. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (referring to reasonableness as 
turning upon the "factual and practical considerations of everyday life"). 
130. Scalia, supra note 19, at 1186 (emphasis added). 
The circuits disagree as to whether a seizure of the person is a factual or a legal question. 
Several circuits hold that the test for a seizure of a person is "an essentially legal assessment 
of whether the particular circumstances would warrant the belief that a person has been 
detained"; thus the lower court's finding as to whether a seizure has occurred is subject to 
de novo review. United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1991); accord United 
States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 880 (1990); United 
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Whether the reasonableness of a search is a constitutional fact, or a 
mixed question of law and fact,131 is irrelevant, because the Court has 
permitted juries to resolve other such constitutionally significant 
questions.132 
The law/fact distinction is also misleading because criminal trials 
normally require resolution of three varieties of questions: questions 
of law, of fact, and of application of a legal standard to the facts.133 
The latter issue often is determined by the jury because it is a rare 
criminal case where the jury is not called upon to resolve some aspect 
of reasonableness as manifested in legal concepts like insanity, ade-
quate provocation, self-defense, criminal negligence, or some more 
general aspect of the reasonably prudent person concept.134 The jury, 
when it determines what a prudent person would have done under 
the facts of the case, gives particular meaning to a general and often 
ambiguous legal standard. In short, the law frequently is stated as a 
States v. Mines, 883 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 997 (1989). The Fourth, 
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, however, appear to apply a clearly erroneous standard 
of review to the lower court's factual finding regarding a seizure. See United States v. McK-
ines, 933 F.2d 1412 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 593 (1991); United States v. Rose, 889 
F.2d 1490, 1494 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Teslim, 869 F.2d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 1989). 
131. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505, 511 (1925) (holding that the admissibility of 
evidence questionably seized was an issue of law and fact for the court, not the jury). See 
generally David L. Faigman, "Nonnative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical 
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541 (1991) (discussing the im-
portance of empirical evidence and fact in constitutional interpretation); Henry P. 
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 229 (1985) (analyzing the consti-
tutional fact doctrine, as distinguished from judicial discretion on issues of constitutional 
law, and discussing the roles of various actors in the legal system with respect to judging 
questions of constitutional fact). 
132. The most obvious example is the jury's determination of community standards in 
obscenity cases. See Scalia, supra note 19, at 1182 (stating that "we generally let juries de-
cide whether certain expression so offends community standards that it is not [protected] 
speech but obscenity"); see also FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAw OF 0BSCENl'lY 150-51 
(1976) (stating that "[d]eterminations of prurient interest and patent offensiveness, and 
also, therefore, of contemporary community standards, are such as to indicate that the 
major determination should be made by the jury, except in the more extreme cases" (foot-
notes omitted)). The jury plays a less well-defined, but still significant, role in the determi-
nation of whether the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment. See Richard D. 
Schwartz, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment: A Quest for a Balance Between Legal and 
Societal Morality, 1 LAw & PoL'Y Q. 2857 (1979) (discussing courts' tendency in capital pun-
ishment cases to invoke participation of the public through juries, which reflect public 
opinion and formulate results based on societal mores). 
133. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 501 (1942). 
134. See, e.g., United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 624-25 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per 
curiam) (Bazelon,J., concurring) (arguing that the jury is uniquely qualified to determine 
questions of responsibility in the light of a community standard). See generally Fleming 
James, Jr. & David K. Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 
VAND. L. REv. 697, 698 (1952) (claiming that although the requisite standard of conduct 
may be unclear, the jury still may determine that "the conduct of the party falls short of any 
standard which they would agree upon as reasonable"). 
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general rule and "[t]hejury, in the privacy ofits retirement, adjusts the 
general rule of law to the justice of the particular case. "135 
Most important, the Court's somewhat illusory distinction between 
law and fact in Spaifis relevant only upon acceptance of the premise 
which underlies claims of judicial preeminence: that it is "the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. "136 In 
rejecting a role for juries in search-and-seizure cases, the noted Fourth 
Amendment scholar Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr. asserted: "In a crimi-
nal case, the only issue for the jury is that of guilt or innocence. Any-
thing that does not bear upon guilt or innocence is utterly foreign to 
the only task assigned to the jury."137 Judge Moylan explained that 
"[t]he jury is assigned the sole mission of determining 'Whodun-
nit?,'"138 while the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule serves the 
extrinsic purpose of deterring police misconduct, not enhancing the 
fact-finding process;139 thus, "[i] tis not the function of the jury to 'po-
lice the police' by denying itself probative evidence."140 This analysis 
does not square with history141 or with the structural nature of the Bill 
of Rights, a structure that respects the jury's role in policing the police 
and all other government agents. 
In The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, Professor Akhil Amar explained 
that protection of the people against self-interested government 
agents was paramount in the minds of those who framed the Bill of 
Rights: 
To borrow from the language of economics, the Bill of Rights was 
centrally concerned with controlling the "agency costs" created by 
the specialization of labor inherent in a republican government. In 
such a government the people (the "principals")· delegate power to 
run day-to-day affairs to a small set of specialized government offi-
cials (the "agents"), who may try to rule in their own self-interest, 
contrary to the interests and expressed wishes of the people. To 
minimize such self-dealing ("agency costs"), the Bill of Rights pro-
tected the ability of local governments to monitor and deter federal 
abuse, ensured that ordinary citizens would participate in the fed-
eral administration of justice through various jury-trial provisions, 
and preserved the transcendent sovereign right of a majority of the 
people themselves to alter or abolish government and thereby pro-
nounce the last word on constitutional questions.142 
135. John H. Wigmore, A Program far the Trial of Jury Tria~ 12 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'v 
166, 170 ( 1929). The Court in Sparf conceded that when rendering a general verdict, the 
jury "of necessity, decided every question before them which involved a joint consideration of 
law and fact," but this did not mean "that the jury could ignore the directions of the court, 
and take the law into their own hands." Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 69 (1895). 
136. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
137. Ehrlich v. State, 403 A.2d 371, 376 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979); see supra note 117. 
See generally Charles Nesson, The Evidence ar the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of 
Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1362 (1985) (arguing that public acceptance of a verdict 
requires a belief that the verdict is a statement about what happened). 
138. Ehrlich, 403 A.2d at 377. 
139. Id. at 376-77. 
140. Id. at 377. 
141. See supra part I.A. 
142. Amar, supra note 8, at 1133. 
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The Framers of our Constitution and Bill of Rights did not perceive 
the sole mission of the jury as resolution of "Whodunnit. "143 The pre-
vailing view was that the jury was a mainstay of liberty and an integral 
part of democratic government because the common man in the jury 
box, no less than the citizen in the voting booth, was central to a dem-
ocratic theory that asserted the sovereignty of the people through self-
government.144 Alexis de Tocqueville suggested that" [ t] he jury system 
as it is understood in America appear[ed] to [him] to be as direct and 
as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as univer-
sal suffrage. They are two instruments of equal power, which contrib-
ute to the supremacy of the majority."145 Although ordinary citizens 
could not harbor any realistic expectations about serving in the small 
House of Representatives, or the even more aristocratic Senate, ordi-
nary citizens could participate in the application of national law 
through their jury service.146 The jury was not simply a popular body 
but a local one as well;147 thus provincial jurors could "interpose" 
143. John Adams stated the democratic principle that "the common people, should 
have as complete a control, as decisive a negative, in every judgment of a court of judica-
ture" as they have with regard to other decisions of government. 2 JOHN ADAMS, THE 
WoRKS OF JoHN ADAMS 253 (Charles C. Little &James Brown eds., Boston, Little Brown & 
Co. 1850). 
144. The jury has grown "so precious to the nation, as the guardian of liberty and life, 
against the power of the court, the vindictive persecution of the prosecutor, and the op-
pression of the government." Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 149 (1895) (Gray & 
Shiras,.IJ., dissenting) (quoting People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 336, 375-76 (1804) (Kent, 
J.)). 
145. 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 13, at 294. 
146. Spanning both civil and criminal proceedings, the key role of the jury was to 
protect ordinary individuals against governmental overreaching. Jurors would 
be drawn from the community; like the militia they were ordinary Citizens, 
not permanent governmeµt officials on the government payroll. Just as the 
militia could check a paid professional standing army, so too the jury could 
thwart overreaching by powerful and ambitious government officials. 
Amar, supra note 8, at 1183. 
147. The Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees a jury "of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See generally Jan 
Martenson, The United Nations and Human Rights and the Contribution of the American 
Bill of Rights, Keynote Address at the Conference for the Federal Judiciary in Honor of the 
Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights (Oct. 22, 1991), in 1 WM. & MARvBILL RTS.J. 105 (1992) 
(discussing the Bill of Rights' influence on international human rights law and arguing 
that the protection of individual and public liberties, including human rights, begins at the 
local level). 
"Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to 
home-so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any map of the 
world. Yet they are the world of the individual person; the neighborhood he 
lives in; the school or college he attends; the factory, farm or office where he 
works. Such are the places where every man, woman and child seeks equal 
justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these 
rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere." 
Id. at 112-13 (quoting Eleanor Roosevelt). 
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themselves against central tyranny by exercising their power to inter-
pret law and return general verdicts.148 
Although seventeenth- and eighteenth-century juries were envi-
sioned as institutions within which rational deliberation determines 
law,149 thejury's·power to interpret law, particularly constitutional law, 
proved to be unnerving to a judiciary accustomed to shepherding 
such power unto itself. An incredulous Justice Baldwin admonished a 
trial jury: "If juries once e~cise this power,. we are without a Constitution or 
laws, one jury has the same power as another, you cannot bind those 
who may take your places, what you declare constitutional to-day an-
other jury may declare unconstitutional to-morrow. "150 Substitute the 
word judge for jury in the above qu9te, and Justice Baldwin provides a 
succinct critique of judicial review. 
With the establishment of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison151 
and the denigration of the jury in Spaif,152 the federal judiciary posi-
tioned itself as the only branch of government that can dictate the 
terms by which it can be regulated.153 Contemporary juries have been 
reduced to employing a form of guerrilla warfare-nullification 
power-as their only means of maintaining some direct control over 
thejudiciary's interpretation oflaw. The Americanjury has clung to 
nullification power as the most dramatic manner of rejecting the 
limited role of determining "Whodunnit." Acquittal rates for those 
prosecuted under the Fugitive Slave Act154 and Prohibition Laws155 
148. The trial by jury in the judicial department, and the collection of the people 
by their representatives in the legislature ... have procured for them, in this 
country, their true proportion of influence, and the wisest and most fit means 
of protecting themselves in the community. Their situation, as jurors and rep-
resentatives, enables them to acquire information and knowledge in the af,. 
fairs and government of the society; and to come forward, in turn, as the 
centinels and guardians of each other. 
Letters from the Federal Farmer (IV), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANn-FEoERAUsr, supra note 17, 
at 245, 249-50. 
149. The Framers did not view "the people" as merely a collection of private interests. 
The people conceived of themselves as acting to advance the public interest, and they 
came together to discuss, to deliberate upon, and ultimately to decide on the course their 
society would take. See Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or Whats Really Wrong with 
Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L REv. 487, 509 (1979) ("[Values] are public as well as 
private in origin, originating in political engagement and dialogue as well as in private 
experience that supposedly preexists political activity and enters into it as a given."). 
150. Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 73 (1895) (quoting United States v. Shive, 27 F. 
Cas. 1065, 1067 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 16,278)). 
151. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
152. 156 U.S. 51 (1895). 
153. "There is no political institution whose own coercive authority constitutional theo-
rists can call upon to discipline judges who abuse their power." Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-
Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1502, 1505 (1985); see also Robert 
H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. LJ. 383, 391 (1985) ("The fact of the 
matter is that there are no really effective means by which the people or the political 
branches can respond to constitutional policymaking of which they disapprove."). 
154. See United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815) 
(judge barring defense counsel from arguing to the jury that the Fugitive Slave Act was 
unconstitutional); LEON FRIEDMAN, THE WISE MINORrIY 28-50 (1971) (discussing thejudici-
ary's effort to control juries); see also ROBERT M. CoVER,jusriCE AccusED: ANnsIAVERY AND 
THEjuDICIAL PROCESS 215 (1975) (recounting a jury acquittal of defendants who shot and 
killed a slave-catcher). 
155. See HARRY KALVEN,jR. &: HANs ZEisEL, THE AMERICANjuRY 291 (1966) (arguing that 
"the Prohibition era provided the most intense example of jury revolt in recent history"). 
384 [\rOL. 62:359 
Fourth Amendment 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
demonstrate the desire of jurors to expand their reach beyond factual 
questions and to address the law itself. Even absent dramatic political 
or moral issues, juries sometimes acquit the defendant "in protest 
against a police or prosecution practice that :[the jury] considers 
improper. "156 
Our legal system's continuing use of general verdicts indicates that 
the judiciary itself lacks total commitment to the premise that the jury 
exists solely to determine "Whodunnit." If the jury truly serves only to 
resolve factual disputes, the jury could be instructed to return special 
findings or the trial judge could direct a verdict of guilty whenever 
reasonable jurors could not disagree on the facts. Yet the Supreme 
Court recently invoked Sparf for the proposition that "although a 
judge may direct a verdict for the defendant if the evidence is legally 
insufficient to establish guilt, he may not direct a verdict for the State, 
no matter how ovenvhelming the evidence. "157 The judiciary's accept-
ance of general verdicts evidences acknowledgment, grudging or 
otherwise, of a function for the jury beyond resolution of factual 
disputes. 
Mere forbearance of general verdicts and nullification power, how-
ever, falls short of recognizing that "we the people," speaking through 
juries, play a legitimate role in protecting ourselves against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures.158 Jury determination of law is a unique 
See generally NATIONAL CoMM'N ON LA.w OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT OF TiiE 
PROHIBmON LA.ws, S. Doc. No. 307, 7Ist Cong., 3d Sess. (1931). 
156. KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 155, at 319 (quoting Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 
51, 105-06 (1895)). 
157. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2080 (1993); see United States v. Garaway, 
425 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that a directed verdict of guilt is improper even 
where no issues of fact are in dispute). 
158. Some have argued that forbearance from nullification legitimizes the legality of 
such power: "if a power was vested in any person, it was surely meant to be exercised," 
Sparf, 156 U.S. at 136 (Gray & Shiras,.IJ., dissenting) (quoting Mr. Fox's comments upon 
moving the introduction of Fox's Libel Act in the House of Commons), "the law must, 
however, have intended, in granting this power to a jury, to grant them a lawful and right-
ful power, or it would have provided a remedy against the undue exercise of it," id. at 148 
(quoting People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 336, 368 (1804)), 
but a legal duty [to follow the judge's instructions in matters of law] which 
cannot in any way, directly or indirectly, be enforced, and a legal power [of 
nullification], of which there can never, under any circumstances, be a right-
ful and lawful exercise, are anomalies-"the test of every legal power" "being 
its capacity to produce a definite effect, liable neither to punishment nor con-
trol" - "to censure nor review," 
id. at 173 (citations omitted). 
· The validity of this reasoning rests upon the tortuous connection between nullification 
power and general verdicts. There is no remedy against the exercise of nullification power 
so long as courts utilize general verdicts. General verdicts necessarily blend law and fact 
and it is impossible to prove that a jury acquitted on the law rather than on the facts. law 
and fact can be separated, and nullification power eliminated, only if the courts require 
the jury to return special findings of fact. Thus, if a proper acquittal must rest on the jury's 
resolution of factual issues, nothing precludes the judge from ordering the jury to return 
special findings of fact. lf, however, juries have a right to acquit for any reason-fact or 
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safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of judicial power. According 
to Justice Curtis, however, the safeguard is superfluous: 
[A]s long as judges of the United States are obliged to express their 
opinions publicly, to give their reasons for them when called upon 
in the usual mode, and to stand responsible for them, not only to 
public opinion, but to a court of impeachment, I can apprehend 
very little danger of the laws being wrested to purposes of 
injustice.159 
As an aspiration, Justice Curtis's view is laudable; as a statement of 
reality, it is perhaps naive. It certainly is not a view universally shared 
by our Founding Fathers. In a letter to James Madison, Thomas Jef-
ferson cautioned against judicial power: 
But we all know that permanent judges acquire an Esprit de corps; 
that being known, they are liable to be tempted by bribery; that they 
are misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party, by a devo-
tion to the executive or legislative power . . . ; It is in the power, 
therefore of the juries, if they think permanent judges are under 
any bias whatever, in any cause, to take on themselves to judge the 
law as well as the fact. They never exercise this power but when they 
suspect partiality in the judges .... 160 
Jefferson's clairvoyance about the partisanship of judges and his faith 
injuries proved accurate when he encountered Tapping Reeve, a Fed-
eralist judge in Connecticut, who accused Jefferson of corrupting and 
subverting the liberties of the people. Judge Reeve "so harangued a 
grand jury in a sedition prosecution against Mr. Jefferson that the 
grand jury returned an indictment against the judge."16 1 
In contrast to Justice Curtis's quixotic view of the judiciary, an atypi-
cal concession of judicial fallibility appeared in Duncan v. Louisiana,162 
when the Court lauded the Framers' regard for the jury as "an inesti-
mable safeguard against the compliant, biased or eccentricjudge."163 
Perhaps Duncan is a limited apology for Sparf and Marbury v. Madison, 
because the idea of judicial review does not mandate that only judges 
consider constitutionality when discharging their unique function. 
law-then it can be argued that our system's continued use of general verdicts necessarily 
condones jury determination of law. 
By condemning jury nullification as extra-legal but insisting on general verdicts, our 
legal system has not faced up to a definitive resolution of the issue. We have adopted a 
compromise in which everyone knows that nullification power exists, but no one, particu-
larly trial counsel, may talk about it to the jury. See People v. Howard, 146 N.W. 315 (Mich. 
1914) (counsel's argument asking the jury to disregard the judge's instructions was outra-
geous and unprofessional conduct meriting immediate discipline); In re Schofield, 66 A.2d 
675 (Pa. 1949) (duty of trial judge to stop counsel from arguing to jury that they may 
nullify or ignore the judge's instructions on the law). At least the current compromise 
improves on the late-nineteenth-century Massachusetts practice, "where counsel are admit-
ted to have the right to argue the law to the jury, [but] it has yet been held that the jury 
have no right to decide it." Sparf, 156 U.S. at 168 (Gray & Shiras, JJ., dissenting). 
159. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 107. "[C]onstitutional theory constrains judges by providing a set 
of public criteria by which theorists, interested observers, and the judges themselves can 
evaluate what the judges do." Tushnet, supra note 153, at 1505. 
160. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 3 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 23, at 82. 
161. Carrington, supra note 55, at 743 n.168. 
162. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
163. Id. at 156. 
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Judges take oaths to uphold the Constitution, as Marbury emphasized, 
but so do presidents and legislators.164 If either the House or the Sen-
ate deems a proposed penal code unconstitutional, it will not become 
law.165 If "the President deems a bill unconstitutional, he may veto 
[the bill] or pardon" convicted citizens.166 If judges deem the law 
unconstitutional, they may order the defendant released and make 
their decision stick through the Great Writ of habeas corpus. "167 "By 
symmetric logic, juries too should be allowed to use their power to 
issue a general verdict for the defendant to achieve the same re-
sult."168 Once again, we may put aside conventional wisdom and look 
at history from Professor Amar's perspective: 
164. U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, 
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, 
both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, 
to support this Constitution."). 
In Spaif, the Court explained: 
"It was evidently the intention of the Constitution that all persons engaged in 
making, expounding, and executing the laws, not only under the authority of 
the United States but of the several States, should be bound by oath or affir-
mation to support the Constitution of the United States. But no such oath or 
affirmation is required of jurors ..•. " 
Spaif, 156 U.S. at 75 (quoting United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1333 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1851) (No. 15,815)). 
Assuming that Sparf's statement is factually accurate, the absence of juror oaths carries 
limited weight in assessing the jury's prerogatives and responsibilities. Justice Gray, dissent-
ing in Spaif, noted: 
The duty of the jury; indeed, like any other duty imposed upon any officer or 
private person by the law of his country, must be governed by the law, and not 
by wilfulness or caprice. The jury must ascertain the law as well as they can. 
Usually they will, and safely may, take it from the instructions of the court. 
But if they are satisfied on their consciences that the law is other than as laid 
down to them by the court, it is their right and their duty to decide by the law 
as they know or believe it to be. 
Id. at 172 (Gray & Shiras,.IJ., dissenting). 
Justice Blackmun suggested that state legislators' oaths to support the Constitution jus-
tify a presumption of constitutionality, which in turn justifies a police officer's "good faith" 
reliance on a statute which is in fact unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350-51 
(1987). 
165. Amar, supra note 8, at 1194. The Spaifmajority invoked Justice Chase's warning 
that if juries are empowered to interpret the Constitution, "petitjurors will be superior to 
the national legislature, and its laws will be subject to their control." Spaif, 156 U.S. at 71 
(quoting United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 258 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709)). 
The question remains whether juries must be seen as inferior to the legislature, or whether 
each entity properly resolves constitutionality within its own sphere of power. See supra 
note 164 and accompanying text. 
166. Amar, supra note 8, at 1194. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. But see Spaif, 156 U.S. at 70 (quoting Callender, 25 F. Cas. at 258). In Callender, 
Justice Chase refused to accept trial counsel's argument that "[s]ince, then, the jury have a 
right to consider the law, and since the Constitution is law, the conclusion is certainly 
syllogistic that the jury have a right to consider the Constitution." 25 F. Cas. at 258. Justice 
Chase's refusal to allow counsel's argument was cited in his articles of impeachment. See 
REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HON. SAMUEL CHASE, supra note 47, app. at 4. 
1994] 387 
Even if juries generally lacked competence to adjudicate intricate 
and technical "lawyer's law," the Constitution was not supposed to 
be a prolix code. It had been made, and could be unmade at will, 
by We the People of the United States-Citizens acting in special 
single-issue assemblies (ratifying conventions), asked to listen, delib-
erate, and then vote up or down. How, it might be asked, were 
juries different from conventions in this regard? If ordinary Citi-
zens were competent to make constitutional judgments when sign-
ing petitions or assembling in conventions, why not injuries too?169 
The concept of the jury as a check upon government power is more 
consistent with democratic theory and the intent of the Framers than 
is the view that the jury exists merely to determine "Whodunnit."170 
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, society has no direct say in 
how to define Fourth Amendment rights or how to remedy Fourth 
Amendment violations. "[H]avingjudges decide what police conduct 
violates the Fourth Amendment reflects a distrust of society's ability or 
willingness to apply the Fourth Amendment properly."171 
Although jury determination of search-and-seizure law is consistent 
with history and with democratic theory establishing checks on gov-
ernment power, such a role for the jury becomes troublesome when it 
conflicts with the individual defendant's constitutional rights. Under-
lying the Sparf decision is the fear that jury determination of law 
would not be a one-way street.172 If ajury could overrule the judge to 
169. Amar, supra note 8, at 1195; see also Thomas & Pollack, supra note 4, at 185 (argu-
ing that juries are capable of answering most Fourth Amendment questions without de-
tailed legal instructions). During the early nineteenth century, the demand that juries 
interpret law was stated with "an extraordinarily insistent vitality springing from a demo-
cratic conviction that the people themselves were competent to interpret their laws." 
Howe, supra note 53, at 582; see also Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, 
and Experience, 72 B.U. L. RE.v. 747, 762 (1992) ("[C]onstitutional theory does not work, and 
... absent theory, judgment is all that remains."). A reasonable knowledge of the princi-
ples and rules oflaw is important to citizens when called to obey as individuals, when called 
to answer as defendants, and when called to judge as jurors. 
170. "[I]n a representative government, there is no absurdity or contradiction, nor 
any arraying of the people against themselves, in requiring that the statutes or 
enactments of the government shall pass the ordeal of any number of sepa-
rate tribunals, before it shall be determined that they are to have the force of 
laws. Our American constitutions have provided five of these separate tribu-
nals, to wit, representatives, senate, executive,jury and judges; and have made 
it necessary that each enactment shall pass the ordeal of all these separate 
tribunals, before its authority can be established by the punishment of those 
who choose to transgress it. And there is no more absurdity or inconsistency 
in giving a jury a veto upon the laws, then [sic] there is in giving a veto to each 
of these other tribunals. The people are no more arrayed against themselves, 
when a jury puts its veto upon a statute, which the other tribunals have sanc-
tioned, than they are when the same veto is exercised by the representatives, 
the senate, the executive, or the judge." 
Scheflin, supra note 52, at 184 (quoting LYSANDER SPOONER, TRIAL BY JURY 11-12 (1852)). 
171. Thomas & Pollack, supra note 4, at 149. Within the context of juries' determina-
tions of the voluntariness of confessions, Justice Black cautioned that "the Constitution 
itself long ago made the decision thatjuries are to be trusted." Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 
368, 405 (1964) (Black,J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
172. Indeed, if a jury may rightfully disregard the direction of the court in matter 
of law, and determine for themselves what the law is in the particular case 
before them, it is difficult to perceive any legal ground upon which a verdict 
of conviction can be set aside by the court as being against law. If it be the 
function of the jury to decide the law as well as the facts-if the function of 
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determine law adversely to the government, another jury might over-
rule the judge and determine law adversely to the defendant.173 A 
jury that sides with the defendant against the government may serve as 
a safeguard against oppressive prosecutions, but a jury is more likely 
to side with the prosecution when the community is antagonistic to 
the defendant or his cause.174 A defendant facing a hostile commu-
nity must look to the judge for protection against the jury, and the 
judiciary's ability175 to curb jury prerogatives is a vital safeguard 
against arbitrary jury power.176 Thus, although permitting the jury to 
determine law might be viewed as an acceptable device for checking 
government power in a conflict between the judiciary and the people 
as represented by the jury, such a scheme may become unacceptable 
when the rights of the individual defendant are considered.177 
Judges are sometimes called upon to be courageous, because they 
must sometimes stand up to what is generally supreme in a democ-
racy: the popular will. Their most significant roles, in our system, 
the court be only advisory as to the law-why should the court interfere for 
the protection of the accused against what it deems an error of the jury in 
matter of law. 
Spaif, 156 U.S. at 101. 
173. Id. 
174. See generally Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 386 (1954) (arguing that the jury, although a "popular symbol of democracy, ..• is 
in one sense the antithesis of democratic government" as its ability to perform legal tasks is 
limited and guided by general emotional reactions). 
175. The judiciary sometimes performs no better than the jury in times of panic or 
emergency. See, e.g., Eugene V. Ros tow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE LJ. 
489 (1945) (claiming that in its decisions in the Japanese-American internment cases, the 
Supreme Court, because of its conflicting loyalties and the political climate, exercised un-
necessary judicial restraint and threatened American citizens' basic civil liberties). 
176. See JESSE H. CHOPER,jUDICIAL REvIEw AND THE NATIONAL PounCAL PROCESS 60-70 
(1980). See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), and ROBERT 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974), both of which discuss the role of the judici-
ary in protecting individual rights even when utilitarian balancing might require sacrificing 
those rights for the common good. On a less theoretical level, the Maryland experience is 
relevant. See supra note 117. 
Prior to its amendment in 1950, the Maryland Constitution's recognition of the jury as 
the final judge of law precluded appellate review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence. A 
defendant who suffered disfavor with the jury could not look to the judiciary for protection 
even when there was an "absolute failure of legal evidence to justify a conviction." Markell, 
Trial by Jury-A Two Horse Team or One Horse Teams'!, 42 MD. S.B.A 72, 81 (1937). In 1950, 
article XV, section 5 of the Maryland Constitution was amended to read as follows: "In the 
trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the 
Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction." Mo. CoNST. art. XV, 
§ 5 (emphasis added). The Maryland experience demonstrates the importance of the judi-
ciary as a safeguard against irresponsible juries. 
177. James Madison suggested that 
"[i]n our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, 
and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of 
Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which 
the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the 
constituents." 
Marcus, supra note 9, at 118 (quoting Madison). 
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are to protect the individual criminal defendant against the occa-
sional excesses of that popular will, and to preseIVe the checks and 
balances within our constitutional system that are precisely designed 
to inhibit swift and complete accomplishment of that popular 
wiu.11s 
Sixty years prior to Spaif, Justice Story insisted that the individual 
defendant had the right "to be tried according to the law of the land, 
the fixed law of the land; and not by the law as a jury may understand 
it, or choose, from wantonness, or ignorance, or accidental mistake, to 
interpret it."179 Of course this statement begs the question, for it pre-
supposes that the judge, not the jury, decides what is the law of the 
land. The question of judicial preeminence in interpreting law can-
not be resolved merely by invoking the maxim that we are a govern-
ment of laws, not a government of men.180 ":Judges are men, and 
their decisions upon complex facts must vary as those of jurors on the 
same facts. Calling one determination an opinion and the other a 
verdict does not . . . make that uniform and certain which from its 
nature must remain variable and uncertain.' "181 If juries constitute 
the rule of men because they decide cases on the basis of "random 
value judgments,"182 then the judiciary must lay claim to a superior 
basis of decision. 
There are those who look to the judiciary for "the right answer";1s3 
an answer which calls for no debatable evaluation of the concrete in-
terests appearing in a particular case. But if there is an objectively 
correct constitutional interpretation, then the identity of the deci-
sionmaker searching for the answer makes little difference. Except 
for fools and knaves, all reasonable decisionmakers (judges or jurors) 
can be guided, pushed or prodded toward the demonstrably correct 
answer. The concept of an objectively correct answer leaves little for 
any capable judge or jury to do except apply the correct constitutional 
standard to the case, while claiming absolution from responsibility for 
the fates of individual litigants- because "The Constitution made me 
do it!" The identity of the decisionmaker becomes crucial, however, if 
no objectively correct constitutional interpretation exists but instead 
only answers chosen by political bodies within broad textual con-
straints. If constitutional interpretation is a matter of political choice 
178. Scalia, supra note 19, at 1180. 
179. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545). 
180. See Robert M. Cover, Fareward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HAR.v. L. REv. 4, 46-53 
(1983) (arguing that what you or I say is "The Law" is on the same normative plane as what 
a majority of the Supreme Court would say is "The Law"). 
181. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALrIY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 180 
(1950) (quoting an uncited New Hampshire decision). See generally KENNETii C. DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 17 (1969) (arguing that "[e]very system of 
administration of justice has always had a large measure of discretionary power"); Lon L. 
Fuller, Reason & Fiat in Case Law, 59 HAR.v. L. REv. 376 (1946) (arguing that judges draw 
their opinions not only from personal predilection and judicial fiat but from the inherent 
limitations of their positions and the need to ensure that their decisions are "right"). 
182. See Earl V. Brown, Commentary, 10 VA.]. INT'L L. 108, 111 (1969) (arguing that 
when juries make decisions based on their own beliefs, they are making a decision based 
on mankind's rules, not the law). 
183. See generally Gary C. Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1361, 1378-92 
(1979) (discussing the "right answer" thesis). 
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among equal or nearly equal alternative interpretations, then the 
question is who to empower to make such choices. The Spaif Court 
claimed power for the judiciary because of its ability to determine law 
according to settled, fixed, legal principles.184 Principled consistency in 
determining law is a means of avoiding the randomness of juries, 
which may treat similarly situated defendants differently;185 moreover, 
sometimes, particularly in the case of the Fourth Amendment, "it is 
more important that the applicable rule oflaw be settled rather than 
that it be settled right."186 
Stripped of superficial references to the law/fact distinction, or to 
law as the conclusion in a formal syllogism,187 Spaifwas but a variation 
on the ageless conflict between Law and Equity; between codifiers of 
the law and common law judges; between firm rules and flexible stan-
dards. Seen in this light, Spaif posed a fundamental dilemma as to the 
structural nature of the decisionmaking process in a democratic na-
tion's tribunals. Which political entity,judge or jury, wields the power 
to make imperfect decisions which are nonetheless binding? Allocat-
ing power to the jury enhances our system's checks onjudicial power 
but sacrifices uniformity and consistency in the law by encouraging 
the jury's uneven and unequal administration of justice. On the other 
hand, sanctioning "the orderly supervision of public affairs by 
judges"188 better achieves uniformity, but at the cost of ensconcing a 
184. Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 74 (1895). 
185. The Spaefopinion concludes with a quote from Justice Curtis: "'The sole end of 
courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and impartially, without respect of persons 
or times, or the opinions of men.'" Id. at 107 (quoting United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 
1323, 1336 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815)). 
186. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,]., dissent-
ing), overruled by Helvering v. Bank.line Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938). Stability of Fourth 
Amendment law provides guidance for police officers in the field; thus the "first principle" 
of Fourth Amendment interpretation is that the constitutional standard must be "workable 
for application by rank-and-file, trained police officers." Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 
772 (1983). Justice Scalia explained that he objected to the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test in Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988), because "I thought that the law could 
properly be made even more precise. I joined Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which said 
that police conduct cannot constitute a 'seizure' until (as that word connotes) it has had a 
restraining effect." Scalia, supra note 19, at 1184. Justice Scalia's approach became the 
Court's holding in California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991). 
187. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 
431, 439-53 (1930) (maintaining that the formalist method of syllogistic reasoning is neces-
sarily indeterminate not only because the judge could choose among an almost infinite set 
of principles as initial premises, but because there is no inevitable method of deduction 
even from agreed principles). 
188. Howe, supra note 53, at 615. See generally MAx WEBER, LAw IN EcoNOMY AND Soc1-
ETI (1954) (suggesting that the judiciary and other personnel associated with the courts 
tend to develop a subculture of their own, with legal norms derived more from the need 
for predictability and administrative convenience than from concern for equity). 
It is difficult if not impossible to distinguish between rules imposed by the Court to 
facilitate efficient administration of law and rules derived from the Constitution. See, e.g., 
Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (O'Connor,]., dissenting) (noting difference 
between "constitutionat-as opposed to purely judicial-limits on governmental action"); see 
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judiciary beyond the immediate control of the people. How is the 
balance to be struck between competing goals of similar, if not equal, 
value? 
In Part III of this Article, I discuss a proposed structural balance for 
Fourth Amendment decisionmaking. But first it is necessary to con-
sider whether current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has fulfilled 
Spaif' s pledge that the judiciary will deliver consistency and uniform-
ity by determining law according to settled, fixed, legal principles. 
II. The Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
"[A] jury is expected to be governed by law, and the law it slwuld 
receive from the court. "189 
"'[T]hejuxywanttoknowwhetherthatarwhatyou told us, when we 
first went out, was raly the law, or whether it was only jist your 
notion.' "190 
Because this Article focuses on a role for the jury in determining 
reasonable searches and seizures, a lengthy chronicle of the judiciary' s 
development of Fourth Amendment law is unnecessary. We need ex-
amine only the basic methodology the courts utilize when they inter-
pret the amendment and whether use of that methodology is within 
the judiciary's exclusive dominion. 
Historically, the major issues of Fourth Amendment litigation fell 
into four discrete categories: (1) the scope of the amendment-the 
circumstances in which the protections of the amendment come into 
play as opposed to situations where the amendment is inapplicable;191 
(2) the standards of the amendment-determination of what factors 
make a search constitutionally reasonable or unreasonable;192 (3) 
standing to raise Fourth Amendment questions-identification of who 
is entitled to invoke the protections of the amendment;193 and ( 4) the 
also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 160 ("But we all know that 
permanent judges acquire an Esprit de corps, that being known they are liable to be 
tempted by bribery, that they are misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party, by a 
devotion to the Executive or Legislative."). 
189. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 63 (quoting the trial court's instruction to the jury). 
190. Howe, supra note 53, at 582 (quoting FoRD, HisroRY OF ILUN01s 84 (1854) (quot-
ing the foreman of a nineteenth-century jury)). 
191. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people rather than places). See generally Charles E. Moylan, Jr., The 
Fourth Amendment lnapplicabl.e vs. the Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold of "So 
What?", 1977 S. lu.. U. LJ. 75 (stating that a distinction must be made between the Fourth 
Amendment being applicable and being satisfied. Applicability of the amendment rests on 
four broad factors of coverage relating to the place searched, the trespassing searcher, the 
victim of the search, and the presence of waiver of protection.). 
192. See, e.g., Dunawayv. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-14 (1979) (finding the balancing 
test to be a narrowly limited exception to the principle that seizures are reasonable only if 
supported by probable cause). See generally Ronald]. Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: 
The Rise and Fall of Probabl.e Cause, 1979 U. ILL. LF. 763 (discussing the traditional probable 
cause doctrine and arguing that "its premises are ultimately subjectively derived"). 
193. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-40 (1978) (stating that only parties 
whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated may benefit from its protections). See 
generally William A. Knox, Some Thoughts on the Sc<>jle of the Fourth Amendment and Standing To 
Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REv. 1, 2 (1975) (discussing the standing require-
ments for assertion of Fourth Amendment violations and proposing that "standing should 
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remedy for Fourth Amendment violations-determination of when the 
exclusionary rule applies.194 Since the days of the Warren Court, and 
particularly the seminal decision in Katz v. United States, 195 the distinc-
tive nature of those four categories has been in doubt. 
A. The Scope of the Fourth Amendment 
Prior to Katz the scope of the amendment turned upon whether 
there had been a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected 
area.196 Katz overturned the requirement for physical trespass but in 
its stead offered only a nebulous new standard of protecting "those 
expectations of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable. "197 Subsequent Supreme Court opinions contain intriguing 
variations on the Katz standard, as the Court has referred to the scope 
of the amendment in terms of "reasonable,"198 "justifiable,"199 or "le-
gitimate"200 expectations of privacy. The various formulations of the 
Katz standard may be significant because each formulation has a bear-
ing on the methodology used to determine the standard and the issue 
of who is the proper decisionmaker.201 
At present, the Court asserts that it is the appropriate and exclusive 
decisionmaker to determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 
"Our problem," Justice White wrote, "is what expectations of privacy 
are constitutionally justifiable' -what expectations the Fourth 
Amendment will protect .... "202 Justice Douglas cryptically added 
that "citizens must bear only those threats to privacy which we decide 
be granted whenever there is an arguable violation of the fourth amendment rights of the 
individual who is seeking to challenge"). 
194. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (generally restricting 
the use of the exclusionary rule to those situations where the "Government's unlawful con-
duct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of a search"). See 
generally Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as 
a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1975) (discussing the constitutional 
principles governing the direct and derivative use of illegally obtained evidence); Potter 
Stewart, The &ad to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the 
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and.Seizure Cases, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983) (discussing the 
origin of and future for the exclusionary rule). 
195. 389 U.S. at 347. 
196. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled b:J Katz, 389 U.S. at 
347. 
197. Ka~ 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Katz established that the Fourth 
Amendment is implicated only in cases in which the state intrudes upon "a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy ..• that society accepts as objectively reasonable." California v. Green-
wood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988). 
198. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973). 
199. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). 
200. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140-49 (1978). 
201. See infra text accompanying notes 288-93. 
202. White, 401 U.S. at 752 (emphasis added). 
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to impose."203 As the exclusive arbiter of society's reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy, the Court has chosen to employ a utilitarian balanc-
ing of societal interests. 
Judicial balancing of societal interests accords with the "Legal Real-
ism" school of jurisprudence -whose patron saint, Justice Holmes, 
maintained that the judicial function necessarily and properly involves 
"considerations of what is expedient for the community con-
cemed."204 Justice Cardozo, another legal realist, maintained that 
analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more: 
logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted stan-
dards of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in combina-
tion shape the progress of the law. Which of these forces shall 
dominate in any case, must depend largely upon the comparative 
importance or value of the social interest that will be thereby pro-
moted or impaired.2os 
By embracing the view, if not the label, of legal realists, the Court 
abandoned the nineteenth-century legal formalism which underlay 
the Sparj decision. "Nineteenth century legal formalism in America 
was exemplified by the view that adjudication proceeds by deduction 
from virtually absolute legal principles rooted in natural law and en-
shrined in both the common law and the Constitution."206 Today, 
however, deductions from the operative premises of formalist thought 
have given way to a subjective, relativistic, and indeterminate debate 
in which majority and dissenting Justices claim to be supporting the 
cause of sound social policy. Although legal formalism may be reas-
serting itself,207 not even an echo of Sparj's legal formalism remains 
in the Court's post-Katz efforts to measure the "impact on the individ-
ual's sense of security balanced against the utility of the [govern-
ment's] conduct as a technique oflaw enforcement."2os 
B. Fourth Amendment Standards 
To determine the standards for a constitutional search, the Justices 
have engaged in a long-standing debate over the relationship of the 
amendment's two conjunctive clauses: the Reasonableness Clause 
and the Warrant Clause.209 One group of Justices regarded the War-
rant Clause's requirement of probable cause as the substantive justifi-
cation for a constitutional search. In the terminology of legal 
203. Williamson v. United States, 405 U.S. 1026, 1029 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (emphasis added). 
204. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAw 35 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) 
(1881). 
205. B~AMIN N. CARoozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921). 
206. Note, Formalism, Legal Realism and Constitutiona~ Protected Privacy Under the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REv. 945, 948 (1977) (footnote omitted). 
207. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991),Justice Scalia stated 
that the Fourth Amendment "should not become less than" the common law. Id. at 1677 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 & n.3 (1991), 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, asserted that with respect to the seizures of a person, 
the Amendment can never mean more than the common law. 
208. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan,J., dissenting). 
209. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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formalism, probable cause most often was referred to as a fixed stan-
dard which applied uniformly whenever the amendment applied.210 
Under this view, the Warrant Clause was dominant, and although the 
Reasonableness Clause could excuse the absence of a warrant in cer-
tain situations, the Reasonableness Clause could not authorize a 
search in the absence of probable cause.211 
The Court, however, subsequently placed increased emphasis on 
the Reasonableness Clause and the inherent flexibility of utilitarian 
balancing when it defined the substantive requirements for a constitu-
tional search.212 Reasonableness was seen as the ultimate standard for 
a constitutional search, and unlike the formalistic definition of prob-
able cause, reasonableness varied according to the "facts and circum-
stances of each case. "213 Reasonableness as a flexible standard and 
probable cause as a relatively rigid and uniform standard represent 
very discrete views of the Fourth Amendment. But the two standards 
have lost their distinctiveness with the Court's recognition of a sliding 
scale of probable cause that imports into the Warrant Clause the flexi-
bility that previously had been unique to the Reasonableness Clause. 
In Camera v. Municipal Court, 214 and in Teny v. Ohio, 215 the Court 
abandoned the formalistic pretense that probable cause was a fixed 
and uniform standard deduced from virtually absolute principles en-
shrined in the Constitution. The Court redefined the probable cause 
standard as a compromise for accommodating the opposing interests 
of the government and individual citizens216 and also recognized that 
the same compromise is not called for in all situations.217 This con-
cept of a variable standard of probable cause is every bit as flexible 
and nebulous as the reasonableness standard.218 In fact, despite the 
210. Bacigal, supra note 192, at 767-70. 
211. "In cases where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer 
acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court [he has] probable cause." 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). 
212. Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (holding that reasonable 
searches without a warrant do not violate the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the practi-
cability of obtaining a search warrant}, overruled lTy Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 
(1969) with Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (holding that seizing contra-
band without a warrant, when obtaining a search warrant would have been practicable, 
violated the Fourth Amendment}, overruled Uy Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 66. 
213. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63. 
214. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
215. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
216. The test for a permissible search became whether "a valid public interest justifies 
the [particular] intrusion contemplated" by the authorities. Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. 
217. Justice Clark referred to Camara as creating a "newfangled warrant system that is 
entirely foreign to Fourth Amendment standards" as it allowed the issuance of "paper" 
warrants issued by a magistrate absent probable cause. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 
547 (1967) (Clark,J., dissenting). 
218. In place ofa rigid definition of probable cause as a "reasonable belief," the Court 
now uses such terms as "reasonable suspicion," United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873, 878-84 (1975), and "clear indication," Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 
(1966). The lower courts have referred to the required level of probable cause as "real 
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Court's protest to the contrary,219 the two standards are essentially the 
same. 220 When the Court resolves the constitutionality of a search by 
employing a single methodology-balancing governmental and indi-
vidual interests-it makes little difference whether the balancing is 
done to determine what is reasonable or to determine what level of 
probable cause is required. 
The flexibility of the balancing approach to Fourth Amendment 
standards not only merges the Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, 
but it also subsumes the threshold question of the amendment's 
scope. The Court, secure in the knowledge that it may weigh and 
balance any number of factors when addressing the Fourth Amend-
ment standards of reasonableness or flexible probable cause, often es-
chews rigorous analysis of the scope of the amendment.221 For 
example, in United States v. Mendenhall, 222 only two members of the 
majority bothered to address the issue of whether a seizure had taken 
place. The three concurring Justices were willing to assume that a 
seizure occurred and confined their consideration to whether the 
standard of reasonable suspicion had been met. 223 Mendenhall and 
other recent decisions224 demonstrate that the Court allows itself al-
ternative expressions of a single determination: the standard of the 
suspicion," Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967), "some knowl-
edge," Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 1966), "mere possibility," Peo-
ple v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973), and non-
whimsical suspicion, People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 563, 569-70 (1976). Of course, the 
important constitutional consideration is the distinction between mere suspicion and reason-
able suspicion, or between mere belief and reasonable belief. The concept of reasonableness 
is the significant legal determination; references to belief, suspicion and justification are 
surplusage. 
219. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) (stating that because the bal-
ancing test of Terry v. Ohio "involved an exception to the general rule requiring probable 
cause, this Court has been careful to maintain its narrow scope"). 
220. When probable cause is viewed as a multitude of compromises which resolves a 
multitude of conflicting governmental and individual interests, the required degree of 
probable cause becomes part of the balance or compromise itself. See Bacigal, supra note 
192, at 782; Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. 
REv. 257, 326-40 (1984) (arguing that the Court has reduced the probable cause standard 
into a factor in the reasonableness determination). 
221. The oral arguments in Browerv. County oflnyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), demonstrate 
the Court's tendency to blur the existence of a seizure with the reasonableness of that 
seizure. During presentation of plaintiff's argument, counsel made it clear that he pre-
ferred not to explore the ultimate reasonableness of the seizure. But, assaulted by ques-
tions on this issue throughout his presentation, "counsel was at pains to assure the justices 
that the question was not before them at this time and a reversal of the lower court's 
decision would mean only that the reasonableness of the seizure could finally be put to the 
test." 44 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at4149 (Feb. 1, 1989). When the Justices continued 
to raise questions about the reasonableness of the seizure, counsel pleaded: "All we want, 
he reminded the justices, is for you to say that there was a seizure here so that we can 
explore the question of reasonableness." Id. at 4150. 
222. 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
223. Id. at 560 (Powell,J., concurring). 
224. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971). The Wyman majority devoted 
nine pages to discussing the reasonableness of a search if the Court "were to assume that a 
caseworker's home visit, ... somehow ... and despite its interview nature, does possess 
some of the characteristics of a search in the traditional sense." Id. at 318; see also Cardwell 
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (holding that ifa warrantless examination of the exterior of 
defendant's car was a search, it intruded upon the lower expectation of privacy in an auto-
mobile and could be justified by probable cause). 
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amendment has been met if the government interest is deemed suffi-
cient to set aside privacy, or, in the terminology of the scope inquiry, 
the privacy interest may be deemed insufficient to trigger Fourth 
Amendment protection.22s 
C. Standing to Invoke the Fourth Amendment 
The Court's adoption of a flexible balancing approach to the 
Fourth Amendment merges not only the questions of the amend-
ment's scope and substantive standards, but also the previously dis-
tinct categories of standing to invoke the amendment's protections 
and the application of the exclusionary rule. Prior to Rakas v. Illi-
nois, 226 the Court had formulated rules of ~automatic" standing, which 
were not tied to expectations of privacy and the balancing ap-
proach. 227 Rakas, however, suggested that Katz's expectation of pri-
vacy formulation228 should be the sole criterion to determine standing 
to invoke Fourth Amendment protections.229 When United States v. 
Salvucc[230 and Rawlings v. Kentuckjl31 eliminated the last vestiges of 
"automatic" standing, the traditional standing inquiry was placed 
within the purview of the Katz formulation: whether the government 
had infringed upon a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy.2s2 
The question of Fourth Amendment standing is thus subsumed within 
the question of the amendment's scope, which in tum is subsumed 
within the question of the amendment's reasonableness standard. 
D. The Remedy far Fourth Amendment Violations 
Justice White, dissenting in Rakas, argued that the majority had un-
dercut the substantive protections of the Fourth Amendment to fur-
ther its desire to reduce the operation of the amendment's 
225. "The similarity in the Court's handling of the questions of what constitutes a 
search, when does probable cause exist, and when may the police search without a warrant 
is striking." Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of 
Lawyering, 48 IND. LJ. 329, 364 (1973). 
226. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
227. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960) (creating a broad stan-
dard "by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may chal-
lenge its legality"), ooerruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). See generally 
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Tenn-Foreword: The Fonns of justice, 93 HAR.v. L. RE.v. 
62, 171 (1979) (discussing the Court's attempt to give practical content to the principle 
that a person's capacity to claim Fourth Amendment protection against a search depends 
upon whether the claimant had a justifiable expectation of privacy in the area searched). 
228. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text. 
229. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142-43. 
230. See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91-92 ("In Rakas, this Court held that an illegal search only 
violates the rights of those who have a 'legitimate expectation of privacy in the place 
invaded.'"). 
231. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
232. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 95 ("We are convinced that the automatic standing rule ••• 
has outlived its usefulness in this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."). 
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exclusionary rule.233 In reality, the Court's approach to the exclusion-
ary rule is yet another aspect of the balancing approach that has come 
to dominate all Fourth Amendment considerations. Whatever the 
original basis of the amendment's exclusionary rule,234 the present 
Court regards the rule as "a judicially created remedy designed to safe-
guard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent ef-
fect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party 
aggrieved."235 When not clearly bound by precedent,236 the Court 
views itself as free to apply or not to apply the exclusionary rule de-
pending upon whether the incremental benefits in terms of deter-
rence are likely to outweigh the incremental costs in terms of 
excluding relevant and trustworthy evidence. 237 
E. Summary of the Court's "Balancing" Jurisprudence 
There seems little point in continuing to separate the Fourth 
Amendment into concepts of sc"ope, standards, standing, and rem-
edy238 when the Court resolves all of these issues by resort to the sin-
gle methodology of flexible case-by-case balancing of individual and 
governmental interests.239 The "incoherence, confusion and intellec-
tual dishonesty of resulting Supreme Court search-and-seizure juris-
prudence is common knowledge. "240 Two decades ago Professor 
233. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 168-69 (White,]., dissenting). 
234. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court referred to deterrence, judicial 
integrity, and the intimate relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 
235. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
236. Former Chief Justice Burger indicated his willingness to overturn Mapp if certain 
conditions were met. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, CJ., concur-
ring); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
420-21 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). 
237. See, e.g., Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 (discussing disparity between deterrent effect on 
police and undermining of justice); United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (refus-
ing to exclude from federal criminal proceedings evidence seized unlawfully by state en-
forcement officer, because such exclusion "has not been shown to have a sufficient 
likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so that it outweighs the societal costs 
imposed by the exclusion"). See also Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in United States 
v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1980), in which he criticized selective application of deter-
rence rationale as "freewheeling." The Court recently explained that "[w]e simply con-
cluded in Stone that the costs of applying the exclusionary rule on collatera) review 
outweighed any potential advantage to be gained by applying it there." Withrow v. Wil-
liams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1750 (1993). 
238. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text. 
239. "'[T]he balancing of competing interests' [is] 'the key principle of the Fourth 
Amendment.'" Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. l, 8 (1985) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 
452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) ); see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of 
Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 989-92 (1987) (criticizing balancing of interests in Tennessee v. 
Gamer and noting that its "analysis neither relies upon nor constructs a theory of the 
Fourth Amendment; it does not examine the purpose, scope or source of the protection 
against unreasonable seizures"). 
240. David Schuman, Taking Law Seriously: Communitarian Search and Seizure, 27 AM. 
CRIM. L. REv. 583, 591 (1990); see Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis M. Seidman, The Fourth 
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. LJ. 19, 29 (1988) (arguing that the "Court has 
produced a series of inconsistent and bizarre results that it has left entirely undefended"). 
Justice Powell conceded that Fourth Amendment law is "intolerably confusing." Robbins v. 
California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell,]., concurring). Many of the doctrinal incon-
sistencies in the Court's Fourth Amendment universe are catalogued in Wayne R. LaFave, 
The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 
U. Prrr. L. REv. 307 (1982). 
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White warned that " [ w] e may be on the threshold of a Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence in which the only question is whether the 
Supreme Court believes a police practice to be 'reasonable.' "241 
Other commentators suggest that the Court has abandoned all at-
tempts at principled analysis242 or doctrinal coherency243 in Fourth 
Amendment cases in favor of resolving each individual case according 
to the "fundamental fairness" approach of Rnchin v. Califomia.244 
Taken to its logical end, the Court's balancing approach to the Fourth 
Amendment reduces all deliberations to two related fundamental in-
quiries: (1) how much and what type of privacy or liberty does a rea-
sonably free society require; and (2) how much and what type of 
intrusion upon privacy or liberty is required to further a reasonably 
ordered society?245 Of course, the Fourth Amendment is not unique 
in posing such fundamental quandaries because all public law issues 
are reducible to a balancing of individual and governmental interests 
for the perceived good of society. 246 This abstract framing of the is-
sues is not particularly helpful when deciding specific cases, but it 
does illustrate the fundamental questions which underlie the Court's 
balancing approach to the Fourth Amendment.247 
241. James B. White, The Fourth Amendment As a Way of Ta!Aing About People: A Study of 
Robinson and Matlock, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 165, 170. 
242. Larry W. Yackle, The Burger.Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. REv. 335, 
427 (1978). 
243. Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. 
L. REv. 603, 603 (1982). 
244. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). "[T]he Constitution is viewed as a broom closet in which 
constitutional interests are stored and taken out when appropriate to be considered with 
other social values." Aleinikoff, supra note 239, at 989. 
245. "[T]he practical calculus evident in the search and seizure corpus is to decide how 
much individual liberty is compatible with the social interest in security." Gerard V. Brad-
ley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DEPAUL L. REv. 817, 859 (1989); see 
also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61 (1949) (Jackson,]., concurring) (noting that the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights can be seen as "the maximum restrictions upon the power 
of organized society over the individual that are compatible with the maintenance of or-
ganized society itself'); LANnYNsKI, supra note 24, at 13 (stating that issues raised under the 
Fourth Amendment "bring into sharp focus the classic dilemma of order vs. liberty in the 
democratic state"). 
246. See Anita L. Allen, Autonomy s Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional Interpretation, 
72 B.U. L. REv. 683, 696-97 (1992) ("The great practical value of the American Constitu-
tion is that its inspirational general language allows, invites, and requires hard judicial 
thinking about the ideal terms and conditions of social and economic life."). The balanc-
ing of conflicting interests has become "a sort of universal solvent . . • for resolving all 
constitutional questions." White, supra note 241, at 167. "[A]n animated due process guar-
antee clause could, according to prevailing canons of interpretation, house all of our con-
stitutional law." Bradley, supra note 245, at 865 (footnote omitted). 
247. The burden of judicial interpretation is to "translat[e] the majestic generalities of 
the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth 
century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth 
century." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). 
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Faced with this type of question, 24s and told by countless commen-
tators that it is making moral and political decisions based on its con-
ception of a good society, it is not surprising that "the Court has 
maintained delphic silence concerning the substantive tradeoff be-
tween "249 law enforcement and privacy. 
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the gen-
eral standard of "unreasonableness" as a guide in determining 
whether searches and seizures meet the standard of that amend-
ment in those cases where a warrant is not required. Very little that 
has been said in our previous decisions ... and very little that we 
might say here can usefully refine the language of the amendment 
itself in order to evolve some detailed formula for judging cases 
such as this. 250 
My point here is not to belabor the obvious deficiencies in legal 
analysis as a means of discovering the ideal mixture of freedom and 
order in some utopian society. All but the most naive disciples of law 
recognize that if there is a utopian ideal, the judiciary, like all mortals, 
possesses a limited ability to divine this paradigm. My goal is simply to 
remind members of the judiciary and' the academy that a healthy dose 
of humility about the blessings of legal analysis will foster a greater 
tolerance for alternative methodologies and alternative entities-such 
as juries-who employ less orthodox analysis. 
When commentators refer to the Court's fluctuating views on the 
Fourth Amendment as "an embarrassing chapter of supreme judicial 
schizophrenia,"251 it is increasingly apparent that the Court has re-
neged on Spaif's promise of uniformity and consistency in the law. 
The Court determines the reasonableness of a search or seizure as if it 
were a jury, free to assess and balance the unique aspects of an individ-
ual case and to decide justice in that particular case without regard to 
general rules or principles. 252 The collective People supposedly pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment are thus subjected to conditions 
prohibited by the Roman maxim: Misera est servitus, ubi jus vagum aut 
248. To reach such a stage is, in a way, a regrettable concession of defeat-an ac-
knowledgment that we have passed the point where "law," properly speaking, 
has any further application. And to reiterate the unfortunate practical conse-
quences of reaching such a pass when there still remains a good deal of judg-
ment to be applied: equality of treatment is difficult to demonstrate and, in a 
multi-tiered judicial system, impossible to achieve; predictability is destroyed; 
judicial arbitrariness is facilitated; judicial courage is impaired. 
Scalia, supra note 19, at 1182. 
249. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 240, at 111. 
250. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973) (citations omitted); see also Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 n.11 (1983) (noting that Fourth Amendment issues are so fact-
intensive that determinations of reasonableness in one case will rarely shed light on the 
next case). 
251. Charles E. Moylan, Jr., The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search 
Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REv. 1047, 1052 (1975). 
252. "The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of pre-
cise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need 
for the particular search against the invasion of the personal rights that the search entails." 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (emphasis added). 
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incertum. 253 Where search-and-seizure law fs unknown and unknow-
able, the judges wielding the lash of power are out of control because 
" [ w] hen a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled princi-
ple to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope 
of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope 
of his authority. "254 
In the light of the judiciary's inability to formulate settled, fixed, 
legal principles of Fourth Amendment law, the benefits of judicial 
consistency were overvalued in Sparf.255 A realistic estimate of the 
consistency of current Fourth Amendment decisions might tip the 
scales in favor of the jury's determination of search-and-seizure law, 
and. lead to a reversal of Sparf.256 Rather than restate the familiar ar-
guments against judicial suprem~cy, however, I accept-for purposes 
of this Article-that within its institutional limitations, the Court does 
and will continue to balance. conflicting interests for the perceived 
good of society.257 With that assumption, I move on to consider the 
possible interaction bet:ween the Court's role and a proposed role for 
253. It is the wretched state of slavery which subsists where the law is vague or 
uncertain. 
254. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981). 
255. The Court's balancing efforts do not "conform[ ] to the disciplined analytical 
method described as 'legal reasoning,' through which judges endeavor to formulate or 
derive principles of decision that can be applied consistently and predictably." United 
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Note, supra note 
206, at 948 (stating that "[n]ineteenth century legal formalism in America was exemplified 
by the view that adjudication proceeds by deduction from virtually absolute legal principles 
rooted in natural law and enshrined in both the common law and the Constitution") (foot-
note omitted)). 
The Court's balancing opinions are radically underwritten: 
[I]nterests are identified and a winner is proclaimed or a rule is announced 
which strikes an "appropriate" balance, but there is little discussion of the 
valuation standards. Some rough, intuitive scale calibrated in degrees of "im-
portance" appears to be at work. But to a large extent, the balancing takes 
place inside a black box. Of course, the hidden process raises the specter of 
the kind of judicial decisionmaking that the Realists warned us about and that 
balancing promised to overcome. 
Aleinikoff, supra note 239, at 976 (footnote omitted). 
256. In the seventeen Fourth Amendment cases decided in 1983-84, 
the Supreme Court has never reached the same result as all lower courts and 
has usually reversed the highest court below, rendering a total of sixty-one 
separate opinions in the process. Thus it is apparent that not only do the 
police not understand fourth amendment law, but that even the courts, after 
briefing, argument, and calm reflection, cannot agree as to what police behav-
ior is appropriate in a particular case. 
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1468 (1985). 
257. The Court may claim the authority to determine social policy within the context of 
a specific case, if only for the reason that someone has to resolve the particular dispute. 
Even justice according to the length of the Chancellor's foot is preferable to anarchy, and 
deliberation must end by enunciating something-law-that constrains the deliberation 
itseif. Prior to 1966, British courts exercised discretion to make law if, and only if, there 
was no applicable law. Once the court's decision was in place, the court lost authority to 
remake or unmake law. See London St. Tramways Co. v. London County Council, 1898 
App. Cas. 375, 381. 
1994] 401 
the jury in determining search-and-seizure law. The proposed struc-
ture for Fourth Amendment decisionmaking does not attempt to shift 
search-and-seizure issues from the exclusive domain of judges to the 
exclusive dominion of juries. In an attempt to forge a workable ac-
commodation between stability and flexibility, both judge and jury are 
given a role in determining search-and-seizure law. 258 
IIL A Structure for Fourth Amendment Decisionmaking 
Although most Fourth Amendment decisions have turned upon a 
nebulous balancing of the totality of the circumstances, the Court 
must be given its due for attempting, at times, to inject stability and 
uniformity into the amendment's jurisprudence by treating all simi-
larly situated defendants alike.259 When the Court does so, however, it 
finds itself trapped between general rules of law and individualized 
justice. The dilemma was foremost in Pennsylvania v. Mimms260 when 
the Court was asked to rule on the police practice of ordering "all 
drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had 
been stopped for a traffic violation."261 The Court addressed this uni-
form practice without inquiring whether the individual police officer 
had any suspicion that the particular motorist was likely to be armed 
and dangerous. 262 In upholding the police practice, the Court relied 
upon statistical evidence, which showed "'that a significant percentage 
of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traf-
fic stops.' "263 The Court balanced the generalized governmental in-
terest in protecting police from attack by armed motorists against the 
generalized privacy interest of motorists as a class.264 In holding that 
all motorists must obey an order to exit their vehicles after a lawful 
258. What I propose in the Fourth Amendment context is what Paul Freund once pro-
posed in the context of determining clear and present danger: "[A] double test ... , one 
from the general standpoint of legislative policy and the other from the standpoint of the 
acts of these defendants." Paul A. Freund, Review of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in SUPREME 
CouRT AND SUPREME LAw 47, 47-53 (Edmond Cohn ed., 1968). It is also a practice that is 
followed when states invest the jury with a supplemental power to determine the admissibil-
ity of confessions. See infra notes 325-29 and accompanying text. 
259. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (holding that 
warrantless routine checkpoint stops are consistent with the Fourth Amendment); South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (holding that warrantless standard inven-
tory searches of lawfully impounded vehicles are "reasonable" under the Fourth Amend-
ment); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that warrantless 
search of a person incident to a lawful custodial arrest is permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
260. 434 U.S. 106 (1977). Automobile searches are the quintessential examples of the 
Court's uneven embrace of "bright line" rules that further stability in the law. The majori-
ties in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 
(1981), favored general rules that govern the search of all automobiles where certain gen-
eral conditions are met. The dissenters favored a case-by-case ad hoc determination of the 
need to search a particular automobile. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 826 (White,]., dissenting); id. 
at 827 (Marshall,J., dissenting); Belton, 453 U.S. at 463 (Brennan,]., dissenting); id. at 472 
(White, J., dissenting). 
261. 434 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added). 
262. The state conceded that "the officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the 
particular driver at the time of the stop, there having been nothing unusual or suspicious 
about his behavior." Id. at 109. 
263. Id. at 110 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973)). 
264. Id. at ll l. 
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stop, the Court attempted to treat all similarly situated defendants 
alike. 
This uniformity, however, was achieved by sacrificing flexibility. As 
Justice Stevens noted in dissent: 
The Court cannot seriously believe that the risk to the arresting of-
ficer is so universal that his safety is always a reasonable justification 
for ordering a driver out of his car. The commuter on his way 
home to dinner, the parent driving children to school, the tourist 
circling the Capitol, or the family on a Sunday afternoon outing 
hardly pose the same threat as a driver curbed after a high-speed 
chase through a high-crime area late at night. Nor is it universally 
true that the driver's interest in remaining in the car is negligible. 
A woman stopped at night may fear for her own safety; a person in 
poor health may object to standing in the cold or rain; another who 
left home in haste to drive children or spouse to school or to the 
train may not be fully dressed; an elderly driver who presents no 
possible threat of violence may regard the police command as noth-
ing more than an arrogant and unnecessary display of authority. 
Whether viewed from the standpoint of the officer's interest in his 
own safety, or of the citizen's interest in not being required to obey 
an arbitrary command, it is perfectly obvious that the millions of 
traffic stops that occur every year are not fungible.265 
Justice Stevens's preference for an "individualized inquiry into the 
particular facts justifying every police intrusion"266 reflects the judici-
ary' s traditional concern for adjudicative facts rather than legislative 
facts such as the statistical evidence cited by the majority.267 Instead 
of forcing fact patterns into preconceived categories, the judiciary's 
traditional function is to weigh all the circumstances in an effort to 
reach the right outcome: reasonableness under the circumstances. 
The genius of the common law, so the theory goes, was that by stick-
ing close to the facts of the case, the law would grow and develop, not 
through the pronouncement of general principles, but case-by-case, 
incrementally, one step at a time. Every interpretation of a common 
law rule is thus a reconstruction of our sense of the rule's meaning 
and rightness. The meaning of the rule emerges, develops, and 
changes in the course of applying it to specific facts. 
265. Id. at 120.21 (Stevens,J., dissenting). 
266. Id. at 116. 
267. Professor Gary A. Ahrens asserts: 
The fundamental value at the base of the ... fourth amendment is the com-
mitment to treating persons who come before the law on the basis of their 
individual, particular, uncommon, and odd property and attributes. Juristic 
procedures which help show the unique characteristics of individuals and ac-
tions to the decision-maker provide the factual evidentiary base for legal judg-
ments which avoid abstract moral structures and remain useful as 
explanations of external phenomena. 
Gary A. Ahrens, Privacy and Property: Can They Remain After juridical Personality is Lost?, 11 
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1077, 1082 (1978) {footnote omitted). 
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The common law's focus on adjudicative facts, however, fails to ac-
count for the institutional role of a supreme court that controls its 
own docket and is free to choose the particular factual situations in 
which to interpret law. "The idyllic notion of 'the court' gradually 
closing in on a fully articulated rule of law by deciding one discrete 
fact situation after another . . . simply cannot be applied to a court 
that will revisit the area in question with great infrequency. "268 The 
Supreme Court's prime institutional task is to deal with issues of sig-
nificant public interest, not merely to do justice to the particular par-
ties of the relatively rare case in which certiorari has been granted. 259 
Thus, Fourth Amendment cases actually granted review are best seen 
as vehicles for articulating broad principles and analytical methods270 
designed to guide lower courts, prosecutors, defense counsel, and 
most important, the police.271 When the Court abandons its institu-
tional role-and Spaif's promise272-of determining law according to 
general principles in favor of unstructured, ad hoc balancing of the 
total circumstances, the Court leaves us with murky law for this day 
and only this case. 273 
In keeping with a structural view of the Bill of Rights as an allocation 
of decisionmaking power, it also would be a mistake to view the Fram-
ers as commissioning "the judiciary to develop a common law of 
search-and-seizure as time goes by and as circumstances demand." 
Professor Gerard Bradley has argued that such a view is "clearly 
wrong."274 
First, there is no historical evidence to support it; instead, it has 
been at some point since the founding that courts have seized the 
[amendment's Reasonableness] clause as a charter for judicial law-
making. Second, the suggestion cannot be sustained as a historical 
matter. Even a passing acquaintance with anti-federalist rhetoric 
shows that the independent federal judiciary was regarded as a 
profound threat to popular liberty, and not the bulwark we have 
268. Scalia, supra note 19, at 1178. The assumption "that fourth amendment law can 
develop meaningfully on a case by case basis, and which finds great significance in differ-
ing factual situations, is an abysmal failure." Dworkin, supra note 225, at 334. 
269. "[A] court addressing a discretionary review petition is not primarily concerned 
with the correctness of the judgment below. Rather, review is generally granted only if a 
case raises an issue of significant public interest or jurisprudential importance or conflicts 
with controlling precedent." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977) (citing Ross v. 
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 615-17 (1974)). 
270. Let us not quibble about the theoretical scope of a "holding": the modern 
reality, at least, is that when the Supreme Court of the federal system, or of 
one of the state systems, decides a case, not merely the outcome of that deci-
sion, but the mcde of analysis that it applies will thereafter be followed by the 
lower courts within that system, and even by that supreme court itself. 
Scalia, supra note 19, at 1177. 
271. See Dworkin, supra note 225; supra note 186. 
272. See supra notes 118-36 and accompanying text. 
273. "If the number of pertinent factors of decision is too large, and each of them is 
constantly shifting, then categories of classification or criteria of analogy will be hard to 
draw and even harder to maintain." ROBERTO M. UNGER, I.Aw IN MODERN Soc1E"IY: TO-
WARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 197 (1976); see, e.g., Walterv. United States, 447 U.S. 
649, 666 (1980) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (characterizing the case as "a strange and par-
ticular one" and drawing comfort from the belief "that sound constitutional precepts will 
survive the result the Court reaches today"). 
274. Bradley, supra note 245, at 851. 
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made it today. Third, the argument is contrary to the tenor of the 
Bill of Rights, which is to limit power, not to transfer the locus of its 
exercise. The short conclusion is that a transfer of such power to 
the judiciary could not have assuaged objections to the Constitu-
tion. Contrary to our impulses, people at that time really believed 
that responsive electoral government, not Delphic Oracles, insured 
liberty.275 
The Court's contemporary role-historically grounded or not-in 
protecting individual liberty necessarily conflicts with its institutional 
role-whether democratically proper or not-of formulating broad 
principles and general rules. In Mimms, Justice Stevens obviously was 
correct when he asserted that individual defendants do not regard 
themselves as fungible items to be manipulated for the general good 
of society.276 The Justice articulated one of our images of how justice 
is done: one case at a time, taking into account all the circumstances, 
and identifying within that context the fair result. 277 But the fair or 
just result in the particular case is but one of a number of competing 
values. Often contradicting the quest for individual justice is the need 
for equal treatment of similarly situated individuals, 278 the need for 
comprehensible and stable laws to guide law enforcement o:fficials,279 
and the larger concerns of general society. 280 It is impossible for the 
Court to maintain its institutional concern for general principles and 
to remain totally responsive to the peculiarities of each case. All indi-
viduals and all Fourth Amendment cases are somewhat unique, just as 
they all share certain common characteristics. As Professor Anthony 
Amsterdam succinctly stated: 
275. Id. (citations omitted). 
276. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 115 (1977) (Stevens,J., dissenting). Belief 
in the uniqueness of each individual is one of the fundamental moral tenets of Western 
society. Such uniqueness inheres in being human and is not an entitlement to be granted 
or withheld by the state depending upon whether the individual's right contributes to the 
total social welfare. See Philip Kurkland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAG., Autumn 1976, at 7, 36 
("Without individuality, there is no function for privacy. When we become fungible goods 
to be manipulated by government, there can be no recognition of idiosyncracies, no pri-
vate realms to husband against intrusion."). 
277. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 116. 
278. Every general rule of law has a few comers that do not quite fit, but 
[r]ightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign; and personal rule, 
whether it be exercised by a single person or a body of persons, should be 
sovereign only in those matters on which law is unable, owing to the difficulty 
of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make an exact 
pronouncement. 
Tm;: POLITICS OF ArusroTLE bk. III, ch. xi,§ 19, at 127 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1958). 
279. See supra note 186. 
280. HOLMES, supra note 204, at 35. According to Holmes, "[T]he law does undoubtedly 
treat the individual as a means to an end • . . . UJustice to the individual is rightly out-
weighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales." Id. at 40-41. 
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[A]ny number of categories, however shaped, is too few to encom-
pass life and too many to organize it manageably. The question re-
mains at what level of generality and in what shape rules should be 
designed in order to encompass all that can be encompassed with-
out throwing organization to the wolves.28I 
Although the Court cannot avoid the dichotomy between uniform 
application of law and responsiveness to individual situations, between 
universe and context, between sameness and difference, the Court 
can achieve an accommodation if it shares with the jury the determi-
nation of reasonable searches and seizures. The jury traditionally is 
concerned with the justice of a particular case without undue regard 
for general rules.282 In situations such as Mimms,283 the judiciary 
could continue to apply the general rule that it is reasonable for po-
lice to protect themselves by ordering motorists to exit their 
automobiles. But an individual jury should be free to consider 
whether it was reasonable to require a particular pajama clad, elderly, 
or invalid person to exit her auto on a cold, dark, rainy night after 
committing the heinous offense of failing to signal for a left turn. 
Should the jury find the police conduct unreasonable under such 
unique circumstances, no critical harm is done to the general rule. 
Neither side, police nor motorist, need experience a final large-scale 
victory or defeat because the jury serves as ~ safety valve to resolve the 
equities of a particular case without predetermining other cases that 
fall within the Court's categorization of search-and-seizure practices. 
The broad guidelines for the police284 would be preserved without 
sacrificing the autonomy of all motorists to the quest for uniformity; 
thus, such a system would realize an acceptable compromise between 
a government of uniform laws and law as tempered by individual 
justice. 285 
This type of accommodation between judicial power and jury power 
is not precluded merely because the jury would interpret constitu-
tional law when it determined the reasonableness of a search or 
seizure. The task before the jury would be no different from the task 
before the Justices of the Supreme Court;286 each must apply the best 
interpretive theory to discern the proper meaning of the Fourth 
281. Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 377. 
282. "The purpose of establishing trial by jury was not to obtain general rules of law for 
future use, but to secure impartialjustice between the government and the accused in each 
case as it arose." Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 174-75 (1895) (Gray & Shiras,.IJ., 
dissenting). 
283. See supra notes 260.S6 and accompanying text. 
284. Increased stability of Fourth Amendment law would provide increased guidance 
for police officers in the field. See supra note 181. At present, police have little understand-
ing of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See William C. Heffernan & Richard 
W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance 
with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311, 332-33 (1991) (noting that a survey of 547 
police officers disclosed that officers responded correctly to questions about Fourth 
Amendment law only slightly more frequently than random chance would dictate). 
285. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial fry Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 
84 HARv. L. REv. 1329, 1376 (1971) ("[T]hejury ... mediate[s] between 'the law' in the 
abstract and the human needs of those affected by it."). 
286. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES at vii (1985) (noting that we "all" 
make constitutional choices as judges, officials, scholars, and citizens). 
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Amendment and then apply that interpretive theory to particular 
cases. When the Court removed the facade of legal formalism in favor 
of balancing conflicting interests, 287 it weakened its position as the 
sole arbiter of the constitutional standard of reasonableness. The 
Court currently determines the reasonableness of a search by decid-
ing what is a reasonable, justifiable, and legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in our society288 and what degree of protection is afforded to 
these expectations. The judiciary has no inalienable claim to make 
such determinations exclusively.289 John Taylor, "one of the early Re-
public's leading constitutional theorists," viewed the jury as the 
"'lower judicial bench' in a bicameral judiciary."290 Our "judicial 
structure mirrored that of the legislature, with an upper house of 
greater stability and experience, and a lower house to represent popu-
lar sentiment more directly."291 In a similar vein, an anti-federalist 
"defined the jury as the democratic branch of the judiciary power-more 
necessary than representatives in the legislature."292 When the jury is 
seen as one division of a bicameral judiciary, we can better address the 
structural question of allocating power to resolve Fourth Amendment 
issues. Determination of society's reasonable expectations of privacy 
and liberty "should be entrusted to whoever can do the job better. Is 
it more appropriate for an expert trained in the law or for twelve rep-
resentatives of the community?"293 
To the extent that the expression "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" connotes the application of common sense and community con-
sensus, 294 it is apparent that the jury can "do the job better." How are 
unreasonable searches and seizures to be defined other than by refer-
ence to what society would find unreasonable? Is it possible that a jury 
287. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
289. By focusing on the procedural requirement for a warrant, the Court has forced 
others, i.e., magistrates, to determine the substantive content of probable cause. See 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) ("Reasonable minds frequently may differ 
on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus 
concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according 
'great deference' to a magistrate's determination." (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U.S. 410, 419 (1969))). The magistrates who have the prime responsibility for defining 
probable cause have little more legal training than jurors. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 
407 U.S. 345, 350-52 (1972) (upholding warrant issued by municipal clerk with no special 
legal training). 
290. Amar, supra note 8, at 1188-89 (citingjoHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCI-
PLES AND POLICY OF THE GoVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 208-09 (Yale Univ. Press 1950) 
(1814)). 
291. Id. at 1189. 
292. Id. (quoting Essays by a Farmer {IV), supra note 17, at 38). 
293. CHAFEE, supra note 133, at 503 (emphasis added). 
294. "Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the 
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 144 n.12 (1978). 
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would agree with the Court's holding in Michigan v. Chestemut,295 that 
although a police car followed the defendant into a narrow alley and 
continued to drive alongside him as he fled, no seizure occurred be-
cause a reasonable person would understand that he was free to disre-
gard the presence of the police and go about his business?296 Why not 
submit this issue to a jury of reasonable people instead of allowing the 
Court to speculate on the perceptions of a hypothetical reasonable 
person? Confronted with the Court's rationale in Chestemut, jurors 
might invoke the maxim that nothing which is against reason can be 
law or Dickens's caustic comment on legal rules that fail to comport 
with common sense: "If the law supposes that, ... the law is a ass-an 
idiot."297 Justice Scalia, who joined the majority in Chestemut, later 
accused the Court of subjecting arrested citizens to a "Dickensian bu-
reaucratic machine . . . [that fosters] . . . the image of a system of 
justice that has lost its ancient sense of priority, a system that few 
Americans would recognize as our own. "298 What the average Ameri-
can does recognize is that the Court's holding in Chestemut is the type 
of legal fiction299 that encourages disrespect for the law by failing to 
place citizens in "a comprehensible public world in ways that [they] 
can respect."300 If we must talk the conventional talk of fact/law dis-
tinctions, the jury can fulfill its traditional factfinding function by de-
termining what expectations of privacy or liberty are held by 
reasonable members of the community. There is no need for the 
Court to speculate on the perceptions of hypothesized reasonable 
people when we have direct access, via the jury, to reasonable mem-
bers of the community. To paraphrase Judge Learned Hand, the jury 
would "indicate the present critical point in the compromise between 
[liberty and order] at which the community may have arrived here and 
now. "301 Thus, in defining reasonable expectations of privacy or lib-
erty, the jury would merely describe the existing social compromise and· 
would not prescribe some ideal compromise. In this way, the Fourth 
295. 486 U.S. 567 (1988). 
296. Id. at 576 (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)). The Court has also 
told citizens that they have no reasonable expectation of privacy against aerial surveillance 
into an enclosed greenhouse in a fenced backyard. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447-
52 (1989); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that pawing by 
police through a citizen's bagged garbage on a public street does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (allowing aerial sur-
veillance with a telescope so powerful it can detect a half-inch wire). 
297. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER Twrsr 354 (Kathleen Tillotson ed., London, Oxford 
Univ. Press 1966) (1838). 
298. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1677 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
299. See United States v. Notorianni, 729 F.2d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the "modest fiction" that a suspect confronted by police will feel 
free to move on "makes it possible for police to cope with drug traffic in a place like 
O'Hare Airport"). 
300. WHITE, supra note 15, at 178; see Rachel A. Van Cleave, Michigan v. Chestemut and 
Investigative Pursuits: Is There No End to the War Between the Constitution and Common Sense?, 40 
HAsrrNGS LJ. 203, 204-05 (1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court in Chestemut erred by 
failing to recognize that the chase was a seizure because, by using common sense, the 
Court would have realized that a citizen chased by police is not free to ignore them and is 
thus seized). 
301. United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). 
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Amendment's Reasonableness Clause is like the Eighth Amendment's 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which "must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society. "302 
A good deal of the Court's current Fourth Amendment doctrine 
can be explained in terms of a search for conventional morality: All 
things considered, have the police comported with the community's 
moral intuitions?3°3 The meaning of Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness thus derives frorµ the culture in which "we the people" live. At 
worst, the jury may be only a rough proxy for what a fully participa-
tional community would insist upon as reasonable search-and-seizure 
practices,304 but as a descriptive process, this rough proxy is superior 
to current judicial musings over the views of a hypothetical reasonable 
person.305 At best, the jury may be "the people's portrait in miniature, 
feeling and thinking just as the people do in all their plurality, acting 
just as the people would if actually present."306 The genius of the jury 
is its direct knowledge of the interests and needs of the people: 
knowledge that can be counted upon to make the jury's decision com-
patible with those needs. Throughjuries, the consent of the governed 
would flow continuously, not just in election-day spurts.3°'7 
This faith in juries may sound more like flowery rhetoric than a 
realistic means for determining reasonable searches and seizures; the 
suggested use of juries to reflect society's view of reasonableness, how-
ever, improves upon the Court's halfway approach, which provides the 
worst of both worlds: the Court, wh;ich is not governed by any current 
consensus, as the final arbiter of constitutional reasonableness, at-
tempting to consult society in determining the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment. 308 
302. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
303. "[C]ommunity values remain the linchpin of search and seizure jurisprudence." 
Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectatfuns of Privacy and Auton-
omy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted 
by Society," 42 DuKE LJ. 727, 775 (1993). 
304. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 240, at 95. 
305. "[I] tis better to assess those [community] values by asking representative members 
of the community about them than by relying on what nine members of a rather isolated 
Court might conjecture." Id. at 746. In defense of the Court, the reasonably prudent 
person standard can be seen as a form of "virtual representation." See Frank I. Michelman, 
The Supreme Court, 1985 Tenn-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L REY. 3, 51 
(1986). As long as the people are envisioned as a "fungible collection with characteristic 
insights and outlooks," the reasonably prudent person stands for all citizens. Id. 
306. See Michelman, supra note 305, at 53; infra note 358 and accompanying text. 
307. See Michelman, supra note 305, at 53. In practice and theory, juries act not only on 
the law as strictly defined in judges' instructions, but also on "informal communication 
from the total culture." United States v. Doughtery, 473 F.2d 1113, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
308. The Court has attempted to determine society's views on reasonableness by such 
means as reference to a telephone book. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 
(1979) (noting that society would not recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
numbers dialed from the defendant's phone because the telephone information pages 
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Although the jury is an appropriate entity for identifying what is 
usually done in the community and thus what is reasonable, the jury 
has no preeminent claim to determiningjustifiable and legitimate ex-
pectations of privacy or liberty, because such determinations are con-
tingent upon value judgments and political choices about what ought 
to be done. 309 When contrasts arise between matters of principle and 
social policy, between individual rights and collective interests,310 the 
concern is no longer about which institution will, as an empirical mat-
ter, better reflect community consensus, but about whether certain 
institutions have the authority to decide certain kinds of questions. 
However much the Framers may have trusted the judgment of the 
people and distrusted a strong central government, the Framers also 
recognized that certain individual rights must be shielded from the 
popular will.311 Thomas Jefferson grudgingly acknowledged that one 
weighty consideration for adopting a declaration of rights was "the 
legal check it puts into the hands of thejudiciary."312 James Madison 
adopted this idea when introducing the Bill of Rights to Congress, 
arguing that if a declaration of rights was 
incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice 
will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of 
those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every as-
sumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be natu-
rally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly 
stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.313 
This original intent, coupled with Marbury v. Madison314 and the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,315 indicates that it is far too 
disclosed that the phone company could identify the origin of phone calls). However 
roughly a jury approximates society, it is a superior medium for societal conventions than 
is the abstruse information contained in the pages of a telephone directory. 
309. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 384-85 (arguing that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not "ask[ ] what we expect of government. [It] tell[s] us what we should demand 
of government."). For a broad perspective on defining and identifying societal values and 
the "moral order" in our society, see Richard D. Schwartz, Moral Order and Sociology of Law: 
Trends, Problems and Prospects, 4 ANN. REv. Soc. 577 (1978). 
310. See DwoRKIN, supra note 176, at 184 (noting that it is generally accepted that indi-
viduals have rights apart from those given them by law);joHN LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF 
GoVERNMENT 366-67 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed., Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1988) (3d ed. 1698) (noting that government is limited by the individual rights that people 
reserved to themselves when they created the government); JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
Jusr1CE 3-6 (1971) (emphasizing personal rights and protection against majoritarian 
tyranny). 
311. In discussing the Bill of Rights, James Madison stated: 
The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be levelled against that quarter 
where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest pre-
rogative of power. But this is not found in either the Executive or the Legisla-
tive departments of Government, but in the body of the people, operating by 
the majority against the minority. 
1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 437 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
312. See Marcus, supra note 9, at 119. 
313. Id. (quoting Madison). 
314. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the Court's preeminence in interpret-
ing the Constitution). 
315. Even if the preeminence of the jury is the correct historical view of the Bill of 
Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment's concerns about minority rights and the heavy reli-
ance placed on federal judges forever altered that view. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 1193, 1281 (1992). 
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late to argue that an individual defendant's only right is to be tried 
according to the popular will.316 Without stabilizing legal institutions, 
"democracy is fragile and surrounded by incivility, mayhem, and de-
struction. "317 "The Founding Fathers thus wisely sought to have the 
best of both worlds, the undeniable benefits of both democratic self-
govemment and individual rights protected against possible excesses 
of that form of govemment."318 Undemocratic though it is, judicial 
review as a check on the popular ·will is one of the balance wheels that 
keep our democracy from running amok. 
Acknowledging the defendant's right to judicial determination of 
the reasonableness of a search or seizure, however, does not preclude 
a supplemental determination of reasonableness by the jury.319 Many 
jurisdictions have adopted, 320 and the Court has upheld against con-
stitutional challenge,321 the jury's ancillary determination of the vol-
untariness of confessions. In Jackson v. Denno, ~22 the Court examined 
316. But see infra note 342 and accompanying text. 
317. See Carrington, supra note 55, at 750. 
318. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 466 (1972) (Rehnquist,]., dissenting). 
319. Only the defendant, not the government, should be given the option to submit the 
reasonableness of a search to the jury. As a practical matter, probable cause for a search or 
arrest often includes references to the defendant's prior convictions and reputation for 
criminal activity. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 582-83 (1971). To allow the 
government the option of placing this information before the jury gives the government an 
unfair advantage. The defendant should control the decision to place such information 
before the jury, just as the defendant now controls the decision to make his character an 
issue in the case or to testify and thereby subject himself to impeachment by his prior 
convictions. 
On a more theoretical level, the defendant must be given the exclusive option to submit 
the issue of reasonableness to the jury because in individual cases the jury represents the 
only effective safeguard against a possible abuse of judicial power. The ju~iciary has inter-
nal safeguards against the abuse of power as when an appellate court reverses a lower 
court. But, except for executive pardon, there is no external check upon the exercise of 
judicial power in individual cases. 
Creating an additional limitation on government power need not necessitate instituting 
a reciprocal benefit for the government. For example, every criminal defendant currently 
enjoys an unreciprocated benefit because the trial court may direct an acquittal but can 
never order the jury to convict. The jury can protect the individual against a formalistic 
application oflaw-which may conflict with justice as determined by at least six representa-
tives of the community-when the defendant is granted a final appeal to the jury as the 
ultimate arbiter of individualized justice: a return to the eighteenth-century view of the 
jury as the last remaining institution within which rational deliberation determines law. A 
government subject to the rule of law, however, should not have recourse to the con-
science of the community-the jury-to overturn unfavorable but formalistically correct 
determinations of law. When the jury is seen as the individual defendant's final protection 
against legal formalism and abuse of government power, it is not inequitable to permit the 
defendant to have access to the jury's determination of Fourth Amendment law and limit 
the government to principled and consistent rulings from the judiciary. 
320. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 410 (1964) (Black,]., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part); infra notes 322-25 and accompanying text. 
321. In dicta the Court has stated that "the Massachusetts procedure does not, in our 
opinion, pose hazards to the rights of a defendant." Denno, 378 U.S. at 378 n.8; see infra 
notes 322-25 and accompanying text. 
322. 378 U.S. at 368. 
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a New York procedure wherein "the judge may not resolve conflicting 
evidence or arrive at his independent appraisal of the voluntariness of 
the confession, one way or the other. These matters he must leave to 
the jury."323 While striking down the New York practice, the Court 
expressed its approval of "the Massachusetts procedure, under which 
the jury passes on voluntariness only after the judge has fully and inde-
pendently resolved the issue against the accused."324 
The Massachusetts approach of allowing both judge and jury to de-
termine the voluntariness of confessions is a useful model for deter-
mining the reasonableness of searches and seizures. 325 The 
identification of justifiable and legitimate expectations of privacy, and 
therefore the reasonableness of searches and seizures, presumes a will-
ingness to deal on the plane of human values and to make social or 
political judgments about the desired compromise between liberty 
and order.326 Under our republican form of government, the task of 
making such judgments should not be assigned exclusively to judge or 
jury, neither of whom possesses some innate or technical expertise in 
resolving conflicts between individual liberty and collective security. 
Assuming that judges are expert in formal logic or legal reasoning 
does not justify the current practice of investing the judiciary with sin-
gular authority to make the underlying value judgments to which legal 
reasoning can be applied.327 Nor can the judiciary's claim to exclusive 
review of search-and-seizure law be justified by combining the rhetoric 
of judicial protection of individual rights with the rhetoric of hostility 
to potentially oppressive government. This type of rationalization ob-
scures the fact that courts are agencies of the government.328 When 
the Court is called upon to resolve the conflict between individual 
liberty and collective security, the only choice is between a govern-
mental restriction on liberty or a governmental impediment to collec-
tive security. Either alternative, resting within the exclusive province 
of the Court, marks another transition from the Framers' concept of 
self-governance to the contemporary reality of judicial governance. 
323. Id. at 377-78. 
324. Id. at 378 (footnotes omitted). Justice Black maintained that the Constitution re-
quires the judge to pass upon voluntariness, while the jury's power to pass on the issue "is a 
mere matter of grace, not something constitutionally required." Id. at 404 (Black, J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in part). 
325. Denno referred to the voluntariness issue as a factual question, id. at 377, but the 
Court in a later case stated that "[w]ithout exception, the Court's confession cases hold that 
the ultimate issue of 'voluntariness' is a legal question requiring independent federal de-
termination," Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985). 
326. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
327. Formal logic or legal reasoning assists the Court in connecting premises to conclu-
sions, but reason is inherently an empty source, which does not support the first premise. 
As Hume said, reason is "the slave of the passions," because reason is employed only in the 
selection of means to ends or values already given, but not in the critical examination or 
clarification of the ends or values themselves. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE 
375 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1949) (1888). 
328. As a legitimate part of tribunals-the lower branch of the judiciary-juries, in 
some sense, are also agencies of the government. But juries do not present the self-inter-
ested "agency costs" associated with permanent government officials. See Amar, supra note 
8, at 1133. Each jury serves a limited term and can never grow into a dangerous system. 
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The solution to judicial governance, however, does not lie in invest-
ing the jury with an exclusive prerogative to define justifiable or legiti-
mate expectations of privacy by applying community consensus. 329 
The acquittal in the first Rodney King case330 brings into question the 
romanticized view of the jury as a bulwark of liberty and justice. Juries 
undoubtedly make mistakes and, like any other agency of power, must 
be subject to checks and balances on their authority.331 In line with 
the Madisonian attempt to disperse government power among com-
peting power centers capable of checking each other, 332 no one deci-
sionmaker should be entrusted with unparallelled authority to make 
bindingjudgments about a democratic society's accommodation of in-
dividual liberty and collective security. The power to make such judg-
ments must be disseminated among rival entities, and although I have 
focused on a role for the jury, the jury is best seen as part of a Fourth 
Amendment decisionmaking structure that recognizes a role for ju-
ries, courts, legislatures, and the executive. Under our republican 
329. The most fundamental objection to interpreting the Fourth Amendment accord-
ing to popular consensus is that such an approach conflicts with the role of the Constitu-
tion as a safeguard against the potential tyranny of the popular majority. The majority 
consensus cannot be employed as a vehicle for protecting individuals from the dictates of 
the majority. See generally Ely, supra note 65, at 52 (arguing "that a consensus approach to 
constitutional adjudication is unlikely to end up amounting to much more than a con-
scious or unconscious cover for the judge's own values"). 
330. King, as everyone knows by now, is the black motorist whose beating by four white 
Los Angeles police officers was captured on videotape for all the world to see. The of-
ficers' acquittal by a mostly white jury sparked three days of rioting, resulting in 60 deaths, 
more than 16,000 arrests, and nearly $1 billion in property damage in Los Angeles. See 
Darlene Ricker, Behind the Silence, 77 A.B.A.J. 45, 47 (1991); see also Lance Morrow, Rough 
Justice, TIME, Apr. 1, 1991, at 16; Seth Mydans, Tape of Beating by Police Revives Charges of 
Racism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at A18. 
331. The trial judge's power to find a search unreasonable and keep its fruits from the 
jury precludes the jury from harming an individual defendant. When a judge determines 
that the search is reasonable and submits this issue to the jury, the jury may harm our sense 
of justice by mistakenly determining that the search was unreasonable. But changed as 
they constantly are, the jury's errors and mistakes can never grow into a dangerous system 
that triggers the agency costs associated with permanent government officials. See supra 
text accompanying note 142. 
Furthermore, althoughjuries make mistakes, "authority cannot be conceded to persons 
because they are right-the authority must preexist their right or wrong judgment and 
must survive it too-and judges [or juries] decide cases by virtue of their authority, and not 
because they are any more likely to be right than other people." Charles Fried, Two Con-
cepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Courl'.s Balancing Test, 76 HAR.v. L. REv. 755, 
761 (1963). 
But in human institutions, the question is not, whether every evil contingency 
can be avoided, but what arrangement will be productive of the least incon-
venience. And it appears to be most consistent with the permanent security of 
the subject, that in criminal cases the jury should, after receiving the advice 
and assistance of the judge as to the law, • . . determine upon the whole, 
whether the act done be, or be not, within the meaning of the law. 
Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 149-50 (1895) (Gray&: Shiras,JJ., dissenting) (quoting 
People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 375-76 (1803) (Kent, J.)). 
332. "This distribution of power, by which the court and jury mutually assist, and mutu-
ally check each other, seems to be the safest, and consequently the wisest arrangement, in 
respect to the trial of crimes." Spaif, 156 U.S. at 150 (quoting Judge Kent of New York). 
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form of government, each of these entities fulfills an important func-
tion in making judgments about reasonable searches and seizures. 
A. The Courts' Role 
The structure of Fourth Amendment decisionmaking proposed 
here resembles an inverted pyramid with the Supreme Court func-
tioning at the most expansive and abstract level by addressing broad 
categories of conflict between liberty and order in society. The 
Court's balancing approach to the Fourth Amendment333 is better 
suited to a high level of abstraction, rather than refined calculations 
in individual cases. 334 Ideally, the Court would abstract from the 
wealth of detail found in live social contexts a few features of a case or 
situation that are legally significant. For example, in classifying police-
citizen encounters, we realistically could expect the Court to recog-
nize broad categories such as border searches, street encounters, 
search incident to arrest, and the like. We would not expect catego-
ries that distinguish between searches of purses, shopping bags, brief-
cases, or duffel bags.335 Obviously, there is no magic number of 
correct categories, and the dividing line between categories always will 
remain somewhat fuzzy. Divisions between categories can be main-
tained more easily, however, than can the dividing lines between indi-
vidual fact situations. 336 Categorical balancing, which has been used 
primarily in the First Amendment context, 337 permits a weighing of all 
the factors in defining categories of cases but avoids the Court's ten-
dency to bog down in case-by-case balancing within the categories.338 
By focusing on broad principles at the necessary expense of the 
unique facts of each case, the Court could better achieve the goal of 
uniformity and consistency in law: the universality of law manifested 
in the generality of its formulas.339 
Although the Supreme Court must focus on expansive and princi-
pled decisionmaking, the lower courts, particularly trial courts, could 
provide some of the flexibility and concern for individualized justice, 
which I would entrust to the jury. But the difference between the 
333. See supra notes 209-25 and accompanying text. 
334. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes,]., dissenting) (stating 
that "[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases"). 
335. "When a legitimate search is under way, ... nice distinctions between •.. glove 
compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, 
must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand." 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982) (Fourth Amendment permits no distinction 
between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers). 
336. See Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 
UCLA L. REv. 428, 443-44 (1967) (contrasting ad-hoc, case-oriented balancing of the Com-
merce Clause cases with categorical or definitional balancing). 
337. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment 
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REv. 935 (1968). 
338. See WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 2.l(e), at 314-20 (2d ed. 1987). 
339. Each judicially recognized category also would constitute an intermediate premise 
from which principled analysis could evolve into more specific rules. For the lower courts 
and police administrators, intermediate premises cut off the debate short of first principles 
and avoid turning every Fourth Amendment case into a battle over ultimate moral truths. 
See Louis]. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 HAR.v. L. 
REv. 986 (1967). 
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Supreme Court and the lower courts is a matter of degree, not a dif-
ference in kind. The lower the court sits in the judicial hierarchy, the 
more the court is concerned with the result in a particular case and 
the less it is concerned with broad principles. The higher the court 
sits in the judicial hierarchy-and the more discretionary its review-
the more the court is concerned with principled analysis and the less 
it is concerned with the result in a specific case. The United States 
Supreme Court is not free to render advisory opinions or postulate 
theory totally independent of the facts of the case, although the Court 
frequently is criticized for doing just that. Conversely, a trial court is 
never totally free to concern itself with individualized justice and ig-
nore existing precedent. 
The Supreme Court's role in formulating broad principles or poli-
cies that provide uniform guidance for lower courts is tempered by 
the realization that policy determinations do not originate in the 
Supreme Court as if springing from a vacuum. Although policy may 
be formulated by articulating a general principle that embraces many 
ad hoc case-by-case determinations, policy determinations most often 
begin their development in the lower courts and flow upward to the 
Supreme Court where they are ultimately ratified or rejected. Draw-
ing a sharp line between the legal analysis employed by the Supreme 
Court and the lower courts is as spurious as recognizing the distinc-
tion between the judiciary's and the jury's ability to determine Fourth 
Amendment law.340 We should conceptualize the determination of 
reasonable searches and seizures as a continuum where all entities in-
terpret law. At one end of the continuum is the Supreme Court, 
which is most concerned with broad legal principles-the outer limits 
of law-and least concerned with individual facts. At the other end of 
the continuum is the jury, which has discretion to divine particular-
ized law in the individual case. Trial judges and lower appellate courts 
fall within the confines of this continuum where they also exercise 
discretion-less than juries but more than higher appellate courts-to 
render individualized justice. Thus, although trial judges, vis-a-vis 
Supreme Court Justices, have more flexibility in adjusting the law to 
an individual case, all responsible members of the judiciary recognize 
that they are not as free as a jury to disregard precedent and princi-
pled analysis to adjust the law to the specific facts of the case. Utiliz-
ing the jury's unique ability to adapt the law to distinctive factual 
situations341 enables the judiciary to focus on the need for consistency 
340. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
341. This is not to say that the jury is concerned merely with intuition and emotional 
justice. I have drawn a sharp line between jury nullification and jury determination of law. 
See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text I envision the jury as determining the law in 
an individual case, and thereby putting content into the open-ended legal concept of rea-
sonable searches. To the extent that the content depends on value judgments, this is no 
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in the fundamental concepts that govern notions of reasonable 
searches and seizures. 
B. The Legislature's R.ol,e 
As the Court discharges its function of formulating broad modes of 
analysis for reasonable search-and-seizure law, a complementary role 
must be recognized for the legislature. We need not, however, go so 
far as Professor Bradley, who argues that "the reasonableness clause, 
properly understood, does not authorize the courts to do anything, 
but exists to affirm legislative supremacy over the law of search-and-
seizure."342 The above view represents, and in my view overstates, a 
strong case for a legislative role in Fourth Amendment law. 
By charging the judiciary with final interpretive authority over con-
stitutional provisions, Marbury v. Madison343 signaled the shift from the 
Framers' concept of self-governance to the contemporary reality of ju-
dicial governance. But Professor Bradley maintains that our Found-
ing Fathers had no intent to take search-and-seizure law out of the 
ordinary processes of democratic self-governance. Because the Ameri-
can Revolution "was fought over the principle of self-rule" and "the 
right of the people to make the laws by which they were to be gov-
erned, "344 Professor Bradley asserts that the Fourth Amendment's 
Reasonableness Clause "place[d] the government on notice that the 
measure of appropriate search-and-seizure is that with which the peo-
ple would burden themselves if delegation of lawmaking authority to 
Congress was not obliged by the extended sphere of the republic."345 
In short, the collective "'right' of the people to make laws overrides 
... [the] right of individuals to be governed in accord with certain 
norms."346 
Professor Bradley insists that the "people, exercising power through 
their representatives," rightfully possess "the final supervisory control 
over search-and-seizure law now held by federaljudges."347 "[l]tis the 
earmark of a republican system that a very persistent populace will 
eventually have its way. The idea behind such systems is to diffuse 
more a matter of intuition or emotion than is the judiciary's attempt to put content into 
the legal concept of reasonable searches. 
342. Bradley, supra note 245, at 817. 
343. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). 
344. Bradley, supra note 245, at 860 (citing RoNALD M. PETERS, JR., THE MAssACHUSETIS 
CONSTITUTION OF 1780: A SocIAL CoMPAcr 44 & n.2 (1987)). 
345. Id. at 862. 
346. Id. at 861. 
347. "Connecticut Chief Justice Jonathan Trumbull, while purposefully delaying action 
on an application for a writ of assistance, privately told customs officials that the 'superior 
court could do nothing contrary to the sense of the people.'" Tracey Maclin, The Central 
MeaningoftheFourthAmendment, 35 WM. & MARYL. REv. 197, 225 (1993) (quotingJ. Frese, 
Writs of Assistance in the American Colonies 1660-1766, at 259-60 (unpublished Ph.D dis-
sertation, Harvard University)). 
Of course, the people may still subject police behavior to judicial control, simply by 
passing a governing statute. Professor Bradley cites Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 
(1988), as "a good example of intense judicial control of a dangerous police technique 
under statutory auspices. The difference is simply that courts will not initially decide for 
society what society wants to do. Instead, society will decide what society wants to do." 
Bradley, supra note 245, at 870. 
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power sufficiently to stymie hasty actions by fleeting majorities, not to 
take away popular power completely."848 Professor Bradley maintains 
that the will of the people is to reign supreme, and he correctly notes 
that the difference between majority and dissent in many Fourth 
Amendment cases comes down to the Justices' disagreement "on the 
pace of the popular pulse. "349 
· Although Learned Hand suggested that no constitution, law, or 
court can preserve or revive liberties that are no longer highly val-
ued, 350 Professor Bradley goes even further in asking, "Is there any 
reason to suspect that, roughly and in anything other than the very 
short run, the balance between privacy and law enforcement worked 
out through political processes will be other than what society 
wants?"351 This faith in the triumphant will of the people is uplifting, 
but I still have difficulty with the suggestion that the people will even-
tually have their way. Because I live in the short run, I draw little sol-
ace from the hope that any present deprivations of my liberties 
ultimately will be rejected by future generations. I also would have 
more faith in the electorate's exclusive regulation of search-and-seizure 
law if the general population were exposed to the type of searches and 
seizures that they are called upon to regulate. 
The decisions to search or to seize are visited most often upon the 
members of less powerful groups that are undervalued in the political 
process. Many of the police who conduct searches and seizures be-
lieve that "all society is divided into two classes of people, the 'kinky' 
(criminal) class and the law-abiding class"; the police officer's "work-
ing principle is that searches of 'kinky' people for drugs and hand-
guns are necessary and proper, whether or not the searches would be 
constitutional if evidence so obtained were presented in court. "352 
Law-abiding citizens, confident that the police will not direct unrea-
sonable searches at them, might condone such searches in the ab-
stract. 353 Should such searches be directed at the particular citizen, 
348. Bradley, supra note 245, at 867; see also Amar, sufrra note 8, at 1180 ("To see the 
Amendment as centrally concerned with countermajoritarian rights is to miss the later 
transformation brought about by the Fourteenth Amendment, with its core concerns 
about minority rights and its heavy reliance on federal judges."). 
349. Bradley, supra note 245, at 868. "Fourth Amendment analysis must turn on such 
factors as 'our societal understanding that certain areas desexve the most scrupulous protec-
tion from government invasion.'" California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (quot-
ing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)). 
350. LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF UBER'IY 189, 190 (2d ed. 
1954). 
351. Bradley, supra note 245, at 870. 
352. KENNETH c. DAVIS, POI.ICE DISCRETION 18 (1975). 
353. Yale Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment7, 62JUDICATURE 66, 70-71 (1978) (arguing that some citizens would pre-
fer Fourth Amendment protections only for those who do not commit crimes). But see 
Tom Wicker, !Ughts vs. Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1989, at A25 (discussing a Washington 
Post/ ABC News Poll that found that "52 percent of respondents were willing to have their 
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however, the result acceptable in the abstract could become intolera-
ble. As Lord Pitt intimated, general warrants to enforce the cider tax 
were "particularly dangerous, when men by their birth, education, 
profession, very distinct from the trader, became subjected to those 
laws. "354 Placing our faith in legislative supremacy might be more ap-
pealing if it were tempered by Professor John Hart Ely's suggestion 
that the tradeoff between privacy and law enforcement produced by 
our political institutions should stand, provided that everyone's inter-
ests are equally represented in the making of these political deci-
sions. 355 In practice, privacy costs often are exacted from discrete and 
insular minorities unable to protect themselves from losses in the 
political process. 
Finally, I am more skeptical than Professor Bradley about the extent 
to which the legislature, subject to the benefits and drawbacks of log 
rolling, actually mirrors society. Although we should avoid cynically 
deprecating legislators as mere tools of special interests, we need not 
idealize them as paragons of representation.356 Why must we limit 
ourselves to the legislature's expression of society's views on liberty 
and security when it is possible for society to speak for itself? The jury 
is a forum more immediately available and less politically compro-
mised than the legislature, and a recent study suggests that a jury 
panel of as few as five members can approximate the entire society if it 
votes unanimously.357 If a jury can reach the same decision in 98% of 
the cases that a majority of society would have reached if it had been 
polled,358 society might best regard the jury as a means for "taking an 
houses searched and 67 percent to have their cars stopped and searched by police without 
a warrant"; 55% supported mandatory drug testing for the general population, while 67% 
supported testing for all high school students). 
354. Joseph J. Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, Part One, 3 U. RxcH. L. REv. 278, 289 (1969) (quoting 15 HANSARD, PARLIAMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1307 (1763)). In 1754, a Massachusetts excise reform bill 
sought to "close a loophole through which significant quantities of wine and spirits had 
hitherto passed in consumption untaxed." SMITH, supra note 64, at 112. An opposing 
editorial charged the following: 
But besides the Excise itself, the propos'd Manner of exacting it, is what can-
not but give very great Disgust, that it should be in the Power of a petty Of-
ficer to come into a Gentleman's House, and with an Air of Authority, 
demand an Account upon Oath of the Liquor he has drank in his Family for 
the past year. 
Maclin, supra note 347, at 220 n.75. 
355. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 97 (1980) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment can 
be seen as another harbinger of the Equal Protection Clause, concerned with avoiding 
indefensible inequities in treatment."). Thus, the Constitution requires the protection of 
privacy that the political process would produce if all interests were fairly represented, if 
people understood the implications of their own moral theories, or if people were not 
carried away by the pressures of the moment. 
356. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ. 
1013, 1029 (1984) (arguing that Congress merely carries on workaday government for the 
people but in no way as the people). 
357. George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Rethinking Guilt, juries, and jeopardy, 91 
MICH. L. REv. 1, 24 (1992). 
358. Id. 
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issue back to the public over the heads of public officialdom"359 and 
thereby avoid the agency costs associated with legislators and other 
government officials.36o 
Although I would not go as far as Professor Bradley's endorsement 
of legislative supremacy, I agree that legislatures have a proper role in 
defining reasonable searches and seizures and that the Court must 
give some deference to legislative judgment. In fact, the Court often 
has noted that there is a "strong presumption of constitutionality due 
to an Act of Congress, especially when it turns on what is 'reason-
able.' "361 The difficult question that remains is what degree of defer-
ence should be given to legislative pronouncements on reasonable 
searches and seizures. Should legislative enactments be subjected to 
"strict scrutiny"362 or to the "rational basis" test?363 That difficult ques-
tion is left for another day, because my purpose here is to challenge 
judicial domination of search-and-seizure law and to outline a consti-
tutional structure containing competing power centers capable of 
checking judicial power. Under our republican form of government, 
legislative bodies, like juries, courts, and administrative officials, have 
a legitimate and significant role in determining reasonable searches 
and seizures. 
C. The Ro"le of Administrative Agencies 
Whatever action the judicial and legislative branches take in formu-
lating broad principles governing reasonable searches, law enforce-
ment agencies are the ones that must function at the intermediate 
level of Fourth Amendment decisionmaking by deciphering statutes 
359. Joseph L. Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57 YALE REv. 
481, 494 (1968). Opponents of the Sedition Act-led by Jefferson and Madison-at-
tempted to appeal fromjudges to juries, who embodied the community's outrage against 
the Act. Amar, supra note 8, at 1209. 
360. See supra text accompanying note 142. 
361. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416 (1976) (quoting United States v. Di Re, 
332 U.S. 581, 585 (1948) ("Obviously the Court should be reluctant to decide that a search 
thus authorized by Congress was unreasonable •... ")). 
362. When preferred constitutional rights are alleged to have been infringed, the Court 
determines whether compelling state interests are at stake and whether the means chosen 
are narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 
492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("The Government may, however, regulate the content of consti-
tutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least 
restrictive means to further the articulated interest."). 
363. The rational basis test is used to decide equal protection and due process chal-
lenges to social and economic legislation. Under that test, government action is upheld if 
officials are pursuing reasonable goals and the means chosen to obtain them are rationally 
or plausibly related to the desired ends. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) 
("The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invari-
ably tum on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means .•.. "). 
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and court decisions into serviceable law enforcement policies and ad-
ministrative rules.364 For example, police officers will routinely face 
questions of constitutional interpretation in deciding whether to seek 
a search warrant before entering a citizen's dwelling. How should the 
task of interpreting the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause, and the 
Court's caveats, qualifications, and exceptions, be described in the po-
lice officer's manual? Only police agencies possess the expertise and 
practical experience necessary to refine search-and-seizure law into 
meaningful guidance for individual police officers.365 
Society must enlist the assistance of administrative officials in con-
trolling and guiding individual police officers, because the officers are 
the most relevant Fourth Amendment actors who impact citizens' 
Fourth Amendment interests. In the final analysis, the people are best 
protected by the amendment when it effectively regulates day-to-day 
police activities. In tum, line officers are more likely to follow agency 
rules than to follow the present vague judicial pronouncements366 on 
the amendment, because "[t]he police, organized in a semi-military 
tradition, work in that tradition's responsiveness to going by the book, 
which is always less grudging if one has had a role in writing the 
book."367 
364. The general benefits of police administrative rulemaking are explored elsewhere 
in great detail. See DAVIS, supra note 352, at 112-20 (discussing advantages of police admin-
istrative rulemaking to govern selective enforcement); Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the 
Police, 70 MICH. L. REv. 659, 677-79 (1972) (stating that police administrative rulemaking 
would be advantageous because of the expanded flexibility and the application of expertise 
on a continuous and systematic basis);]. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary justice, 81 YALE 
LJ. 575, 588-89 (1972) (arguing that administrative rulemaking would guarantee due pro-
cess of law by having one's conduct governed by rules set forth in advance rather than 
those applied on an ad hoc basis). Here, I merely consider the role of police administra-
tors in determining reasonable searches. See Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 417 (arguing 
that "ruleless searches and seizures are 'unreasonable'"); Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case 
Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 
127, 142 (stating that for people to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, the 
police must act under a set of rules which would allow them to make a correct determina-
tion beforehand). 
365. Existing law enforcement policy does not emanate from the administrative level of 
the police hierarchy but is made primarily by individual patrolmen, who are "the least 
qualified." DAVIS, supra note 352, at 165. Such policy is an amalgamation of past practices, 
vague rules of thumb, racial and cultural stereotyping, and a great deal of "offhand guess-
work" about what the public really wants. Id. at 113-20; see also A.B.A. PROJECT ON STAN· 
DARDS FOR CRIMINALjUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION§ 4.3 
(1973) [hereinafter A.B.A. PROJECT] (stating that "[p]olice discretion can best be structured 
and controlled through the process of administrative rule-making by police agencies"); 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINALjUSTICE STANDARDS & GoALS, POLICE§§ 1.1-1.3 
(1973) (stating that the advantages of having police agencies develop clear rules would 
include helping officers understand the law, providing courts with thoroughly considered 
policies, and eliminating discriminatory enforcement of the law). 
366. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950) (noting that "[r]easonableness 
is in the first instance for the [trial court] ... to determine"), overruled lTj Chime! v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Professor Amsterdam suggested: 
What it means in practice is that appellate courts defer to trial courts and trial 
courts defer to the police. What other results should we expect? If there are 
no fairly clear rules telling the policeman what he may and may not do, courts 
are seldom going to say that what he did was unreasonable. 
Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 394. 
367. McGowan, supra note 364, at 673; see also A.B.A. PROJECT, supra note 365, § 4.3 
("Police discretion can best be structured and controlled through the process of adminis-
trative rule-making by police agencies."). 
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Recognizing a role for police administrators in promulgating visi-
ble368 regulations also ensures a role for the people in checking the 
agency's power. For example, if the police promulgate a rule that of-
ficers will or will not shoot looters during a riot, "law and order" 
groups will represent one viewpoint and "libertarian" groups can be 
expected to represent the opposing viewpoint.369 Although conflict-
ing public input may complicate the rulemaking process for adminis-
trators, 370 consideration of the community's views is a necessary 
component of a democratic society and an important check upon the 
unfettered discretion of government officials. Visible police rulemak-
ing would help ensure that the police act reasonably and could bene-
fit the police by enhancing public awareness and understanding of the 
difficulties in law enforcement. 371 
D. The Jury's Role 
At the lowest level of particularized Four$ Amendment decision-
making (the bottom of the inverted pyramid), the jury fulfills its tradi-
tional function of applying general principles and guidelines to the 
facts of the specific case.372 Each individual jury should be free to 
consider the type of detailed factual situations that could not be con-
sidered by courts, legislatures, or police agencies, who in classifying 
factual situations into broad categories or general administrative rules 
necessarily focus on common characteristics and look past the unique 
368. Present policy, and the underlying value judgments, are kept deliberately vague 
and invisible to avoid scrutiny and criticism. DAVIS, supra note 352, at 69-74. Formal recog-
nition of administrative policy formulation as a legitimate part of Fourth Amendment deci-
sionmaking would subject the formulation of law enforcement policy to the controls and 
procedures normally applied to administrative rulemaking. See id. at 77. 
369. Other administrative agencies are required to comply with the notice-and-com-
ment procedure and "much experience shows that the procedure is efficient, fair, demo-
cratic and easy." KENNETH DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 241 (6th ed. 1977). But see Richard 
B. Stewart, The Refonnation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669, 1775 
(1975) ("In notice and comment rulemaking the agency is not bound by the comments 
filed with it, and many such comments may be ignored or given short shrift."). 
370. The public's interest in the rule must be balanced against the agency's interest in 
economy and efficiency. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 
(1972). 
371. See NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMM'N ON CRIMINALjUsrrCE STANDARDS & GoALS, supra 
note 365, at 9 ("The ultimate goal toward which [these] standards are directed is greater 
public trust in the police and a resulting reduction in crime through public 
cooperation."). 
372. Search-and-seizure law could be addressed by making minor adjustments to the 
Maryland instruction on the jury's prerogative to determine substantive criminal law. See 
supra note 117. For example, the following instruction could be used: Members of the 
jury, you are the final judges of the lawfulness of the search in this case. So, whatever I tell 
you about the law, although it is intended to be helpful to you in reaching a just and 
proper verdict in the case, it is not binding upon you as members of the jury and you may 
determine the law as you apprehend it to be in the case. 
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aspects of particular situations. 373 By formulating standards for cases 
like this, categorization of search-and-seizure law discounts this case 
and how its resolution will affect the actual parties and their needs. 
The unique facts of the particular case, facts which were irrelevant in 
the process of categorizing search-and-seizure law, could be restored 
to the decisionmaking process by a jury concerned with justice in the 
individual case. The jury's concern for justice also reopens the dia-
logue over first principles regarding liberty and order in society, a dia-
logue which the courts, legislatures, and administrative officials had to 
cut short in the interests of providing some uniformity and consis-
tency in the administration of criminal justice. The jury thus becomes 
a safety valve for resolving the equities of a particular case without 
predetermining other cases that fall within the courts' or legislature's 
categorization of search-and-seizure practices. Like their seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century counterparts, modem juries would be recon-
stituted as the last remaining institution within which rational deliber-
ation determines law,374 albeit only the law of a particular case. 
Unlike their earlier counterparts, however, contemporary juries 
must grapple with increasingly violent crime, the nation's drug crisis, 
and the operation of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. 
Although the fundamental dilemma facing a free society remains the 
problem of controlling the public monopoly of force, for much of the 
general public the greatest perceived threat to individual security 
comes from criminals, not the police or other potentially oppressive 
arms of government. In the light of mounting evidence that the judi-
ciary has sacrificed the Fourth Amendment to the general War on 
Crime, and more specifically, the War on Drugs,375 it is unlikely that 
juries would champion the privacy rights of defendants appre-
hended- reasonably or unreasonably-with a large quantity of 
373. "[T] he act of intentionally distorting or over-simplifying a situation is simply part of 
what rules do all the time .... " Schauer, supra note 16, at 739. 
374. See supra text accompanying note 149. 
375. Justice Stevens recently charged that the Court "has become a loyal foot soldier in 
the Executive's fight against crime." California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 2002 (1991) 
(Stevens, J ., dissenting) (noting that the Court has upheld the constitutionality of searches 
or seizures in 27 of 30 Fourth Amendment cases involving narcotics). There is statistical 
evidence that the lower courts have also joined in the War on Drugs. The number of 
defendants charged and convicted of drug law violations increased 134% between 1980 
and 1986; the corresponding increase in convictions for non-drug offenses was 27%. Bu. 
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: DRUG l..Aw VIOLATORS, 1980-86, at 1 (1988). 
See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment 
(As Illustrated l7y the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1986) (arguing that courts 
are turning their backs on fundamental Fourth Amendment principles to aid the War on 
Drugs); Peter A. Winn, Seizures of Private Property in the War Against Drugs: What Process Is 
Due?, 41 Sw. LJ. 1111 (1988) (stating that "in response to the sweeping new drug forfeiture 
laws, lower courts again have begun to impose constitutional limits on the power of author-
ities to carry out forfeiture seizures"). 
If these be hard times in which we live, it may be wise to realize that the times often 
appear uniquely difficult to those who live in them. Some 300 years ago Lord Hale "au-
thorized search warrants on the ground of 'necessity especially in these times, where felo-
nies and robberies are so frequent.'" l..ANDYNSKI, supra note 24, at 26-27 (quoting 2 SIR 
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 149r (Philadelphia, 1st Am. ed. 
1847)). 
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drugs.376 Although, as Justice Scalia has noted, if we are skeptical of 
juries "when an obviously guilty defendant is in the dock," we are not 
consistent in our approach.377 "We let the jury decide, for example, 
whether or not a policeman fired upon a felon in unavoidable self-
defense, though that also is not a question on which the jurors are 
likely to be dispassionate."378 
There is no avoiding the inevitable tension between security against 
the government and security that depends on government efforts to 
control crime, but whatever the jury's reaction to dangerous felons or 
drug pushers, the question of privacy rights does not always arise in 
relation to dangerous crimes or unsympathetic defendants. Jurors 
who lack empathy for drug pushers arrested or searched without 
probable cause may be con1:erne4 when police peer through cracked 
window curtains into a marital bedroom,379 utilize stop-and-frisk tac-
tics as a means of harassing minorities,380 or monitor political gather-
ings. 381 In such situations the jury might choose to make a statement 
about protecting privacy and liberty in spite of the defendant's obvi-
ous factual guilt. 382 The history of jury nullification demonstrates that 
if the issue is sufficiently important, the jury will look beyond the guilt 
or innocence of the particular defendant and speak to the law 
itself.383 
In all cases, whether or not involving violent crime or illegal drugs, 
unique problems arise when jurors are called upon to apply the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Can we ask the jury to disre-
gard relevant evidence they have heard-in the parlance of trial attor-
neys, is it possible to unring a bell which has been rung? Although the 
problems are real, the operation of the exclusionary rule has driven 
far too much of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Professor George 
Thomas and Barry Pollack recently advocated reconceptualizing the 
amendment in a way that severs the question of right from remedy. 
376. See Wicker, supra note 353, at A25. 
377. Scalia, supra note 19, at 1182. 
378. Id. 
379. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court stated that allowing 
"the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use 
of contraceptives • • • [would be] repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the mar-
riage relationship." Id. at 485-86. 
380. Develcpments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1472, 1495 
n.5 (1988) ("[B]lacks are more likely than whites in similar situations to be stopped by the 
police on 'suspicion.'"). See generally Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters," Some Pre-
liminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 
243 (1991). 
381. In Donohoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971), affd, 465 F.2d 196 (4th 
Cir. 1972), the court stated that "[i]t has long been the policy in Richmond and other 
places throughout the nation to photograph persons participating in vigils, demonstra-
tions, protests and other like activities whether peaceful or otherwise." Id. at 309. 
382. See KAI.VEN 8c ZEISEL, supra note 155, at 319. 
383. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56. 
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They suggest empanelling five-member pretrial juries to rule upon the 
existence of Fourth Amendment violations and allowing the judge to 
determine the separate issue of admitting the fruits of such violations 
at trial. 384 This suggestion neatly finesses the problem of unringing 
the bell, although the cost and inefficiency of empanelling two juries 
appear to be significant drawbacks. The costs, however, might be de 
minimis in the light of Thomas and ·Pollack's suggestion to concep-
tualize the pretrial jury as functioning more like a grand jury than a 
trial jury. 385 Thus, a single panel could consider pretrial motions to 
suppress in numerous cases, and except for the presence of a jury, the 
proceedings would otherwise resemble current motions to 
suppress. 386 
If separate pretrial juries prove too costly, there is the possibility of 
utilizing parallel civil juries, who might award money damages to the 
aggrieved individual or issue sanctions against the offending govern-
ment actor.387 Finally, there is the prospect of meeting the exclusion-
ary rule head-on by attempting to "unring the bell" via instructions to 
the trial jury.388 Although it is difficult to disregard what has been 
heard, the law often requires jurors to perform just such mental gym-
nastics. All limiting instructions are based on the assumption that the 
jury, at least to some extent, is able and willing to utilize evidence for a 
limited purpose. In addition, there is a very real difference between 
asking the jury to disregard evidence that the judge determines to be 
inadmissible and inviting the jury to disregard what they themselves 
have found to be improper.389 The Massachusetts approach to deter-
mining the voluntariness of confessions rests on the assumption that 
juries will disregard confessions that they deem to be involuntary. 39o 
However one resolves the operation of (and in fact the continued 
existence of) the exclusionary rule, the remedy for Fourth Amend-
ment violations and the jury's function in applying the remedy should 
be kept distinct from the jury's role in defining reasonable search-and-
384. Thomas & Pollack, supra note 4, at 182-83. 
385. Id. at 150. 
386. Id. 
387. See Evans v. Detlefsen, 857 F.2d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that in an action 
for civil rights violations, the jury decides whether a police officer had probable cause to 
arrest the defendant). But see James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the 
Exclusionary Rule and/ts Alternatives, 2]. LEGAL STUD. 243, 269-75 (1973) (finding that juries 
are reluctant to award money damages in civil rights actions based on illegal search and 
seizure). 
388. For example the judge would state the following: Members of the jury, you may 
consider the evidence produced by the search only if you determine that the search was 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. If you find the search to be 
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, you must disregard all evi-
dence produced by the search. 
389. I have no empirical evidence to support this observation but I am not convinced 
that there is much empirical evidence to support the assumption that juries generally ig-
nore limiting instructions and consider inadmissible as well as admissible evidence. There 
are studies which suggest that in the proper setting a jury will endeavor to disregard inad-
missible evidence. See Stanley Sue et al., Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of 
Simulated jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3]. APPLIED Soc. PsvcHOL 345 (1973) (finding that 
inadmissible but introduced evidence influenced the verdict when there already was strong 
evidence against the defendant, but not when evidence was weak). 
390. See supra text accompanying note 325. 
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seizure practices in· our society. The important consideration is to in-
volve society-we the people-in the process for determining Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness. 
E Summary of the Model 
My proposed multi-tiered structure for Fourth Amendment deci-
sionmaking creates an unfamiliar-some would say radical-but polit-
ically prudent division of authority and responsibility. The courts and 
legislatures are primarily responsible for providing uniformity and 
consistency in the law; police administrative officials are primarily re-
sponsible for developing clear rules readily understood by line of-
ficers; and juries are predominantly concerned with individual justice 
based on the unique facts of each case. The proposed model is faith-
ful to a constitutional system of checks and balances that seeks to util-
ize fully the expertise and wisdom of each decisionmaker while strictly 
confining each decisionmaker to its proper sphere of power. 
Although there is a division of authority and responsibility in the 
proposed model, there is also considerable overlap, because each 
decisionmaker must ground its decision in society's accommodation 
of the fundamental conflict between individual liberty and collective 
security. This overlap is a benefit, not a drawback, 391 to the model, 
because it accounts for the competing claims of judge, juror, adminis-
trator, and legislator and affords an opportunity for institutional inter-
action between these decisionmakers.392 Perhaps the best defense for 
jury review of search-and-seizure practices is that the process of delib-
eration and the presence of more than a single viewpoint forces criti-
cal reexamination of current norms and practices. By candidly 
addressing the competing interests at stake, judge, jury, legislator, and 
administrator can interact in a meaningful dialogue about the weight 
to be attached to those interests. 
391. One possible drawback to the model is a supposed tendency of trial judges to "pass 
the buck" to the jury on close questions. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In 
theory, my proposal does not permit the judge to abdicate his responsibility to make an 
independent determination of the reasonableness of a search. In practice, trial judges 
being human, there may be a temptation to let the jury decide close questions. Given the 
present uncertainty of Fourth Amendment law, however, a trial judge who is inclined to 
avoid a difficult decision might well pass the buck to the appellate courts. There is a famil-
iar maxim which encourages trial judges to resolve questionable facts in favor of the de-
fendant and resolve close questions of law in favor of the government, because the 
defendant can have the legal ruling reviewed on appeal. In short, a judge inclined to 
assume responsibility is not likely to defer to the jury, and a trialjudge inclined to rule in 
favor of the government in order to have the jury decide the issue is the same judge who 
might rule in favor of the government in order to have the appellate court review the issue. 
392. See generally Paul Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM . .ANnmoPOLO-
Gisr 33 (spec. ed. 1965) (anthropologist Bohannan refers to the relationship of societal 
and legal morality, and the interaction of courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and 
citizens, as a process of "double institutionalization"). 
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The specific mode of interaction between the various Fourth 
Amendment decisionmakers might be structural, systematic, and ho-
listic. For example, each jury could be informed of the relevant ad-
ministrative regulations, statutes, and court decisions governing 
similar search-and-seizure cases. 393 Such information would not limit 
the jury's final authority in the particular case394 but might help guide 
its discretion by acquainting the jury with the general principles and 
rules selected by the other decisionmakers who have considered fun-
damental questions of liberty and order in society.395 In tum, police 
administrators would receive more meaningful guidance from court 
decisions and statutes that identify categories of settled law where uni-
form rules normally apply. In unsettled areas requiring the exercise 
of sound discretion, the police would profit from an awareness that 
juries consistently approve or disapprove of certain types of searches 
because such information allows the police to adjust their regulations 
and actual practices to gain jury approval.396 Finally, the interaction 
between decisionmakers would benefit the Supreme Court because 
393. In earlier times, the judiciary was less avaricious in its insistence that only judges 
could interpret the law. When the four trial judges in the Trial of the Seuen Bishops, 12 
Howell's State Trials 183, disagreed among themselves, the jury on retiring requested and 
was permitted by the court to take with them the statute book, the information, the peti-
tion of the bishops, and the declaration of the King. The sparf dissent referred to the Trial 
of the Seuen Bishops as "one of the most important in English history, deeply affecting the 
liberties of the people." Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 125 (1895) (Gray & Shiras,.IJ., 
dissenting). The Sparjdissent also noted thatjustice Chase, sitting in the Circuit Court of 
the United States for the District of Pennsylvania, welcomed trial counsel's quotations from 
English law books: "They may, any of them, be read to the jury, and the decisions there-
upon-not as authorities whereby we are bound, but as the opinions and decisions of men 
of great legal learning and ability." Id. at 161-62 (quoting Chase,].). 
In Maryland, which has retained the historic practice of allowing the jury to determine 
substantive criminal law, see supra note 117, the courts have permitted liberal use of materi-
als for enlightenment of the jury. See Dillon v. State, 357 A.2d 360, 367-68 (Md. 1976) 
(reading to the jury the legislative preamble to a criminal statute); Brown v. State, 159 A.2d 
844, 850 (Md. 1960) (reading to the jury opinions of the appellate court);Jackson v. State, 
26 A.2d 815, 819 (Md. 1942) (reading to the jury excerpts from legal textbooks). 
Even when barred from formally addressing the legality of a search or seizure, a jury is 
sometimes called upon to address Fourth Amendment law that relates, at least tangentially, 
to the merits of the case. In United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 1993), the 
defense sought to impeach the arresting police officers by establishing that they concocted 
a false account of the circumstances surrounding the arrest. Although the defense was 
denied its request to call a witness expert in Fourth Amendment law, the defense was 
permitted to cross-examine the officers on their justification for the arrest and "to educate 
the jury on search and seizure law." Id. at 732. 
If educating the jury on the complexities of search and seizure law is too burdensome, 
perhaps the "trial judge could simply read the text of the Fourth Amendment to the jury 
and ask them a few questions: Did the police seize the suspect? If so, did the police have 
sufficient cause to make the seizure reasonable? If a search ensued, was it reasonable?" 
Thomas & Pollack, supra note 4, at 185. 
394. "To assist them in the decision of the facts, Gurors] hear the testimony of witnesses; 
but they are not bound to believe the testimony. To assist them in the decision of the law, 
they receive the instructions of the judge; but they are not obliged to follow his instruc-
tions." sparf, 156 U.S. at 171 (Gray & Shiras,.IJ., dissenting). 
395. "The instructions of the court in matters of law may safely guide the consciences of 
the jury, unless they know them to be wrong." Id. at 145 (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Knapp, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 477, 496 (1830)). 
396. When juries consistently refuse to convict for certain substantive offenses, prosecu-
tors and police often abandon efforts to enforce such laws. See KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 
155, at 310. If juries consistently were to disapprove of certain types of searches and 
seizures, the police would have to aqjust their practices in order to gain jury approval. 
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the existence of specific administrative regulations frees the Court 
from the highly criticized practice of writing detailed law enforcement 
manuals for police.397 The Court would also benefit, as it has in the 
death penalty cases,398 from some systematic accounting of juries' de-
terminations of reasonable searches. Should juries decide uniformly 
regarding a type of search-for example, spuming all wiretap evi-
dence-the juries would indicate thereby a prevailing consensus. 
The interaction between the proposed decisionmakers builds upon 
our Founding Fathers' understanding that legal tribunals foster the 
political education of citizenjurors.399 Tocqueville regarded the 
American jury as 
a gratuitous public school, ever open, in which every juror learns his 
rights, enters into daily communication with the most learned and 
enlightened members of the upper classes, and becomes practically 
acquainted with the laws .... I look upon [the jury] as one of the 
most efficacious means for the education of the people which soci-
ety can employ.400 
With all respect to Tocqueville, perhaps the correct metaphor is not 
that of teacher and pupil but a less hierarchical dialogue between 
397. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (in determining a citizen's expec-
tation of privacy against aerial surveillance, the Court relied on FAA guidelines governing 
navigable airspace). In dealing with searches or inspections pursuant to administrative 
regulations, the "touchstone of fourth amendment reasonableness .•. [becomes] the ab-
sence of discretion in individual officers to 'pick and choose' occasions and suspects." 
Bradley, supra note 245, at 869. Deference to rational police procedures is the Court's 
preferred mode of constitutional decisionmaking, and "[t]he upshot is that as long as field 
operatives cannot readily harass people, superior executive officers may determine the na-
ture, timing and the scope of search and seizure activity." Id. 
In United States v. Perry, 449 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971}, the court reviewed a police 
administrative rule and stated: 
We also note that, after this case arose, the Metropolitan Police Department 
put into operation a regulation restricting on- and near-the-scene identifica-
tion confrontations to suspects arrested within 60 minutes after the alleged 
offense and in close proximity to the scene. We see in this regulation a care-
ful and commendable administrative effort to balance the freshness of such a 
confrontation against its inherent suggestiveness, and to balance both factors 
against the need to pick up the trail while fresh if the suspect is not the of-
fender. We see no need for interposing at this time any more rigid time stan-
dard by judicial declaration. 
Id. at 1037 (footnotes omitted). 
398. For a discussion of the role of the aggregate decisions of juries in death penalty 
cases, see Schwartz, supra note 132. 
399. See Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 
127. Although James Madison dismissed bills of rights as so many "parchment barriers" of 
little practical use, THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 ijames Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961), he conceded their possible educational value. "'The political truths declared in 
that solemn manner ... acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free 
Government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment, counteract 
the impulses of interest and passion.'" Marcus, supra note 9, at 118 (quoting Madison). 
400. 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 13, at 296. 
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equals "speaking in the voice of colloquy, not authority; of persua-
sion,"401 not self justification. Tocqueville's elitist view accords a priori 
privileged status to the views of the "most learned and enlightened 
members of the upper classes,"402 but the educational process need 
not be a one-way street when the pupil also can become the teacher. 
Placing search-and-seizure law within the exclusive domain of the judi-
ciary gives rise to the cynical, but accurate, observation that in "legal 
interpretation there is only one school and attendance is 
mandatory."403 Under my proposed model of Fourth Amendment 
decisionmaking, the legal dialogue over liberty and security in society 
need not be closed off ipse dixit with the latest Supreme Court deci-
sion. Instead, those "most learned and enlightened members of the 
upper classes" -i.e., judges, legislators, and administrators404-could 
benefit from a systematic accounting of juries' perceptions of reason-
able searches and seizures.405 
Conclusion 
Although I have no desire to be ruled from the grave, even by our 
distinguished founders, I also believe that respect for tradition coun-
ters the arrogance implicit in giving votes only to those who happen to 
be walking around at the time. As a constitutional republic, the Amer-
ican political system is an historically extended community in which 
relevant traditions bear importance in and for the present. As part of 
our collective past, the lived experience of we the people during the 
formative stage of our republic is particularly relevant in identifying a 
constitutional framework that orients or shapes our current situations 
and directions of change.406 Retrieving and building upon the repub-
lican tradition as the Framers knew it-or as we imagine it4°7-re-
quires a radical decentralization of law4°8 and thus suggests both 
401. See Michelman, supra note 305, at 36. 
402. Id. 
403. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 746 (1982). 
404. For Tocqueville, the metaphor of the school suggests an informed and dominating 
person instructing people who sit and listen, who absorb what is offered to them, to find 
out what the law is. CJ Cover, supra note 180, at 46-53 (reasoning that everyone is a 
lawmaker, or, to use Tocqueville's metaphor, a schoolmaster). 
405. See Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE LJ. 
455 (1984) (postulating that judges may invoke the Constitution as a rhetorical device to 
suggest a better course to us, not to coerce us into following their advice). 
406. I am indebted to Michael Perry, who suggested this view in a paper presented as 
the Allen chair Professor at the University of Richmond. 
407. "Republicanism is not a well-defined historical doctrine. As a 'tradition' in polit-
ical thought, it figures less as canon than ethos, less as blueprint than as conceptual grid, 
less as settled institutional fact than as semantic field for normative debate and constructive 
imagination." Michelman, supra note 305, at 17. 
408. Of course decentralization exists to the extent that various jurisdictions have en-
hanced privacy rights by legislation or state constitution. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 531 
P.2d 1099, 1111-15 (Cal. 1975) (interpreting the California constitutional protection 
against unreasonable searches as prohibiting the type of search approved in United States 
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)). See generally William]. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions 
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAR.v. L. REv. 489 (1977) (supporting the state 
trend of interpreting state constitutions as creating standards distinct from the federal con-
stitution); A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger 
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boldness and caution. A degree of boldness is warranted by the reali-
zation that the judiciary's balancing analysis of Fourth Amendment 
issues has become stagnant and that "if we would hav~ new knowl-
edge, we must get us a whole world of new questions."409 Prudence, 
however, suggests that if the social conditions for the republican tradi-
tion are not met, there may be little to commend a structural model 
of Fourth Amendment decisionmaking that fosters dialogue and in-
teraction among diverse decisionmakers.410 Thus, I do not contend 
that my structural model of Fourth Amendment decisionmaking is 
Court, 62 VA. L. RE.v. 873 (1976) (discussing the use of state law to create stricter standards 
and greater protections than those under federal law). 
The question is whether a single uniform federal law is required under a republican form 
of government. Justice Chase warned that jury interpretation of law " 'has a direct ten-
dency to dissolve the Union of the United States, on which, under divine Providence, our 
political safety, happiness, and prosperity depend.'" Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 71 
(1895) (quoting Chase,J.). To date, the Union has survived the Supreme Court's tolera-
tion of some variety among the states in dealing with open-ended constitutional concepts 
like obscenity, cruel and unusual punishment, and due process. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 
406 U.S. 404 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (upholding state-court interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment as not requiring jury unanimity despite requirement for unanimity in 
federal courts); Schwartz, supra note 132 (examining the Supreme Court's review of vary-
ing state-law approaches to the death penalty). 
The Framers, at least the Federalists, recognized that "bills of rights were statements of 
values held in common and these differed from state to state." Marcus, supra note 9, at 
117. They feared that a "national bill of rights would consist of the lowest common denom-
inator and therefore exclude rights believed by many to be of great consequence." Id. In 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence it has been only thirty years since the Court reversed 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and allowed the states to experiment with alterna-
tives to the exclusionary rule. Jury interpretation of search-and-seizure law would return us 
to a period when uniformity in our nation was tempered by provincial concerns. See Schu-
man, supra note 240, at 608 ("[T]he modem nation-state is too large a unit in which to 
discover or nurture a sense of common norms."); see almJohn Kincaid, State Constitutions in 
the Federal System, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 12, 21 (1988) ("[T)he state consti-
tutional tradition is more democratic than its federal counterpart and more willing to as-
sume that citizens are sufficiently competent and responsible to govern themselves."). 
Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear any 
criminal appeal from circuit courts, which might frequently disagree among themselves. 
See Akhil R. Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. RE.v. 1499 
(1980). It was not until 1802 that Congress authorized the Supreme Court to decide cases 
in which there was a division of opinion between the judges of the circuit courts. Sparf, 156 
U.S. at 76. The actual trials in circuit courts were "presided over by two or even three 
judges," and if "these judges disagreed among themselves, whose instructions must the jury 
follow? If anything, the very structure of the judges' hierarchy implied a radical decentrali-
zation and nonuniformity wholly consistent with jury review." Amar, supra note 8, at 1194. 
409. SUZANNE K. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY 13 (3d ed. 195'7). 
410. Professor Tushnet describes the social base for the Framers' republicanism as 
follows: 
1994] 
Citizens had to have secure economic positions, allowing them to avoid per-
sonal domination by individuals on whom they depended, in order that they 
be able to develop public values in public life without fear of retaliation in 
their other activities. They had to have sufficient education in public matters 
and in their republican traditions to understand the virtues of the republican 
polity, in order that they be able to resist its subversion from within and with-
out. They had to have a sympathetic understanding of the life situations of 
people occupying different social positions from theirs, in order that the val-
ues they develop be fully public. 
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constitutionally mandated; I contend merely that the model's histori-
cal and systematic plausibility can survive constitutional challenge. 
We must look toward the past for the fundamental constitutional 
structure to which fidelity is to be maintained and toward the future 
for the likely shape of the world in which the constitutional frame-
work is to function. In considering what the Fourth Amendment was 
intended to mean, what it has come to mean, and what it ought to 
mean, I have forged a model that integrates desirable aspects of each 
consideration. 
Verifying what the amendment was intended to mean compels us to 
focus on the perspective of the people who fought against oppressive 
searches and seizures. Even a brief canvass of search-and-seizure prac-
tices in colonial America411 illuminates the thesis that the Framers of 
the Bill of Rights regarded juries, not judges, as the heroes of the 
Fourth Amendment's story.412 Pre-revolutionary juries did, and con-
temporary juries could once again, serve a democratic function by 
testing various policies and practices of the government against the 
community's political-moral directives. 
Although the Fourth Amendment's history begins with juries as the 
heroes of our morality tale, we must remember that this is a story with 
many threads and many heroes. The most immediate pre-revolution-
ary search-and-seizure controversy-the Writs of Assistance conflict-
demonstrates that the judiciary also can perform in a heroic fashion 
when called upon to protect the liberty of citizens.413 Fortunately, we 
need not choose between anointing juries or judges as our heroes 
when we can have the benefit of both. 
In considering what the Fourth Amendment has come to mean, I 
have been critical of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Although some of the Court's failings stem from intellectual dishon-
esty, a significant amount of the problem is unavoidable. We ask too 
much from the Justices when we expect them to be totally responsive 
to individual equity in each case and yet be consistent and principled 
in their decisions.414 Whichever side of the line a Court decision 
comes down on, the Court is rebuked for failing to account for the 
other side. If the task of determining individualized justice for each 
case can be entrusted to juries, we can hold the Court to a higher 
standard of consistency and integrity when formulating the more gen-
eral constitutional directives that govern searches and seizures. As co-
lonial Americans did, we can benefit from the luxury of having two 
heroes by asking each of them to perform a different task-neither 
task being greater or lesser than the other but tasks which must be 
separated to free a single decisionmaker from the insoluble dilemma 
of mediating between a general standard and the particular case. 
Tushnet, supra note 153, at 1542-43; cf. Michelman, supra note 305, at 74-75 (obseiving that 
the civic-republican tradition maintains a stubborn hold in the constitutional imagination 
despite its obvious impracticality in modern America). 
411. See supra notes 23-92 and accompanying text. 
412. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
413. See supra note 112. 
414. See supra notes 259-73 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, in considering what the amendment ought to mean, we 
must afford legislators and administrators an opportunity to play their 
role in Fourth Amendment decisionmaking. Historically, legislators 
and administrators have been minor players in search-and-seizure ju-
risprudence, but they have the potential to be the greatest heroes of 
the Fourth Amendment's morality tale because they are best situated 
to protect the people by regulating and controlling law enforcement 
officials-the actors who most directly impact on citizens' Fourth 
Amendment interests. Should legislators or administrators fail to live 
up to their potential, they can be educated, prodded, or removed 
from office by the people. 
By integratingjuries,judges, legislators, and administrators into the 
Fourth Amendment's decisionmaking structure, we stimulate the 
ideal of participatory political decisionmaking under our republican 
form of government. In the continuing struggle between individual 
autonomy and collective security, we the people must "find a way to 
talk about an irreconcilable clash of interests that does some real jus-
tice to the claims on both sides. "415 This dialogue cannot be left to 
organs of the state because the judiciary is not us; the legislature is not 
us; the executive is not us. By putting the people back into the Fourth 
Amendment via their participation in jury determination of search-
and-seizure law, we empower the people as an important force of so-
cial definition and cohesion. 
A Proposed Ending to the Fab'le . 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence remains a fable without an end-
ing because no single school of interpretation has been capable of 
total victory. Perhaps the people will acknowledge that this is as it 
should be in a constitutional democracy where neither individual au-
tonomy nor collective security may utterly dominate the other: "chaos 
and tyranny are equally to be avoided."416 Rather than despair in 
their failure to find a single hero who could conclude the fable with a 
singular right answer, the people may compromise on an imperfect 
but multi-faceted structure for resolving the inherent conflict between 
individual liberty and collective security. The people may or may 
not live happily ever after under this compromise, but they may learn 
to rejoice in the " 'instinctive apprehension among a political people 
that there is usually much to be said for both sides of a question, 
and that further knowledge may reconcile the seemingly 
incompatibles.' "417 
415. WHITE, supra note 15, at 195. 
416. John M. Junker, The Structure bf the Fourth Amendment: The Sc<>jle of the Protection, 79 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1183 (1989). 
417. Fuller, supra note 181, at 391 (quoting SIR WILLIAM DAMPIER, A HISTORY OF ScraNCE 
214 (1930)). 
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